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SUMMARY OF THE THESIS 
The thesis undertakes an analysis of the modelling methods 
used in the Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) developed by 
Peter Checkland and Brian Wilson. The analysis is undertaken 
using formal logic and work drawn from modern Anglo-American 
analytical philosophy especially work in the area of 
philosophical logic, the theory of meaning, epistemology and 
the philosophy of science. 
The ability of SSM models to represent causation is found to 
be deficient and improved modelling techniques suitable for 
cause and effect analysis are developed. The notional status 
of SSM models is explained in terms of Wittgenstein's 
language game theory. Modal predicate logic is used to solve 
the problem of mapping notional models on to the real world. 
The thesis presents a method for extending SSM modelling in 
to a system for the design of a knowledge based system. This 
six stage method comprises: systems analysis, using SSM 
models; language creation, using logico-linguistic models; 
knowledge elicitation, using empirical models; knowledge 
representation, using modal predicate logic; codification, 
using Prolog; and verification using a type of non-monotonic 
logic. The resulting system is constructed in such a way 
that built in inductive hypotheses can be falsified, as in 
Karl Popper's philosophy of science, by particular facts. As 
the system can learn what is false it has some artificial 
intelligence capability. A variant of the method can be used 
for the design of other types of information system such as 




1.1 The nature of the inquiry 
1.1.1 The nature of the problem 
The normal way of presenting a thesis is to give a clear 
statement of the problem and then proceed to its solution. 
The procedure is apt when the nature of the problem is 
conceptually simple and easily recognized. When the problem 
is highly abstract and conceptually complex this procedure 
is not possible. With conceptually complex problems 
demonstrating that there is a problem often involves 
considerable work, and a clear statement of the problem yet 
more work. In analytical philosophy, which is concerned with 
conceptually complex problems, the greater part of an 
academic paper will usually be devoted to giving a clear 
statement of the problem. When this is done the solution is 
often fairly simple. 
The thesis will identify a number of minor logical problems 
that can be found in the modelling techniques used in SSM 
(Soft Systems Methodology). Once a problem has been 
identified, recommendations will be made as to how the SSM 
models can be developed in order to overcome the problem. 
Solutions will be found by using more powerful logic which 
results in more powerful models. More powerful models open 
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up a range of applications, such as cause and effect 
analysis, and knowledge elicitation, not found in 
traditional SSM. 
Underlying the minor logical problems is a fundamental 
problem. This is a problem not just for SSM but for all 
methods of systems analysis that can be used for information 
system design. A precise statement of this problem will 
require the use of modal logic and modal logic will provide 
its solution. The greater part of the thesis will be 
concerned with demonstrating that modal logic is relevant to 
information system design. Thus the nature of the problem 
will not be made absolutely clear until the latter stages of 
the thesis. However, a preliminary statement of the problem 
can be given in order to orientate the reader. 
The fundamental problem is the problem of real world 
mapping, and this is the problem of how something that 
people have made up can tell us anything about things that 
have not been made up. It is a well recognized problem in 
mathematics. It was expressed rather nicely in a recent book 
review: 
One of the great mysteries of existence is the way in 
which mathematics -a human mental construct - captures 
aspects of reality. Stewart (p. 27,1993). 
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Real world mapping is a problem that will arise in the 
design of any computerized information system. It will be a 
problem for all information systems be they for business, 
administration or science. As hardware constraints on, 
computer systems diminish, it is a problem that will rise to 
the surface. However, this fact is not generally recognized 
and the vast majority of people who work in this area are 
unaware of the problem. This is just as true of academics as 
it is of practitioners. 
One of the main objectives of the thesis will be to show 
that real world mapping is a problem for information system 
designers. However, a considerable amount of logical scene 
setting will be required before the problem can be presented 
in a tractable form. Once this is done a theoretical 
solution is presented and this in turn suggests a direction 
in which a practical solution might be found. The thesis 
expounds a theory of information system design and puts 
forward the outline of a practical method of information 
system design simultaneously. 
The problem could have been addressed solely at the level of 
high level theory in which case the thesis would be a work 
of pure analytical philosophy. However, the production of 
purely abstract theory has not been the motivating factor 
behind this work. The author believes that analytical 
philosophy can have very practical consequences and a second 
objective of the thesis is to give a demonstration of this 
fact. 
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A third objective is to present the theoretical and 
practical solutions in a way that can be easily understood 
by people working in the area of information system design. 
The main agenda will be to prove the point, a second agenda 
is to persuade professionals to use the ideas and adopt the 
proposed method in their work. It is for this reason that 
the arguments will center around a discussion of SSM. Unlike 
other methodologies used in information system design, SSM 
comes close to surfacing the problem of real world mapping. 
Also the core components of SSM can be developed to provide 
the logical requirements needed for a solution of the real 
world mapping problem. 
In the next seven sections, sections 1.1.2 - 1.1.8, it will 
be explained how the thesis relates to the work that has 
already been undertaken in SSM and in information system 
design. It is contended that SSM is best pictured as a 
branching tree-like structure rather than something that 
occupies a pigeon hole. Given this the direction of the 
thesis can be plotted against the other branches of SSM. 
Problems that are now being encountered with traditional 
information system design methodologies suggest that it is 
worthwhile to look at radically different possibilities. SSM 
is radically different. However, neither Checkland nor 
Wilson, who were mainly responsible for the development of 
SSM, have capitalized on this difference in the context of 
information system design. This is not surprising as 
traditional information systems solutions are not capable of 
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representing the unusual status of the SSM models. The full 
representation of the sSM models requires a new solution, 
this can be found by designing a system of the knowledge 
based type. 
1.1.2 The nature of SSM 
Any brief description of SSM will inevitably be both 
inadequate and contentious. An account of SSM must contend 
with a variety of authors, a variety of problems and a 
variety of results. Checkland and Wilson will be taken as 
the authorities on SSM in this thesis and it is their models 
that will be analyzed. However, it needs to be said that the 
applications emphasized by some authors are quite different 
from those emphasized by others. 
At one extreme we have the work of Davis (Davis & Ledington, 
1991) in which SSM is used as a kind of organizational 
psychotherapy with the methodology providing a structure for 
an on-going and endless debate. At the other extreme we have 
Wilson (1984,1990) using SSM as a front end to SSADM with 
the SSM models providing the skeleton for detailed 
information system design. The use of techniques is 
similarly varied. In Avison & Wood-Harper (1990) and 
Patching (1990) heavy use is made of complex rich pictures 
comprising numerous icons. In Wilson rich pictures are not 
always used and when they are they tend to be frugal and 
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non-essential. Checkland and Scholes' five constitutive 
rules for SSM (1990, pp. 284 - 290) are broad enough to 
cover many styles of use. 
Nevertheless there is a feature which is common, and we can 
claim, fundamental to all uses of the methodology. This is 
the construction of a consensus conceptual model through an 
iterative debate driven by members of the client 
organization. A rich picture of SSM is given in figure 
SSM is seen as a tree structure in which various types of 
problem form the roots, the conceptual model building 
process forms the trunk and various developments of this 
form branches some of which further divide before leading to 
different solutions. In the figure the solutions reached by 
Checkland and by Wilson are indicated as such, the other end 
points are solutions that might be obtained using the 
methods advocated in this thesis. 
The tree analogy is a reaction against attempts to pigeon 
hole SSM as something contained in a particular area. Unlike 
cybernetics, SSM is a methodology not an area of study. SSM 
is not concerned with the study of systems but with 
development of system thinking which is part of the study of 
other things. SSM is similar to mathematics in that it is a 
way of thought that applies to many fields of study. It is 
dissimilar to chemistry which is an area of study that can 
employ many ways of thought e. g. mathematics, logic, 
systems. 
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Checkland and Scholes (1990, p. 284) have emphasized that 
SSM is a methodology rather than a method. The terms IISSWI, 
"the methodology", "the use of SSM" and the "SSM method'', 
will be used frequently in this thesis. These are not all 
interchangeable. SSM as a methodology is of a higher logical 
order to the use of SSM and the SSM method. The method 
exists in the wider context of the methodology. The 
methodology is about methods. 
1.1.3 The direction of the thesis 
It is hoped that the tree structure can be helpful to the 
reader by providing a rough guide to the direction that this 
thesis will take. The tree structure is just a guide line 
and should not be taken too literally. It is intended as a 
guide to this thesis and nothing more. It has a quite 
different status to the later figures which will be the 
subject of rigorous logical analysis. 
Figure 1 shows results, at the end of the branches, and the 
models used to achieve them. The broken lines link the 
models and methods which have been devised during the 
doctoral research. Solid lines indicate traditional SSM 
methods and show how the thesis fits in with Checkland and 
Wilson's work. The branches to the left of the trunk show 
the sort of results obtained by Checkland. These results can 
be summarized as changes of thinking on the part of the 
people in the client organization. Outcomes of this type 
14 
will only be tangentially related to this thesis. The main 
concern will be with those types of SSM project where the 
development of a rigorous logical model might lead to a 
useful outcome. Checkland's work will mainly be relevant to 
the initial model building. 
The thesis will be more closely related to the work of 
Wilson where a detailed information system design is a 
possible outcome. It will be contended that an information 
system design needs to be robust and to have logical rigor. 
The author has considerable misgivings about Wilson's work 
both in terms of the rigor of his methods and the validity 
of the solutions. It is the latter that is of greatest 
concern. 
The thesis will explore the consequences of an analysis of 
the basic SSM process from the perspective of logic, the 
theory of meaning and the theory of knowledge. Greatest 
emphasis will be given to the design of an information 
system of the knowledge based type as a possible outcome of 
an SSM project. This emphasis on knowledge based systems has 
not been the result of a plan. It has resulted from the fact 
that the research indicates that unless "information" is 
very narrowly defined, database approaches and structured 
methods have serious logical shortcomings as information 
system design methods. A method for designing a relational 
database is propounded but it seems that much of the content 
15 
of a fully developed conceptual model must be lost in this 
type of solution. 
1.1.4 Traditional ISD methodologies 
The traditional methodologies, such as SSADM and Information 
Engineering, provide tools and techniques for professional 
analysts and designers. These professionals are wholly 
responsible for the resulting system. These methodologies 
take as their stating point either unambiguous 
specifications or empirical observation. It is upon this 
basis that the rigorous tools of analysis and design are 
applied. 
Traditional methodologies are open to criticism on a number 
of grounds. The most simple is that in the environment of 
the 1990s they are failing to produce workable systems. 
There is ample empirical evidence for this. Given that this 
thesis is not an empirical work (see section 1.2) it is 
perhaps permissible, for the first and last time, to quote 
secondary sources. Jayaratna (1990) cites figures from the 
US General Accounting Office on the effectiveness of Federal 
software products; these indicate that less than 2% of 
software products were used as delivered, 3% used after 
change, 19% abandoned or reworked, 29% paid for but never 
delivered and 47% delivered but never used. Lyytinen (1988, 
p. 61) in a survey of empirical literature concerning 
information systems failures concluded that "Many reports 
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show that somewhere between one-third to half of all systems 
fail, and some researchers have reported even higher failure 
rates " 
The reason for these would also appear to be simple. SSADM 
and Information Engineering were developed as methods of 
computerization. Computerization can be defined as the 
process whereby a model is converted into a functioning 
computer system. In the case of SSADM the model has 
traditionally been an existing bureaucracy and the process 
begins with a manual systems flowchart. Information 
engineering is more subtle and uses the functional 
decomposition of existing processes as well as elements from 
the bureaucracy such as forms. Both however, are concerned 
with the representation of existing processes as their 
starting point. 
The traditional methodologies have become victims of their 
own success. In developed countries most bureaucracies have 
now been computerized and therefore the demand for 
information system design is in green field situations. The 
availability of a host of packaged programs makes design 
unnecessary for standard green field requirements such as 
order processing and stock control. If the green field 
requirement is quite new then there will be no existing 
process for the traditional methodologies to use as a 
starting point. 
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These practical problems are rooted in serious theoretical 
difficulties which will be explained in a later part of the 
thesis. For the present it is enough to note that 
while various attempts are being made to bring these 
methodologies into line with current demand, their 
shortcomings are sufficient to justify serious consideration 
of other approaches. 
1.1.5 Special status of SSM 
A casual comparison of the use of SSM for information system 
design with the standard and traditional information system 
design methodologies reveals that SSM is startlingly 
different. An obvious difference is that traditional 
methodologies are analyst driven while the core of SSM is a 
stake-holder (client, actors and owners in, and of, the 
problem) driven modelling process. 
Another major difference is that whereas traditional 
methodologies are based on some representation of the real 
world, the models in SSM are purely notional. This is quite 
clear in Checkland's writing. When Checkland talks about 
"holons" it is evident that he does not even iagard systems 
as part of the real world. 
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Choosing to think about the world as if it were a 
system can be helpful. But it is very different stance 
from arguing that the world is a system, a Position 
that pretends to knowledge that no human being can 
have. (Checkland & Scholes, p. 22). 
The negative aspect is that the increasing complexity 
of the models might lead to our slipping into thinking 
in terms of models of part of the real world, rather 
than models relevant to debate about change in the real 
world. (Checkland & Scholes, p. 41). 
Wilson also give a notional account of the SSM models: 
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that what the 
analyst is doing, in developing a HAS [Human Activity 
System conceptual] model, is not trying to describe 
what exists but is modeling a view of what exists. 
(Wilson 1984). 
The term "real world" is apt to cause some debate as it may 
be thought that it is not clear what the real world is. The 
terms "external world" and "physical world" might also be 
used but there is also debate about what these are, and the 
three terms need not be regarded as coextensive. To pursue 
these questions would take the thesis far from its course 
which is not to determine the nature of reality. The author 
of this thesis takes the term "real world" to denote the 
world that is not illusory and which is not made up. This is 
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sufficiently close to Checkland and Wilson for the purposes 
of the thesis which will be largely concerned with 
conceptual models which are made up and the physical world 
which is not made up. 
Checkland & Scholes also think that as the models are not 
descriptions of part of the real world they are not valid 
either. 
Since the model does not purport to be a description 
of part of the real world, merely a holon relevant to 
debating perceptions of the real world, adequacy or 
validity cannot be checked against the real world. 
Such models are not, in fact, "valid" or "invalid", 
only technically defensible or indefensible. 
(Checkland & Scholes, p. 41, original italics). 
The arrows in conceptual models are described as indicating 
"contingent upon" or "logically dependent upon". They are 
not intended to represent time dependencies as many people 
think. Checkland has specifically ruled this out in an 
unpublished internal discussion paper where he compared 
conceptual models with PERT networks which do indicate time 
dependencies. 
In such entities all arrows show logical dependencies; 
many of them also happen to indicate time dependencies. 
But it is the logic, not the time, which is 
fundamental. (Checkland, 1984). 
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It was remarks such as these, which indicate that the models 
have a unusual logical status, that prompted the research 
described in this thesis. It can be doubted that many SSM 
practitioners take Checkland literally here. However, if the 
word "valid" above is taken to mean factually true as 
opposed to logically true then we can take Checkland at his 
word and account for conceptual models in terms of modal 
logic. However, although modal logic can be used to explain 
what Checkland says about the models it will not explain 
what Wilson does with them. 
1.1.6 Checkland on information systems 
Checkland & Scholes claim that an information system: 
... will always have to include the attribution of 
meaning which is a uniquely human act. An information 
system, in the exact sense of the phrase, will consist 
of both data manipulation, which machines can do, and 
the transformation of data into information by the 
attribution of meaning. (Checkland & Scholes, p. 55). 
Checkland uses the formula "data plus meaning equals 
information". He does not seem to be very impressed by the 
data processing systems produced by traditional 
methodologies. Nevertheless, he would be unlikely to contend 
that the traditional methodologies are an efficient means of 
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computerization. His point is that a data manipulation 
system is not a information system. His work in this area, 
is therefore, concerned with the design of information 
systems of which a computer system may, or may not be, a 
part. 
Checkland's work is quite consistent in this area. He 
produces human activity models that are relevant to 
information problem. He also produces models of systems to 
build information systems (see Checkland, 1989). What he 
does not do is use SSM to produce a design for a computer 
system that can work within the information system, nor does 
he think this has been accomplished: 
Much work is currently underway in this area. In 
particular SSM could enrich those poverty-stricken 
stages of systems analysis and design methodologies in 
which information requirements analysis is assumed to 
be straight-forward, or organizations are naively 
documented as a set of unproblematical entities and 
functions ... (Checkland & Scholes, p. 55). 
Checkland makes two assumptions here that will be challenged 
in this thesis. One is that attribution of meaning is 
uniquely human. The second, which in CheCkland's terminology 
will follow from the first, is that computer systems can 
only manipulate data. Checkland's system of thought here 
could be understood as indicating that "meaning attribution" 
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will include real world mapping. He seems to be concerned 
about reference here. He could be interpreted as saying that 
item of data does not have reference unless a reference is 
ascribed to it by a human being. 
As reference is necessary for real world mapping, it follows 
that humans will map the data on to the real world and only 
humans can map the data onto the real world. 
There are two problems with this. One is that it relegates 
computers to an unnecessarily limited role and ignores work 
on artificial intelligence. The second is that the people 
who interface with the computer do not always critically map 
the data on to the real world. They often, as it were, take 
the computer's word for it. This produces a strange 
situation where the computer indicates that something does 
not exist, the operators believe the computer, but it is 
plain for all to see that it does exist. This problem is not 
unique to information systems involving computers nor is it 
new. Fifty years ago Franz Kafka's novels explored the 
paradoxical situation where a bureaucracy (read: 
"information system") and the behavior of the people 
involved with it did not correspond to perceivable events. 
The thesis will attempt to show that computerized 
information systems are capable of taking on more of the 
real world mapping task than Checkland and many others mi ght 
think. This opens up the possibility of computers being 
capable of meaning attribution. Of course, if human activity 
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is built into the definition of "meaning'' this will not be 
possible. However, if a decision on whether computers can 
attribute meaning is left open to something like the Turing 
test (Turing, 1950) then the system that is constructed in 
chapter 6 might be said to exhibit a rudimentary form of 
meaning attribution. 
1.1.7 Wilson on information systems 
There is a conflict between Checkland and Wilson over Ssm 
and information system design. While Checkland thinks that 
the link between SSM and detailed computer system design has 
not been accomplished, Wilson offers a step by step method 
to accomplish it. 
In the earlier sections it was argued that the present 
shortcomings of traditional methodologies warranted 
consideration of a radically different approach and that SSM 
was radically different. The first thing to note about 
Wilson's work is that his solutions are of the same type as 
those of traditional SSADM. It is, therefore, implicit in 
Wilson work that there is nothing wrong with traditional 
solutions. For Wilson the problem must be the way in which 
the solution is obtained not the type of solution itself. 
This thesis will argue that these types of solution cannot 
solve the real world mapping problem and are, therefore, 
inadequate. However, it will also be contended that the SSM 
conceptual models, if suitably developed, are capable of 
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producing a computer system design that can deal with the 
real world mapping problem. Wilson's method can be 
criticized for not taking advantage of this. 
Real world mapping is a double theoretical error in Wilson's 
work. Not only does he fail to produce a computer system 
that can deal with it, he also fails to account for it in 
the internal working of his method. He starts with a 
notional model and proceeds to produce a computer system 
that will monitor and control stock in a warehouse (Wilson, 
1984, pp. 195 - 208). It is obvious that our notions do not 
always correspond to real world facts, if they did we would 
never revise our opinions. Yet Wilson presents the consensus 
primary task model as incorrigible. It is something which 
through a series of steps (construction of information 
categories, Maltese cross and data flow diagrams) will 
inevitably produce a computer system that represents 
physical objects. 
It is easy to see how this muddies the water with regard to 
the logical status of, the conceptual models. Given that we 
end up with computer code that represents physical objects, 
and given that the code is derived from a conceptual model, 
then it would seem that the conceptual model must also 
represent physical objects. But as Wilson himself points out 
the conceptual models "is not trying to describe what exists 
but is modeling a view of what exists. " To solve this 
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dilemma requires a solution to the real world mapping 
problem, Wilson does not provide a solution nor does he even 
recognize the problem. 
It might be thought that a solution can be found on the 
fringe of SSM. The constructivists argue that everything is 
a mental construct. As everything is an idea there is no 
separate real world to map ideas against and thus no real 
world mapping problem. (Stephens & Wood (1991) argue for a 
form of constructivism and link this to SSM. Their position 
is that communication, rather than an individual's ideas, is 
ontologically formative. Thus, for them, communication 
creates things in the real world and there is, therefore, no 
need to map communications on to the real world. ) 
Powerful objections to this position will be given in a 
later section, for the present it is enough to point out 
that even if correct the constructivists would not solve 
Wilson's problem. We would still need to distinguish between 
ideas that are voluntary and those that are not. We would 
have to account for the fact that some voluntary ideas such 
as a plan for a nice day at the sea side to not always map 
onto to involuntary ideas such as the weather. 
The special logical status of the SSM conceptual models is 
inevitably lost in Wilson's method because of the limited 
logical power of the solution. Despite this Wilson's method 
may still be a useful practical guide and a considerable 
improvement on traditional methods. Although the logic does 
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not carry through into the solution the building of the 
conceptual model may still have a causal effect on the 
design. It can, causally, make the designers of traditional 
solutions more sensitive to the context in which the 
solution is intended to operate. 
1.1.8 SSM for knowledge based system design 
The thesis will describe a method whereby an SSM conceptual 
model can be developed to the point where a computer program 
can be derived. The program will be the basis of a 
computerized information system that will have learning 
capability. This informations system will be best described 
as a knowledge based system. The term "knowledge based" is 
appropriate because the system will be set up to include 
empirical knowledge and have the capability to acquire more 
empirical knowledge. It can, therefore, be distinguished 
from those expert systems which comprised only definitions 
and in which the rules are permanently fixed. It will also 
be open to data from the real world and so can be 
distinguished from closed world artificial intelligence 
systems such as chess players. 
At one level the thesis will present an outline and a 
proposal for a practical method of knowledge based system 
design. This, it is hoped, will be interesting in itself. It 
presents a powerful extension of Soft Systems Methodology. 
It is a development which will enable SSM to be used in the 
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production of intelligent computer systems, and therefore 
gives it the capacity to produce solutions which have 
hitherto been beyond the scope of the Methodology. The 
method will enable the computer system to dynamically 
incorporate the language of the users and, therefore, to 
perform operations to go beyond mere data manipulation. Such 
a computer system will be capable of being a true 
information system in Checkland's sense of the word. 
At a second level it surfaces a number of theoretical 
problems in SSM and in traditional information system 
design. These problems are identified and explained. Once 
explained a practical solution, which is theoretically 
sound, can be offered. This might be instructive to design 
practitioners whose practical problems are sometimes the 
result of theoretical difficulties that are not even 
recognized. Once theoretical gaps in Wilson's method and the 
Multiview method (Avison & Wood-Harper, 1990) have been 
identified the problem situation in which they can be 
successfully applied is more easily recognized. 
At a third level it presents one solution, there may be 
others, to the real world mapping problem. The method 
outlined at the first level can be taken as an example which 
illustrates how the real world mapping problem can be 
solved. The benefits of a computer system that can achieve 
this should be fairly obvious. It represents a general 
increase in the power of the computer system. it will stand 
to reduce error in the interface between the computer system 
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and the physical world. It will allow the computer system 11o 
respond to changes. it will enable designers to cope with 
green field situations where information requirements are 
novel. 
1.1.9 Plan of the Thesis 
These three levels of inquiry will largely be interconnected 
I 
and, therefore, they will not be dealt with sequentially in 
the substantive sections. The introductory chapter continues 
with a description of the methodological issues that bear 
upon the thesis, a comment on the literature and an 
explanation of the limitations of the study. The main 
arguments are put forward in chapters 2 through 6. Each of 
these main chapters deals with a theoretical problem, finds 
a solution that is theoretically sound and suggests a 
practical method for the implementation of that solution. 
The main chapters are self contained arguments that are of 
interest in themselves. Each section has been published in 
one form or another. Each main chapter produces conclusions 
that lead into the following main chapter. Many sections 
also produce conclusions and suggested avenues for research 
which are not followed in the remainder of the thesis. 
Returning to the tree analogy in figure 1, these are 
branches which will not be explored here. They do, however, 
give extra weight to the contention that the line of inquiry 
is useful. The final four chapters give on outline of 
potential scientific applications for the method, a 
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description of a project using the method, a account of some 
philosophical arguments that bear on the subject, and 
conclusions. 
The thesis is organized into four parts. Part I comprises 
the present introductory chapter. Part II comprises chapters 
2-7, this contains the main argument of the thesis 
presented as a continuous narrative and concluding with an 
account of an action research pro3ect. The main objectives 
of the thesis are accomplished by the end of chapter 7. Part 
III contains ancillary arguments which support some of the 
arguments made in earlier sections and explore some 
arguments in greater depth. Many of the arguments in Part 
III are inconclusive, indeed some of the philosophical 
argument have been going on for hundreds of years. Part III 
is speculative, when compared to Part II, and seeks to link 
the earl-er work to a wider debate. Part IV consists of the 
conclusions and directions for further research, this is of 
considerable importance because the wide ranging research 
program indicated in the thesis may well be of greater 
importance than the work accomplished in it. 
Chapter 2 shows how SSM conceptual models can be expressed 
in the propositional calculus. It explains that the logic of 
SSM models is not capable of representing cause and effect 
which is tacitly required in Wilson's method. It is shown 
how the models can be enhanced, by the addition of two 
logical connectives, in such a way that they become capable 
of representing causation. The benefits of doing this are 
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numerous: it enables SSM to be used for cause & effect 
diagramming; it leads to a logical, rather than a 
mathematical, account of efficiency; it shows how SSM can be 
used for automating monitor and control activities; it 
enables the models to be converted into analytic data flow 
diagrams thereby effecting a link to structured solutions in 
information system design. However, problems remain in the 
area of information system design because propositional 
logic, like structured solutions, is incapable of 
representing the notional status of the SSM models. 
Chapter 3 explains the notional status of SSM models in 
terms of Wittgenstein's language game theory. A logical 
foundation for information system design requires a theory 
of meaning. The section considers Ideational theories which 
attach meaning to the ideas in the private world of a 
conscious subject. These are contrasted with Wittgenstein's 
theory which held that language and meaning were primarily 
public and that a private, purely subjective, language was 
impossible. The iterative debate among stake-holders that 
takes place in the practice of Soft Systems Methodology 
(SSM) can be understood as a Wittgensteinian language game 
in which meaning is created not just discovered. If 
conceptual models are understood as stipulative definitions 
then they can be expressed as logically true in modal logic. 
With this the notional status of the model can be expressed 
rigorously in a formal system. 
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Chapter 4 introduces predicate logic in order to enhance the 
limited logic of chapter 2 but also to answer criticism of 
SSM put forward by Probert. A distinction is made between 
universal statement and particular statements. Three types 
of universal are identified: inductive hypotheses, value 
statements and definitions. A second line of argument is 
presented to show that SSM models are sets of definition. 
Multiview models by contrast are sets of inductive 
hypotheses. Therefore, in modal logic SSM models have the 
status of being logically true while Multiview models have 
the status of being factually true or false. As inductive 
hypotheses and definitions are inexorably tied together 
neither type of model is adequate in itself. 
Chapter 5 builds a model that combines the logically true 
elements with factually true elements. Thus merging 
-Checkland and Wilson style models with Multiview style 
models. The composite model demonstrate how real world 
mapping of a notional model can be achieved. 
Chapter 6 introduces the six stage method for knowledge 
based system design which constitutes the main deliverable 
of the thesis. The method begins with system analysis and 
proceeds through stages of language creation, knowledge 
elicitation, knowledge representation, codification and 
terminates with an in-built mechanism for verification. Each 
stage, with the exception of the last, comprises the 
development of a model. The model building process begins 
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with an SSM conceptual model which develops into a 
logico-linguistic model, then an empirical model, a modal 
predicate logic and, finally, a program written in Prolog. 
A project for problem structuring in a public relations 
company is described in chapter 7. Logico-linguistic 
modelling was used in the project up to the knowledge 
representation stage. It was found that the client did not 
have sufficient knowledge of the problem area to build a 
worthwhile knowledge based system. Instead the model was 
used to put together plans for empirical research projects 
that would increase the client's knowledge. As a 
demonstration the chapter continues by describing how a 
relational database and a knowledge based system could have 
been obtained from the model. 
The example given in chapter 6 is a rather linguistic one. 
It was mainly concerned with how a given situation should be 
described. Chapter 8 gives an example that shows more 
clearly how the method can aid in scientific discoveries. 
The foundations of formal modal logics are discussed and 
informal system of rules for modal operators is described. 
Chapter 9 discusses a number of philosophical issues that 
have arisen during the proceeding chapter. A comparison of 
logico-linguistic modelling methods with other forms of 
knowledge representation is also made. 
33 
1.2 Methodology 
1.2.1 Philosophical analysis 
Business studies is not a discipline but an area of study. A 
thesis in this area must either develop its own methodology, 
a bold undertaking which will not be attempted here, or take 
a methodological position from another discipline. It is 
normal in a business studies degree to take the methodology 
from the social sciences and in business studies concerned 
with information systems sociology is probably the favorite. 
This thesis will break with this tradition and take modern 
analytical philosophy as the parent discipline. The 
methodology will, therefore, be one of analysis from the 
perspectives of philosophical logic, the philosophy of 
language and the theory of knowledge. This can be justified 
in two ways. The first line of argument is to show that 
sociology is not an inevitable choice, the second is to show 
that philosophy is appropriate. 
Choosing to take the methodology for the study of business 
information systems from sociology is fraught with 
difficulty because sociology has, and always has had, 
serious methodological problems of its own. It is difficult 
to think of another discipline where the practitioners are 
in such wide disagreement over what their subject is about. 
The methodological stances of Weberians, Durkhiemians and 
Marxists are fundamentally apposed and incompatible. If 
sociology is taken as the parent discipline then we will 
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have Weberian business information studies, Durkhiemian 
business information studies and Marxist business 
information studies. Anyone using one of these methodologies 
would have to justify the choice and this justification 
would require an appeal to the philosophy of science. This 
is not to say that using a methodology drawn from sociology 
would be misconceived, it is to say that drawing a 
methodology from sociology is not as simplistic as many 
might believe. 
Advocates of Human Centered Design argue that the 
fulfillment of human needs must be taken as the main 
objective of computerized information systems. This would 
indicate that sociological findings are relevant to system 
design but it does not indicate that sociology should 
provide the methodology for system design. 
The choice of social science methodologies as the foundation 
of information system design is by no means universal. Some 
argue that computer systems are essentially about 
communication and language. In some areas of cognitive 
science and artificial intelligence linguistics provides the 
major methodological input. Cybernetics takes most of its 
methodology from biology. 
An argument can be made for the appropriateness of 
philosophy by considering the nature of current work in 
information systems. Judging by the papers that appear in 
British information system journals the subject is becoming 
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increasingly philosophical. However, few of the writers on 
the philosophical aspects of information system design have 
any formal training in philosophy. 
It is pertinent to note that the line of inquiry of which 
this thesis is a product began with a MSc dissertation about 
SSM for the Department of Systems and Information Management 
at Lancaster University. The author was encouraged in this 
work by the late Ronald Anderton, then Head of Department, 
who thought that the work would be interesting because 
nobody trained in philosophy had ever undertaken an analysis 
of SSM. Considering the range of main stream philosophical 
ideas discussed in Checkland's "Systems thinking, systems 
practice"(1981), this was somewhat surprising. It would 
appear that the use of analytical philosophy as a 
methodology in this area of study is not only appropriate 
but long overdue. 
It should be made absolutely clear at this point that the 
methodology will be that of Anglo-American analytical 
philosophy. This has very little common ground with Western 
philosophers of the Continental School. In the British 
information system journals most discussions of philosophy 
refer to philosophers of the Continental School. This can be 
explained by the fact that Continental philosophers are 
popular in the social sciences and that writers on 
information systems have become familiar with these 
philosophers though the social science literature. This 
thesis is written in the belief that analytical philosophy 
has far greater relevance to information systems than 
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Continental philosophy. However, there will IDe nc-ý atr-emý: r- 'Eo 
argue this point. The thesis will attempt to show rather 
than say. That is, the thesis will use the tools and 
techniques of analytical philosophy and produce results, 
such as a program in Prolog, that could not have been 
produced using continental methods. 
1.2.2 Systems as its own methodology 
It could be argued, has Checkland has done (1981), that 
Systems Studies is, itself, an emerging discipline. If this 
is correct then Systems could be taken as the methodology 
for the thesis, However, as the thesis will be concerned 
with systems methodologies this would be circular. One would 
be using systems ideas as a methodology to critically 
examine systems ideas. 
Unfortunately the use of philosophy as a critical tool to 
does not entirely avoid this problem. If Checkland is 
correct "Systems" is a school of philosophy -a school 
committed to certain philosophical positions such as the 
existence of emergent properties. Given this the circularity 
returns. We will be using philosophy as a methodology to 
critically examine philosophy. As philosophy is a study of 
the highest logical order (it takes nothing as a given while 
all other disciplines must take as given a theory of 
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knowledge and a theory of truth) there is no eas-i wa-i ýio 
avoid the problem and any attempt at a solution would take 
us well beyond the scope of the present work. 
What happens in practice is that one area of philosophy -s 
used to critically examine another. Thus the philosophy of 
language might be used to examine a theory of knowledge, and 
the theory of knowledge might be used to examine a theory of 
meaning. This is the solution that will be adopted here. 
1.2.3 Limits of current systems thinking 
Checkland (1981) and Churchman (1971) have produced works 
which are relevant to information system design and have a 
high philosophical content. Both are concerned mainly with 
epistemology - the theory of knowledge. Both attempt to give 
an account of knowledge and having done so proceed to give 
an account of the nature of the world. When they discuss the 
philosophy of science, ontology or metaphysics their 
arguments are drawn from their epistemology. However, 
neither offer anything particularly new in this area. 
Churchman's book is treated with respect and something like 
reverence in systems circles, but for a philosopher it is a 
rather pedestrian history of epistemology. The book has not 
occasioned much interest in philosophical circles. While it 
provides a useful function in drawing attention to the 
importance of epistemology for an information systems 
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audience, it does not solve, or even attempt to soj-', -: ý, 'Ene 
major problems in information system design. Although 
Checkland is not a professional philosopher his work is, as 
this thesis will seek to show, of considerable ph1losoi.:, hic-il 
interest. Perhaps more than that of Churchman who is a 
professional philosopher. However, the significance of 
Checkland's method lies not in epistemology but in the 
philosophy of language. Although epistemology will 
inevitably be bound up in the this thesis the main tools of 
analysis will be the philosophy of language, the theory of 
meaning, philosophical logic and modal logic. The lines of 
demarcation now need to be drawn. 
The traditional analysis of knowledge is that it is true, 
justified belief. Some attribute this analysis to Plato 
(Gettier, 1967) and although some philosophers think that 
this analysis is in need of considerable qualification, it 
will be sufficient to explain the relationships between 
philosophical logic, epistemology and the philosophy of 
language. The following is a very simplistic explanation. 
Theories of truth are a concern of philosophical logic. 
Historically there have been two main theories. The 
correspondence theory of truth states that a proposition is 
true if it corresponds to a fact. The coherence theory of 
truth states that a proposition is true if it coheres with 
other propositions that are true. 
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Justification is a concern of epistemology. *Histori, --: a 
there have been two main theories. Rationalists, such as 
Descartes and Spinoza, state that a beliefs are justifle, d by 
the understanding of the logical connection between them, 
rationalists hold that knowledge must be a priori. 
Empiricist hold that all knowledge comes from experience and 
that logical connections are 3ust tautologies. 
Belief is a concern of the philosophy of mind and the 
philosophy of language. Built into the notion of belief is 
assent to a proposition and therefore an understanding of 
what it means. The philosophy of language is largely a 
twentieth century development and there are no clear cut 
historical positions. However, there is a divide about how 
to deal with meaning. Semantic theories seek to explain the 
meaning of a proposition in terms of its truth conditions, 
for them the theory of meaning loops back to philosophical 
logic. Other theories, notably that of the later 
Wittgenstein, seek to explain truth in terms of meaning. 
A word of warning about terminology is appropriate here. A 
person familiar with Checkland's work but not familiar with 
philosophy will be confused by the use of the term 
"epistemology" here just as a philosopher is apt to be 
confused by Checkland's use of the term. Checkland uses the 
term "an epistemology" to denote a framework in which 
something can be learned rather than as a term to denote 
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high level theory about what is and is not a valid ýicco--7nt 
of knowledge. 
1.2.4 Misconceptions about logic 
Logic is an integral part of philosophy and will form a 
major part of the arguments that follow. The remainder of 
this methodology section will try to explain what it is (in 
information systems writings one finds the most peculiar 
ideas about it). We can start with some general definitions: 
"Science of reasoning, proof, thinking or inference" Concise 
Oxford Dictionary; "the study of Inference" Fontana 
Dictionary of Modern Thought; "In its broadest sense logic 
is the study of the structure and principles of reasoning or 
of sound argument. " Dictionary of Philosophy (Flew, 1979). 
Logic is about inference or reasoning. The adjective 
"logical" refers either to the science or to an inference 
that is valid in logic. There is, however, a slight 
equivocation in the use of the word "logical" even in the 
rigorous world of philosophy. Normally we will say that an 
argument is logical if it is deductively valid, but logic 
textbooks often contain sections on induction or the logic 
of commands. However, David Hume's notorious problem of 
induction is based on the contention that induction is not 
deductively valid. Nor is the logic of commands deductively 
valid (see Probert, 1991,1992, for a recent discussion). In 
one of the later substantive section when modal logic is 
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introduced the term "logically true" will be used to 
describe definitions, but definitions are not the result o-,: 
valid deductions. To determine the eHact range of the term 
''logic" requires recourse to theories of truth and theories 
of meaning and these theories are all contentious. 
In spite of this there is a large amount of agreement about 
logic in academic philosophy and mathematics. It is 
generally agreed that the term "logical" applies to 
propositions, statements or arguments made up of 
propositions or statements. The term "logical" never refers 
to real world events themselves, it can however, refer to 
statements about real world events. This is in contrast to 
ordinary usage where the term "logical" is equated with 
"reasonable" or "rational" and as such can be used to 
describe real world behaviour directly. 
This unfortunate difference between technical and popular 
usage can leads some people into serious error. It leads 
some people to think that rules of logic are intended to be 
laws of nature. It leads some people to confuse logical 
connectives with causal relations. This can be illustrated 
with a syllogism: 
All men at the draw won a lottery prize 
Socrates was a man at the draw 
Therefore: 
Socrates won a lottery prize 
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The conclusion foijows from the premises by tne rulý: --, s of 
Modus Ponens. The conclusion will be true if the premises 
are true. More importantly it will be true that the 
conclusion follows from the premises even if the premises 
are false. Deductive logic alone cannot generate facts about 
the physical world. Some people take the example to be a 
causal account, they think that it is trying to say that 
being a man at the draw caused Socrates to win. But this is 
not so, it could be just coincidence that all the men won; 
this would not make any difference to the logic. 
A second misunderstanding about logic is more complex. It 
has been said by commentators on earlier versions of this 
work that logic is only about formal systems. This is not 
true. Although logic can be used to describe formal system, 
such as mathematics, it can also be used to describe a 
casual conversation in a pub. 
Yet another view, which is not endorsed in this thesis, is 
that logic is only a formal system and is quite distinct 
from meaning. On this account meaning is a matter of 
semantics, logic is a matter of syntactics, syntactics is 
only concerned with formal systems and, therefore, logic 
does not play a part in determining meaning. 
The system that will be used here is as follows: Meaning 
comprises sense and reference. Reference includes the 
connection between terms and things in the real world. 
Reference is determined by semantics. Sense is about the 
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connection between terms and other terms. -Ihe con. -ec-. ion 
between terms and other terms is governed b. y the rules o-, 
Wittgensteinian language game. Syntact1cs is concerned ý. ýiitt-, 
rules. Sense can be determined by reference i. e. 
semantically, or by rules i. e. syntactically. Any language 
formal or otherwise is bound by rules. Therefore, syntac-cics 
can play a part in determining meaning in any language. 
The thesis does not accept the idea that the semantics of a 
set of terms must be established before a syntactic system 
can be devised. That reference must be established before 
sense. The argument that will be put forward here is that 
the syntactics of a set of terms must be established before 
the semantics. That sense must be established before 
reference. 
A third misconception about logic comes about through 
deviant usage in computer science. Data flow diagrams are 
described as logical. They are however, nothing more than an 
abstraction from manual systems flow charts. They are like 
the standard London Underground map which is an abstraction 
of a scale map of the Underground. There is nothing logical 
about them, though they could be a stage on the route to 
logic. The term "logical" in this context seems to mean 
nothing more than "not physical". This deviant usage like 
many others in computer science, for example "relation" in 
relational data base design, is very unfortunate. This is 
because some diagrams in artificial intelligence, such as 
Sowa. 's conceptual graphs, are intended to be logical in the 
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true sense of the word. It would not be I-ar fr--m the 
to say that they are pictorial versions of the predicate 
calculus (they are not always e. ýactly coe.,, tensive, but this 
is a complez. point that will be dealt with later). 
. 
Discussions of logical models represented by diagrams will 
be a major part of the substantive sections below. It must 
be understood that "logical" means a lot more than "not 
physical". The fact that something is not physical does not 
mean that it is logical. 
1.3 Limitations of the Study 
1.3.1 Philosophical points of controversy 
Although the substantive sections will contain a good deal 
of high level theory and will seek to establish a number of 
theoretical points, the objectives here are not solely 
confined to theory. There will be an attempt to show how the 
theory can lead to a practical method for knowledge based 
system design. This means that a lot of ground will have to 
be covered in a short space. In philosophy there are few if 
any facts or theories that are not contentious. It will not 
be possible to discuss all the theories that bear upon 
knowledge based system design. Philosophical issues will be 
raised only when they have immediate bearing upon the 
development of the argument. There will be an attempt to 
base the arguments on respectable philosophical positions. 
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That is positions that although they do not necessarily 
command general assent, are not generally considered to h: i-: --- 
been discredited. 
These days argumentative PhD theses tend to be written 
defensively. The authors take a minor point and try to 
establish it incontrovertibly. This will not be the tactic 
here. The arguments themselves will, hopefully, been seen to 
be valid however the premises upon which they rest will 
inevitably be contentious and open to dispute. 
1.3.2 Formal problems in information systems 
Logic and theories of meaning have application in 
information systems design in connection with their formal 
properties such as completeness, decidability and 
validation. These are implementation problems and will not 
be the main area of concern in the thesis. The main area of 
analysis will be in systems analysis and knowledge 
elicitation. The logic employed does bear upon the formal 
properties involved in implementation and the thesis will 
show how this logic carries through into a program. However, 
a full discussion of all the formal issues that bear upon 
computerized information system design will be beyond the 
scope of the thesis. 
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1.3.3 Results 
The practical guidelines for the proposed method for 
knowledge based system design go as far as the theory wil' 
usefully take it. Stake-holder constructed Logico-linguistic 
conceptual models are an essential tool in the proposed 
method. These are far more complex than the SSM conceptual 
models. The theory indicates that they are necessary but 
provides no indication of how their construction might be 
managed. The assumption is that they can be constructed in 
more or less the same circumstances as those in which 
traditional SSM models are constructed. However, the way to 
find out would be by empirical research. Empirical research 
in this area would be best carried out in the context of 
action research, as has been argued by SSM advocates. Such 
research projects are very time consuming and beyond the 
scope of the thesis. This work would be a development and 
implementation stage that would follow the theoretical work 
undertaken here. 
The case study at the end of the thesis does give some 
empirical support to the contention that the method is a 
practical possibility. However, this empirical support is 
minimal. It only shows that Logico-linguistic models can be 
understood and constructed by some businessmen that have no 
training in logic, philosophy or information systems. The 
main reason for the case study is to provide a more natural 
example of how the method might work. Conceptual models and 
Logico-linguistic models are intended to be constructed by 
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people in the client organization. The e:, -amples 1: -., ý: he 
substantive sections are made up. This is rather a strain. 
SSM conceptual models are not models of the real world. A 
conceptual model made up as an example is not a real 
conceptual model but a hypothetical example of what a group 
of stakeholders might have come up with if they had really 
been there to build the model. It is thus, two stages 
removed from reality. 
It was found in presentations that these hypothetical 
examples often occasioned dispute. In one case a 
hypothetical conceptual model of an order processing system 
was vehemently attacked because "order processing systems 
are not like that". This objection was irrelevant as a 
conceptual model of an order processing system is not 
intended to represent any existing order processing system. 
A more pertinent objection would have been "a group of 
people involved in order processing would never build a 
conceptual model like that". This might have been true, but 
does not matter as the point of the hypothetical model was 
not to show what models stake-holders would actually build 
but to illustrate the logic involved in the building 
process. Logical points are best illustrated in very simple 
models, but very simple models are rarely credible examples 
of what stake-holders might build. 
The thesis puts forward a method and a theoretical 
justification of the method. It is, therefore, distinctive 
in the field. Wilson and Avison & Wood-Harper put forward 
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methods but little in the way of 3ustification of : he 
methods in terms of the theories knowledge and meaning. 
Checkland in the context information systems puts forward a 
lot of theory but little on method. Although Checkland's 
Systems Thinking, Systems Practice (1981) might provide, --i 
general justification for Wilson's line of approach, the 
techniques such as information categories and the Maltese 
cross have no substantial theory behind them. In the 
following substantive sections each move in the method is 
given a theoretical justification. 
1.4 The literature 
It is conventional in a thesis in Business Studies to 
include a literature review as part of the introductory 
sections. The reason for this is because Business Studies 
tends to follow the methodology of the sciences especially 
social science. The method is different in philosophy as it 
is concerned with developing arguments rather than 
evaluating evidence. In a philosophy essay relevant 
literature is not assigned to a separate section but is 
discussed throughout the essay as it becomes relevant to the 
developing argument. As this thesis will follow the 
methodology of philosophy there will not be a separate 
literature review. 
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There are also practical reasons for omitting a secarate 
literature review. If the review was given a narrow doýý, ýiin 
then it would be largely limited to a review of the author's 
own work. The logical analysis of soft systems modelling is 
an unprecedented endeavour. The first paper on the subject 
was the author's Causation and Soft Systems Models (see 
declaration above). Since the publication of that paper 
there have been other authors on the subject, Probert (1991, 
1993) and Merali (1993), and their work has been the result 
of the author first drawing attention to the subject. 
If the review was given a wide domain and concerned itself 
with logic and information systems it would be so large that 
a bibliography alone would take up an entire PhD. Digital 
computers are logical machines and, therefore, any paper 
that discussed computers would be included in the domain. 
Even if the review were limited to papers that explicitly 
mention logic and information systems the domain would still 
be too large - there are some journals entirely devoted to 
this subject e. g. the Journal of Logic Programming. 
The writings of a "philosophical" nature on the subject of 
SSM which appear in the information systems literature have 
little relevance to the rigorous logical analysis that will 
appear in the thesis. Of far greater significance is work in 
artificial intelligence which has been completely 







During the last decade Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) has 
had considerable success as a general purpose problem 
solving methodology. The ability of SSM to address 
unstructured (soft) problems can be contrasted with 
traditional Operational Research which alms at solving 
structured (hard) problems. Although there is a contrast 
this does not amount to an incompatibility. During the 
process of SSM analysis a soft problem will often turn into 
a hard problem which can be solved by structured methods. 
A key device in SSM is the development of a conceptual 
model. As was stressed in section 1.1.5 this type of model 
is not intended to represent what exists. The difficulty 
here is that having constructed a desirable conceptual model 
there is no guarantee that it will correspond to anything 
that actually can exist. In most uses of the methodology, 
especially Checkland's, this does not matter as the Primary 
aim is a change of perspective on the part of those 
concerned rather than a change in a state of affairs in the 
physical world. However, Wilson and Avison & Wood-Harper use 
the models as the starting point for the design of 
information systems intended to support physical processes. 
In these cases a correspondence between the models and the 
physical world is required. 
52 
Any such correspondence is inhibited by the 1091cal poverty 
of the models. The models contain only one type of logical 
connective and this is incapable, in any straight forward 
way, of fully representing causation. Without a 
comprehensive representation of causation there can be no 
guarantee of a correspondence between the models and the 
physical world. This chapter will show how the logical power 
of the models can be increased to the point where they are 
capable of representing causation and the physical world. 
In section 2.2 an analysis of the logical status of SSM 
conceptual models is undertaken. It is suggested that a 
correspondence between the models and the physical world 
will hold if two conditions are met. Firstly, the terms or 
elements of the model must refer, directly or indirectly, to 
objects or events in the physical world. Secondly, the 
relations between the terms or elements in the models must 
have the same logical form as the relations that hold 
between the objects and events in the physical world. It is 
in respect of this last condition that SSM models are 
inadequate. The elements in the models are connected only by 
relations of necessity. Relations of sufficiency are also 
required in order to match the causal sequences in the 
physical world. 
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Section 2.3 shows that sufficiency can be introduced into 
the models without difficulty. With this additional relation 
a logico-linguistic model is produced which is exhaustive 
and capable of representing, within the limitations of the 
propositional calculus, any conceivable state of affairs. 
Section 2.4.1 considers applications resulting from the fact 
that a logico-linguistic model functions as a conceptual 
cause and effect diagram. The ability to represent all 
logical possibilities in a cause and effect sequence gives 
the model greater scope than the empirical models that tend 
to be used in quality control. Section 2.4.2 discusses 
applications concerning efficiency. In SSM, a criterion for 
efficiency is one of three measures of performance that 
accompany every system, but it is not clear what this 
criterion is meant to operate on. It is suggested that 
efficiency can operate as the arbiter between two or more 
conditions that are sufficient for a desired effect. This 
gives efficiency a systemic and logical role that can be 
complimentary to quantitative accounts of efficiency in 
terms inputs and outputs. 
Cause & effect diagramming and the logical account of 
efficiency are not taken any further in the thesis, the 
remainder will be concerned with information systems and 
knowledge acquisition. Section 2.4.3 describes how the use 
of propositional logic can pay immediate dividends in 
information system design. 
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2.2 Conceptual models in SSM 
2.2.1 The outcome of using SSM 
General descriptions of Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) are 
highly diverse. SSM has been characterized as a learning 
system (Checkland, 1985), part of a new paradigm for 
Operational Research (Rosenhead, 1989) and as a front-end 
for information system design (Curtis, 1989). However, such 
diversity is to be expected considering that its aim is to 
address any kind of unstructured "soft" problem in any 
organizational or social context. 
SSM functions as a learning system because it facilitates a 
greater understanding of the problem situation on the part 
of those concerned. By bringing out the world views 
(Weltanschauungen) of the people involved in the problem 
situation, SSM can produce various types of result: the 
problem might simply disappear as the result of a consensus; 
a fairly unstructured solution might result, such as 
agreement to adopt a new role for the organization; a third 
possibility is that the problem becomes structured, in this 
case a soft problem resolves into an identifiable "hard" 
problem. It is this third type of result that will be the 
subject of most of the thesis. 
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2.2.2 The seven stage process 
The classic SSM method is a seven stage process comprising: 
(1) entering the problem situation, (2) expressing the 
problem situation, (3) formulating root definitions of 
relevant systems, (4) building conceptual models of Human 
Activity Systems, (5) comparing the models with the real 
world, (6) defining changes that are desirable and feasible, 
and (7) taking action to improve the real world situation 
(Checkland, 1989; Checkland & Scholes, 1990; Wilson, 1984). 
The dynamics of the method come from the fact that stages 
(2) through (4) are always an iterative process. The 
stake-holders engage in a debate guided by the 
analyst/facilitator. (In this thesis the term 
"stake-holders" is used only as a shorthand for the Client, 
Actors and Owner elements of Checkland's CATWOE). During 
this debate various root definitions (succinct statements of 
appropriate systems) and conceptual models are put forward, 
modified and developed until a desirable model is achieved 
by consensus. This model then forms the basis for real world 
changes. 
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2.2.3 Models and concepts 
The name "conceptual model" is ambiguous. It could mean a 
model of a concept or it could mean a model that is 
conceptual. The notional status of the models would seem to 
imply that they intended to be models of concepts. However, 
it is worth reflecting on the difference here. 
We can distinguish between what models are and what models 
are models of. With the exception of iconic models, such as 
a scale model of Winchester Cathedral, most models are 
concepts. But they are, mostly, intended to be n7odels of 
real world states of affairs. The value of a model is 
usually directly proportional to how well it corresponds to 
a past, present, future, actual or potential state of 
affairs. A model of a concept is quite different because in 
order to be a good model it need not have this real world 
correspondence. 
One of the features of modelling concepts is the ability to 
repre I sent notions that have no easily defined physical 
equivalent. Rules, laws, values, and judgements can easily 
be represented. This, plus the ability to represent, compare 
and integrate various Weltanschauungen, gives models of 
concepts tremendous scope. This scope must always be greater 
than the scope of a model of a physical state of affairs for 
the simple reason that models of concepts are limited only 
by what is conceivable. As no model of a physical states of 
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affairs can be inconceivable, every model of a physical 
state of affairs must be capable of being paired with a 
model of a concept. 
This unlimited modelling scope allows Checkland to achieve 
solutions that could not have been identified using models 
of actual states of affairs. This is particularly true where 
the problem has been non-physical i. e. a problem about 
goals, gaining a consensus, values etc. 
2.2.4 Concepts and the physical world 
In subsequent chapters the idea of conceptual models being 
models of concepts will need to revised and refined, for the 
present it can be taken as a given. This prompts a 
consideration what sort of relationship can exist between a 
conceptual model and the physical world. 
When a physical solution is required to resolve a problem 
situation, Checkland does not, in practice, take the models 
far beyond a general description. This is clear in the 
results of case studies. In Checkland and Scholes' Soft 
Systems Methodology in Action the outcome of the case 
studies are described as changes in thinking or perspective, 
changes of role for the organization as a whole, problem 
identification, or what has been learned about the 
organization. While these changes in thinking have lead on 
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to real world changes such as detailed organizational 
restructuring and new information channels, the real world 
changes were not specified by the methodology. 
By contrast, the case studies in Wilson's Systems: Concepts, 
Methodologies and Applications come up with specifications 
for new information processing procedures intended to 
support physical processes. This implies that there must be 
some relationship between the conceptual model and the 
information system; just as there must be some relationship 
between the information system and the physical process. 
There is a prima facie dilemma here. What has been said so 
far is that a conceptual model need not be based on anything 
in the physical world. If this is so, then it would seem to 
follow that there can be no guarantee that a desirable 
conceptual model will ever correspond to anything in the 
physical world. The literature of SSM is not enlightening on 
this point. It is not clear how the transition from a model 
of a concept to a change in the physical world is effected. 
At stage (4) in the methodology we--have a model of a view of 
what exists, but a view of what exists might bear no 
relation at all to what actually exists. In this case, the 
model can be no help in taking action to improve the real 
world situation as is required in stage (7). 
The most simple solution to the dilemma is to take the 
conceptual models to be a number of inductive hypotheses 
connected together. 
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Given this, the models would be empirical and could be 
tested against events in the real world. However, this would 
mean that they are not models of concepts but models of 
putative physical states of affairs. As such they would not 
be significantly different from most other types of model. 
A second solution to the dilemma is more difficult. This is 
to take the conceptual models as being logico-linguistic 
models. On this interpretation model building is a type of 
Wittgensteinian language game in which the stake-holders 
create an agreed language for describing the problem 
situation (this account will be detailed in chapter 3). The 
iterative process enables the sense (connotation, intension) 
of the various terms in the models to become fixed, thereby 
establishing a syntactical structure. In this way the models 
are analogous to formal systems such as arithmetic. 
There are two requirements for a formal system to correspond 
to the physical world. The first is that its terms should 
have direct or indirect reference (denotation, extension) to 
objects, events or states or affairs in the physical world. 
The second is that the functional connectives should be 
capable of reflecting the behaviour of objects, the sequence 
of events or changes of states of affairs in the physical 
world. In arithmetic the terms are numbers, the functional 
connectives are addition, subtraction etc. In SSM models the 
terms are contained in the bubbles and the functional 
connectives are the arrows between the bubbles. 
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Exactly how reference is established has been the subject of 7 
ongoing debate among some of the world's most eminent 
philosophers and logicians for nearly a century. However, 
although reference is difficult in theory it tends to'be 
unproblematic in practice. If people can agree. about the 
sense of a word there is usually no problem about 
establishing whether it has reference or not. In the present 
case, sense is unproblematic because it is established by 
building the model. 
This leaves the second requirement. The most general 
principles governing the behaviour of objects, the sequence 
of events and changes of states of affairs in the physical 
world are the laws of cause and effect. The remainder of 
this chapter will show firstly, that the connectives in SSM 
models do not reflect the laws of cause and effect, 
secondly, that this shortcoming can be easily avoided by a 
modification of the models, thirdly, that such modification 
could have interesting applications. 
2.3 Propositional Logic 
2.3.1 The logic of soft systems models 
According to Checkland and Wilson the SSM modeling language 
consists of English verbs. These are formulated into 
elements which express commands. This has the advantage of 
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being easily understood by the stake-holders in the client 
organization and this is essential as their participation is 
a fundamental requirement in the development of the model. 
The connectivity between the elements is defined as "logical 
dependence" (Checkland & Scholes, 1990). This supports the 
view that the SSM conceptual models are intended to be 
models of concepts, rather than models of physical objects 
or events, because logical relations cannot exist between 
physical objects or events. Logical dependence is 
illustrated in the hypothetical conceptual model shown in 
figure 2. It shows that -r 
is dependent on u and v. 
There is a problem here because the elements of the SSM 
models are commands and generally accepted logics only 
operate on truth bearers (for a discussion of what is and is 
not a logic see Haack, 1978, and Grayling, 1990). 
Statements, or more strictly propositions, can be true or 
false and are, therefore, truth bearers. Commands can be 
neither true nor false and have no place in generally 
accepted logics. A logic of commands, an imperative logic, 
has been discussed by some authors (Haack, 1978) but Probert 
(1991,1993) finds that an imperative logic is not enough to 
fulfil the role required of it in an SSM model. 
This problem can be easily overcome by replacing the 
imperative phrases in the models with declarative phrases. 
Instead of putting "wash rice" we could put "the activity 
wash rice has occurred" and now the truth of this 
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proposition could be said to be dependent on the truth of 
the proposition "the activity obtain rice has occurred" . (--)r, 
more concisely, we copld say "rice is washed" instead of 
''wash rice" and "rice is obtained" instead of "obtain rice" 
Figure 3 shows how the commands of figure 2 can be replaced 
by propositions. 
2.3.2 The problem of insufficiency 
Accounts of the logic of causation are in terms of necessary 
conditions, sufficient conditions and necessary and 
sufficient conditions (Copi, 1968; Mackie, 1980; Papineau, 
1978; Taylor, 1963). Logical dependency, which is the only 
relation used in SSM models, is parallel to a necessary 
condition. If the truth of the statement "rice has been 
washed" is logically dependent on the truth of the statement 
"water has been obtained", then obtaining water will be a 
necessary condition of washing rice. However, the relation 
of logical dependency does not amount to sufficiency; 
obtaining water is not sufficient for washing rice. 
In figures 2 and 3 if we say r is logically dependent on u 
and v we are saying the same thing as saying u and v are 
necessary for r, but this does not mean that u and v are 
sufficient for -r. The logical way of expressing this 
is to 




Here the truth of r allows us to infer the truth of u and v. 
However, the truth of u and v does not allow us to infer 
anything about r. In causal terms the fact that r happens 
means that u and v must have happened but the fact that u 
and v happen does not mean that r will happen. If we think 
of the arrows as representing implication, as they do in 
symbolic logic, then the arrows point the wrong way in SSM 
models. The upshot of this, in simple English, is that the 
fact that rice and water are obtained does not mean that the 
rice gets washed. 
This entails that a physical system that is based on a model 
that contains only necessary conditions can never be 
guaranteed to work. It may work because the necessary 
conditions may in fact also be sufficient but it is also 
possible that they might not be. 
This deficiency can easily be remedied by adding another 
condition that, in conjunction with the existing conditions, 
forms a set which is sufficient. The way this can be done is 
shown in figure 4. Here the set comprising w and u and v is 
sufficient for r. As each of these conditions (w, u and v) 
is also necessary for r, the set is a necessary and 
sufficient condition (N&S condition) of r. 
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In figure 4 the new elements corresponding to agents are 
introduced in order to create sets of sufficient conditions. 
The new element w An agent is employed who will wash rice 11ý" 
rice and water are obtained when combined with u Rice is 
obtained and with v Water is obtained is sufficient for r 
Rice is washed. That is, if we employ an agent who will wash 
rice if rice and water are obtained and we obtain rice and 
water then rice will be washed. 
Agents could correspond to people, machines or, in the case 
of an information system, a computer program. Traditional 
SSM models are models of human activity systems and it is 
reasonable to think that implicitly the presence of a human 
agent has been assumed. While sets of sufficient conditions 
are required for all full explanations of causal sequences, 
agents are not. Figure 22 give a full causal account of 
measles without needing to introduce the notion of an agent 
or an agency. 
It is not immediately obvious when agents need to be 
included in a full account of a causal sequence. Some man 
made systems such as cooking rice, making chair legs (figure 
7) and painting fences (figure 10) seem to require them. 
Others such as the hospital system (figure 21) and the 
public relation project (figures 28 - 33) do not seem to 
need agents. It might be simply that if these models were 
expanded to sufficient depth the need for agents would 
become apparent. 
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Another factor is that in the cooking rice, making chair 
legs and painting fences examples the movement is towards a 
monitor and control system that would bring about a certain 
state of affairs. In the hospital, measles and public 
relations system the concern is more to develop a system 
that will correspond to an existing state of affairs; if 
detailed monitor and control systems were added to these 
then agents might be required. 
However, there might also be a philosophical problem here. 
The notion of an agent or agency as it is used here has 
parallels to the ancient notion of causal power or causal 
efficacy. By this account state of affairs A could only 
cause state of affairs B by virtue of A's power to do so. 
Causal power was an ontological notion and today it tends to 
be regarded as an otiose metaphysical extra. However, Taylor 
(1963) recently resurrected this notion. A full discussion 
of Taylor's paper would be an unnecessary digression, but it 
does not appear to be obvious when the notion of agency 
needs to come in to an account of causation. 
2.3.3 Showing different possibilities 
The introduction of N&S conditions solves the problem of 
insufficiency but deficiencies in the model remain. 
Necessary conditions and N&S conditions show only one way in 
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which the ob3ective can be attained. For e. --ample, if we want 
to obtain equipment this could be accomplished by buying it 
or making it or borrowing it. 
Wilson recognizes this and tries to accommodate it by making 
distinctions between what is to be done and how it is to be 
done. The how can be expanded in two ways: by showing 
greater detail (in effect, more necessary conditions) or by 
showing different possibilities. 
Mingers (1990) has shown that the what/how distinction is 
not, in itself, capable of making the distinctions that are 
required. One problem is that the expansion of the model by 
taking it to a higher resolution level, which is similar to 
the way data flow diagrams are decomposed, will fail to make 
clear whether the model is being expanded in order to show 
greater detail or whether it is being expanded to show one 
of a number of possibilities. 
Mingers suggest a qualified what/how distinction as the 
basis for the development of the two hierarchies, one to 
show greater detail and one to show different possibilities. 
There is, however, another way of introducing different 
possibilities into the models; this involves the 
introduction of a third logical connection. 
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2.3.4 Introducing SUN conditions 
So far we have two types of logical connection: 
A -> B. Which means A implies B. This corresponds to B being 
a necessary condition of A. 
A <-> B. Which means A implies B and B, implies A. This 
corresponds to B being an N&S condition of A, and, as a 
logical consequence, A being an N&S condition of B. 
To this group we can add: 
B -> A. Which means that B implies A, or that A is implied 
by B. This corresponds to B being a sufficient but 
unnecessary condition (SUN condition) of A. SUN conditions 
are indicated by broken lines in figure 5. (A notational 
device for SUN conditions is useful but not essential see 
section 11.3.1.2) 
With solid lines to indicate necessary conditions and broken 
lines to indicate sufficient conditions we could indicate A 
being an N&S condition of B by two lines one, solid and one 
broken, going from A to B. However, if A is an N&S condition 
of B, then B will be an N&S condition of A; therefore, four 
lines would be required. To avoid the diagrams becoming to 
messy a double headed arrow will be introduced to stand for 
N&S conditions at a later stage, see figure 16. 
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It is self evident that if it is true that Polished rice is 
obtained then it will be true that rice is obtained. We can, 
therefore, say that obtaining polished rice is a sufficient 
condition of obtaining rice, and that "polished rice is 
obtained" implies "rice is obtained". While the truth of 
"polished rice is obtained" is a sufficient condition of the 
truth of "rice is obtained" it is not a necessary condition 
because rice can be obtained without obtaining polished 
rice, in the case in point rice can be obtained by obtaining 
unpolished rice. 
The SUN conditions for any event, or for the truth of any 
proposition, form a set. The occurrence of the event or the 
truth of the proposition does not entail that any individual 
member of the set obtains or is true; however, it does 
require that at least one member of the set obtains or is 
true. This means that if we know that u is true then one of 
c, d, e and f must be true, if this is not the case then the 
set of SUN conditions for u (the set comprising c, d, e and 
f) will not be exhaustive. If the model is not exhaustive 
then it cannot be universal and cannot account for every 
case. The way to make sure that a model is exhaustive is to 
make sure that each set of SUN conditions cover all 
possibilities. 
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In figure 5, c and d cover all the possibilities for b. That 
is, if polished rice is obtained then the rice that is 
obtained must be domestic or imported. There is no other 
possibility, therefore, c and d form an exhaustive set of 
SUN conditions for b. 
The break down of q, in figure 5, has deliberately been left 
so that it is not exhaustive. It is reasonable to think that 
if rice can be cooked with borrowed equipment it can be 
cooked with stolen equipment. Therefore, "equipment is 
stolen" is a SUN condition of q. The easiest way to correct 
this is to include "equipment is stolen" as an additional 
element. However, in many cases the stake-holders would not 
want to consider the possibility of stealing being part of 
their system. Fortunately other solutions are possible. We 
can omit stealing from the model but still make it 
exhaustive by altering p from "rice is cooked" to "rice is 
cooked by legal means". In this way the models begins to 
become linguistically as well as logically dynamic. 
A third possibility is to take it that "legal means" is part 
of the Universe. -of Discourse for the system. That is, we can 
take it that the model is not intended to cover all 
possibilities but only legal possibilities. This limitation 
could be recorded by amending the root definition to include 
legality. This going back to modify the root definition 
following an inadequacy in the model would be undertaken as 
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part of the iterative process. The interrogation of the 
stake-holders' concepts is a large part of what the model 
building is about. 
With the inclusion of necessary, N&S conditions and SUN 
conditions conceptual models are capable of representing any 
conceivable cause and effect sequence. These types of model 
will have far greater scope than models which are based 
directly on past experience. 
2.4 Applications of the models 
2.4.1 Cause & effect diagrams 
2.4.1.1 Ishikawa's diagrams 
Cause and effect diagrams are closely identified with the 
work of Ishikawa (1986). His book on quality control devotes 
considerable space to the subject. Ishikawals account of 
causation is inadequate in two ways. Firstly, he does not 
distinguish between necessary conditions and sufficient 
conditions. Secondly, he does not take logical possibilities 
into account. 
For Ishikawa "a cause" is broken down into other causes and 
these in turn can be further broken down into yet other 
causes. At any given point, therefore, it is difficult to 
understand what Ishikawa means when he uses the word 
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ficauself. He could be meaning a necessary condition, a 
sufficient condition, or a necessary and sufficient 
condition. 
Figure 6 is taken from one of Ishikawals cause and effect 
diagrams. The effect, delicious rice, is represented at the 
end of the main arrow. Leading into this are four arrows 
labelled "Pretreatment (washing)", "Raw Materials (rice)", 
"Equipment (cooker)", and "Second treatment (steaming)". It 
appears that these"are meant to represent necessary 
conditions but it is not clear if they are meant to 
represent a set that is sufficient. 
At the lowest level the diagram seems to list SUN 
conditions. The the upper right part of the diagram would 
seem to be saying that obtaining rice from Thailand or 
obtaining rice from China are SUN conditions of obtaining 
rice from foreign countries. However, these SUN condition 
could not be considered an exhaustive set unless one thought 
it would be impossible to make delicious rice from, say, 
American rice or Indian rice. 
Figure 6 is one of the most comprehensive of the Ishikawa 
diagrams. In practice, cause and effect analysis in the 
Ishikawa tradition sometimes gives little more than an 
ordered sequence of events that have been involved in a 
production or distribution system (for example, see Jones & 
Clark, 1990). Ishikawa's research method is confined to the 
study of the past performance of a system. Like all such 
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work its scope is very limited. It tells us very little 
about what could happen nor, in a rapidly changing 
environment, is it likely to tell us what will happen. 
The greatest advantage of logico-linguistic models over the 
Ishikawa type is the fact that they can cover all logical 
possibilities. This brings us back to the point that a 
conceptual model need never have a smaller scope than an 
empirically based model. This is because anything that is 
known empirically is conceivable and can, therefore, be 
included in a conceptual model. By contrast some things that 
are conceivable can never be known empirically. 
2.4.1.2 Fault trees 
Ishikawa's method developed in the context of quality 
control and many of his diagrams are directed at finding the 
causes of faults. A causal account of a fault merely 
reverses the logic of a desired state of affairs. If we want 
to achieve X, and Y is a necessary condition of X, then not 
Y will be sufficient for not X; to put it another way, Y 
will be sufficient for a fault. By the same reasoning, if Z 
is a sufficient condition of X, then not Z will be a 
necessary condition of a fault. The use of Ishikawa's models 
in this context does not, therefore, avoid the difficulties 
raised above. 
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Fault tree analysis is a rigorous method of fault detection 
used in engineering. It employs flow diagrams containing 
input events, AND gates and OR gates. The occurrence or 
non-occurrence of an input event provides the equivalent of 
logical negation. Given this, a fault tree is capable of 
representing the full range of causal conditions. For 
example p -> q could be expressed as (p AND q) OR (NOT p AND 
q) OR (NOT p AND NOT q). However, fault tree analysis 
presupposes a comprehensive system description (Barlow & 
Lambert, 1975) whereas conceptual modeling and cause and 
effect diagrams are meant to provide a systems description. 
2.4.2 A logical account of efficiency 
2.4.2.1 The problem of efficiency in SSM 
Checkland & Scholes (1990) indicate that most systems should 
be accompanied by three measures of performance: efficacy 
(El), efficiency (E2) and effectiveness (E3). 
The criterion for efficacy will tell us whether the desired 
effect has occurred or not. In the case of figure 5 this 
will amount to whether p is true or not. If p is false we 
know that t or r or q or s must be false, and if r is false 
ý11 
we know that w or u or v must be false. From this an 
algorithm can be formulated that will find the faults in a 
system and take remedial action. El, therefore, has a useful 
role. 
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Effectiveness (E3) is the measure of whether the system 
meets a longer term aim. In the case of our example this 
might be to enjoy a good meal. The criterion for El would be 
is -rice cooked" If the criterion for El is met it remains an 
open question whether the criterion for E3 is met. The fact 
that rice has been cooked does not entail that we enjoy a 
good meal. Better systems might be to fry potatoes, go to a 
restaurant or to hire a caterer. E3, therefore, also has a 
useful role. 
Problems arise when we come to consider efficiency. 
Checkland & Scholes define efficiency as "amount of output 
divided by amount of resources used". There is a difficulty 
here because SSM models consist entirely of necessary 
conditions. If a system is to work, no necessary condition 
can be left out. This means that any system that consists 
entirely of necessary conditions can operate in only one 
way. Which leaves the question: what is the criterion for 
efficiency meant-to measure? 
The introduction of SUN conditions into the models can 
provide the role for the criterion of efficiency and, 
thereby, solve this problem. We can say that the system is 
efficient if the only SUN conditions that are true are those 
that meet the predetermined criterion that we have selected 
as E2. The criterion for efficiency can select the optimal 
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SUN condition, or set of SUN conditions, needed to achieve 
El. As a consequence it will minimize unnecessary conditions 
and thereby eliminate redundancy. 
It is worth pointing out that there is nothing in the logic 
of SSM that requires that the criterion for efficiency be 
quantitative. In the cook rice example the criterion could 
be palatability. We can take the account of efficiency in 
terms of SUN conditions to be a logical concept of 
efficiency. As such it can be contrasted with the 
mathematical concept. 
2.4.2.2 A logical concept of efficiency 
Figure 7 gives a model of a system to make chair legs. The 
input for the system is square lengths of wood and the 
output is round lengths with holes provided for cross piece 
joints. 
The model serves to illustrate how time can be introduced 
into the models as well as showing how causes of efficiency 
can be identified. If the final event, p, takes place at T, 
then q, s, r and w must take place at T minus I. If q, s, r 
and w take place at T minus 1, then u, b, a, c and v must 
take place at T minus 2. 
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There are two ways in which this system can operate. One -s 
by drilling the holes in the square lengths and then making 
the lengths round on the lathe; this way invokes the w SUN 
condition. The other is to make the lengths round and then 
drill the holes; this way invokes the s SUN condition. 
Given a criterion for efficiency as the number of lengths 
produced per day, it is quite likely that one method will 
conform to the criterion better than the other. It might be 
that difficulties in positioning a round piece of wood prior 
to drilling make the s route less productive. Alternatively 
a hole in the length might interfere with the smooth 
operation of the lathe, making the w route less productive. 
To determine which of the possibilities is, in fact, the 
most efficient, would require experiment or monitoring the 
system in real world application. However, the important 
thing here is that this question of efficiency was 
recognized without comparison with other systems as would be 
required for a mathematical account of efficiency. The other 
important thing is that the parameters of efficiency here 
have been recognized without acquaintance with any real 
world chair leg making system. This suggests applications in 
a green field situation. 
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2.4-2.3 Mathematical ideas of efficiency 
The mathematical idea of efficiency takes a system to 
consist of inputs, a black box and outputs. A system A will 
be taken to be more efficient than system B if the ratio of 
outputs to inputs is higher in A than in B. Data Envelopment 
Analysis is more sophisticated but the black box remains 
and, for the purposes of this discussion, it can be treated 
as the same as the simple input/output account. 
While the mathematical concept will help to identify 
efficiency it does not identify the cause of efficiency. 
Take two systems, A and B, with comparable inputs and 
outputs but in which A is determined to be more efficient. 
There are two possibilities as to the cause: it could be 
external to the systems, or it could be internal to the 
systems. 
If the cause is a factor that is external to the system then 
it would seem that the cause is really an input, but perhaps 
one that has been overlooked. Let us suppose that A and B 
are farms in which the inputs are seed, fertilizer, manpower 
and equipment, and the output is grain. Let us suppose A 
does better then B because A is situated in a place where 
the weather is better than it is at the location of B. We do 
not want to say that the weather is internal to the systems 
as far as efficiency is concerned. This is because our 
concept of efficiency, unlike the concept of productivity, 
requires that we can make changes that can improve it. So, 
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as we cannot change the weather we add it to the list of 
inputs. If the weather was the only cause of the low 
productivity of B, then B should now have the same 
efficiency rating as -A. 
Given this we must conclude that any true cause of 
efficiency or inefficiency is internal to the system. But if 
the cause of efficiency is internal an analysis of inputs 
and outputs cannot locate it. To identify the cause of 
efficiency or inefficiency of two systems would require a 
comparison of their internal configuration. 
Logico-linguistic conceptual models are one of the ways in 
which a system's internal configuration can be described. 
2.4.3 Automated monitor & control 
2.4.3.1 Sets of sufficient conditions 
SSM conceptual models developed into propositional logic 
expressing causal sequences could be used for the design of 
automated monitor and control systems. The first stage is to 
express exhaustive sets of SUN conditions, that is SUN 
conditions that cover all possibilities. The example that 
will be used is taken from Soft Systems methodology in 
Action (Checkland & Scholes, 1990) and is reproduced as 
figure 8. The model is derived from the following Root 
Definition: "A householder-owned and manned system to paint 
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a fence, by conventional hand painting, in keeping with the 
overall decoration scheme of the property, in order to 
enhance the visual appearance of the property" 
As in all traditional SSM models the arrows in the model are 
meant to represent necessary conditions, which means that 5 
Paint the fence is contingent upon 4 Obtain materials, but 
they do not represent sufficient conditions. The fact that 
the activity Obtain materials is performed does not imply 
that the activity Paint the fence is performed. If we think 
about applying this model to a real world situation there is 
no guarantee that it will work. It is quite possible (and 
with a tedious task like painting a fence, even likely) that 
the materials are obtained but the householder never gets 
round to doing the painting. 
Figure 9 shows a way in which sufficient conditions for 
painting a fence can be presented. This is by adding three 
new elements which stand for the notion of human agents 
which are implicit in--the fence painting model. The elements 
standing for the agent designate a required role. This is 
specified in greater detail than in figures 5 or 7. The 
element 5a A agent is employed who will make 5 true if 4 is 
true is detailed in term of two necessary conditions (5a and 
5c) that are jointly sufficient. The con3unction of 5a and 
5b, therefore, form a set that is necessary and sufficient. 
One of these, 5c, is that the agent is competent, this is 
defined in terms of the system. That is, the fence will be 
painted if the agent is competent, if the fence is not 
80 
painted then the agent cannot be competent. This enables 
control action to be specified: if the materials have been 
obtained but the fence does not get painted then the agent 
cannot be competent and the agent should be changed. 
However, the system might be badly configured and be such 
that no agent could possibly accomplish the task. In this 
case 5b, 5 is possible if 4 is true, will be false and the 
system should be changed. The precise configuration of the 
monitor and control action will depend on the particular 
circumstances. The number of possible agents will depend on 
the environment. Quite often it will be enormous in which 
case some cut off point will need to be determined. For 
example there may be thousands of painters available for 
employment, in this case we could build in the rule that if 
the agent has been changed, say five times, and the fence 
has still not been painted then the system should be 
changed. 
The logic of the model can now be explained. With the 
central part of the fence-painting model converted into 
propositional form it can be expressed in the propositional 
calculus: 
4) & ((4 -> (2 & 3)) & (2 -> 1) 
In this formula the original numbers from the Checkland & 
Scholes model are retained and stand for propositions. This 
makes it easier to see how the formula is derived but breaks 
with the convention in logic that propositions are denoted 
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by lower case letters. The use of numbers in the formulas 
has also caused difficulties because some people have been 
reading mathematical or temporal significance into them. In 
subsequent examples only letters will be used. 
Translating the implementation system into propositional 
form and adding the sufficient conditions gives figure 10. 
Part of this model can be expressed in the following formula 
from which some interesting deductions can be made. These 
could be used for system diagnostics: 
(5 <-> (4 & 5a)) & (5a <-> (5b & 5c)) 
Therefore: -5 -> (-4 v -5a) 
and: -5a -> (-5b v -5c) 
This means that if 5 is false (if the fence is not painted) 
then 4 must be false or 5a must be false (the materials are 
not obtained or an agent who will paint the fence if the 
materials are obtained is not employed). Also that if 5a is 
false (an agent who will paint the fence if the materials 
are obtained is not employed) then 5b must be false or 5c 
must be false (that it is not possible for an agent to paint 
the fence or that the agent is not competent). 
This makes it easy to track a fault in the system. If the 
measure of performance for efficacy is not met (if the fence 
is not painted), it must be because materials have not been 
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obtained or the agent has not performed the task. If the 
agent has not performed the task this must be bec ause the 
agent is incompetent or because the system is unworkable in 
its present form. 
The same process occurs one stage back. From figure 10 we 
know: 
(4 <-> (2 &3& 4a)) & (4a <-> (4b & 4c)) 
Therefore: -4 -> (-2 v -3 v -4a) 
and: -4a -> (-4b v -4c) 
Again we have the same form of inference. If materials have 
not been obtained, it must be because the colour to paint 
the fence has not been decided or because the scope of the 
fence painting task has not been described or because the 
agent has not performed the task. 
In any model elements standing for agents can be attached to 
any element for which a necessary condition has been 
specified (any element which has an arrow going into it). 
These new elements are shown by the broken lines in figure 5 
(the fact that the lines are broken has no logical 
significance). Those elements which do not have arrows 
leading into them (those for which necessary conditions are 
83 
not given) do not have elements standing for agents attached 
to them; this is because the agents will appear when the 
model is taken to a higher resolution level. 
2.4.3.2 Structured English for control 
From figure 10 it can be seen that there are three types of 
way in which the system can go wrong, these are: 
Type One: Problems of supply from outside the system. In 
this case it would be 1 or 2 not being true. 
Type Two: Problems with the competence of agents. In this 
case it would be 5c, 4c or 3c not being true. 
Type Three: Problems because it is impossible for the agents 
to do their job, in this case it would be 5b, 4b or 3b not 
being true. 
Given this it is easy to specify the control action. If the 
problem is of Type One, then the supply sub-system should be 
changed. If the problem is of Type Two, then the agent 
should be changed. If the problem is of Type Three, then the 
operating system should be changed, with Type Three problems 
the model is unworkable. Type Three problems would require a 
new conceptual model and a return to CATWOE and the root 
definition. 
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The following gives a simple algorithm, in structured 
English, for control action based on the monitoring of 
efficacy. 
(1 ) IF 5 
THEN stop 
ELSE IF not 4 
THEN goto (2) 
ELSE IF not 5c 
THEN change agent 
ELSE change system 
(2) IF not 3 
THEN goto (3) 
ELSE IF not 2 
THEN change sub-system 
ELSE IF not 4c 
THEN change agent 
ELSE change system 
( IF not 1 
THEN change sub-system 
ELSE IF not 3c 
THEN change agent 
ELSE change system 
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An obvious objection to what has been said above is that 
obtaining materials and emploYing an agent might mean that 
fence painting has begun but it does not mean that the fence 
is painted. This problem can be overcome if we build in 
temporal references. 
Say it takes six hours to paint the fence. We can amend 
element 5 to "the fence is painted at t", element 4 can be 
amended to "materials are obtained at t-6 hrs", and 
element 5a can be amended to "an agent is employed who will 
make it true that the fence is painted at t if materials 
have been obtained at t-6 hrs". 
2.4.3.3 Organizational mapping 
The method of developing a conceptual model given above 
represents a considerable refinement of the organizational 
mapping techniques developed by Wilson (1984, pp. 149-256). 
If elements 1,3c, 2,4c and 5c can be mapped onto a real 
world situation we can be sure that the fence will be 
painted or that the system is unworkable. 
As Wilson's models are based on necessary, but not 
sufficient, conditions there is no similar guarantee. We 
could find that when one of these models maps onto the real 
world the system works or we could find that it does not. 
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The method also allows for greater detail in mapping. For 
example, the revised models could be mapped onto individual 
workers in a production line. With Wilson's models this 
cannot be done, they are confined to mapping boundaries and 
areas of responsibility; in effect they are concerned only 
with monitor and control functions such as those shown in 
f igure 8. 
The third advantage is that Wilson's method requires that 
the entire conceptual model (expanded to three or four 
higher resolution levels and sometimes comprising hundreds 
of activities) is mapped onto what is known about the entire 
organization (derived from organization charts plus field 
research), whereas the revised models could be mapped piece 
by piece. 
To explain this, let us suppose that in our fence painting 
example the problem situation is that the fence is not 
getting painted. The first task is to produce the conceptual 
model (figure 10). The second task is to see if elements 4 
and 5a can be mapped onto the real world situation. If 
element 4 cannot be mapped, i. e. if the materials are not 
obtained, then we try to map elements 3,2 and 4a. If the 
words change agent selection system is substituted for 
change agent and the words change Conceptual Model 
substituted for change system then organizational mapping 
can follow the general lines of the algorithm given above. 
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2.5 Limitations of propositional logic 
The logical analysis of SSM models at a propositional level 
can have uses in understanding and stimulating the SSM 
debate. Merall (1993) has described how, firsýtly, logically 
enhanced models can be used to encourage stake-holders to 
rethink the problem situation and secondly, how the 
consensus that is reached at the end of the debate can be 
expressed in a logical model. 
Merali (1992) has also shown how logico-linguistic models at 
the level of propositional logic can be converted into 
analytic, that is conceptual, data flow diagrams. This opens 
the way for SSM modelling methods to be used in a solution 
of the structured methods type. However, while this might 
have some useful applications, the limited power of a 
structured methods solution and the limited power of the 
propositional calculus imposed severe limitations on the 
range of applications. 
An obvious limitation is the absence of data analysis in a 
structured methods solution. It seems that propositional 
logic is inadequate to support data analysis and that the 
more powerful predicate logic is required. Logico-linguistic 
models based on propositional logic tend to be awkward to 
construct. The propositions the models need to refer to each 
other; for example, 5b in figure 9 needs to refer to 5 and 
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to 4. This is inelegant and cumbersome and could easily lead 
to problems of circular reference in large models. This 
problem disappears when predicate logic is introduced. 
The greatest shortcoming of both propositional logic and 
structured methods is that they cannot distinguish between 
the notional status of SSM models and status of real world 
facts. As was stressed in section 1.1.5 it is the notional 
status of the SSM models that makes then startlingly 
different and, therefore, interesting. The next chapter will 
seek to account for this special status in terms of 
Wittgenstein's language game theory. Chapter 4 will develop 
the logical tools needed to express it. 
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A WITTGENSTEINIAN PERSPECTIVE ON SSM 
3.1 The context 
3.1.1 Meaning and information system design 
The aim of this chapter is to show how SSM conceptual 
models, which are notional, can play a role in the design of 
information systems intended to support real world 
activities. Attempts to explain this, especially 
Checkland's, have been in the area of the theory of 
knowledge (epistemology). They have tried to show how a 
notional model, systems idea or "holon" plays a role in the 
acquisition of knowledge. This chapter takes a new 
initiative and addresses the problem from the perspective of 
the theory of meaning. It is contended that meaning is the 
main problem here and that once this is sorted out many of 
the epistemological problems will be easily resolved. 
A consideration of meaning was prompted by the logical 
problems discussed at the end of the last chapter. The 
foundation of any applied logic is inexorably tied up with 
meaning. The literature of logic and, to a certain extent, 
artificial intelligence abound with elaborate formalisms 
which have only a tenuous relation to practical problems. An 
ac-count of meaning will provide the grounding for logic and 
information system design. It will be argued that the SSM 
conceptual model building process is a type of 
Wittgensteinian language game in which a new language is 
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created to describe the problem situation. Given this the 
model building will express meaning that can be used as the 
basis for the logic needed for an information system design. 
Connecting Wittgenstein with information system design is 
not new but other writers have tended to emphasis 
Wittgenstein's work on the contextual aspect of language 
(see Hanseth, 1991). Wittgenstein's emphasis on the study of 
language as it is used largely gave rise to speech act 
theory. Speech act theory is now employed in modelling for 
IS design in the SAMPO approach (Auramaki et al, 1988, 
forthcomming). Here language game theory is employed to help 
the analyst understand the meaning of terms used in the 
context of on-going activities. In this chapter a different 
role will be considered, that of a language game as 
preliminary to new activities in an existing situation or 
new activities in a new situation. 
In the Investigations Wittgenstein draws a connection 
between language and games especially chess. The main point 
is that both are constituted by their rules. But the rules 
of-language like the rules of a game can be invented. 
To invent a language could mean an instrument for a 
particular purpose on the basis of the laws of nature 
(or consistently with them); but it also has another 
sense, analogous to that in which we speak of the 
invention of a game. (Philosophical Investigations, 
492) 
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Wittgenstein did not see any fundamental difference between 
the rules of a so-called natural language, such as English, 
and the rules of a so-called artificial language, such as 
predicate logic. For Wittgenstein the rules that govern 
language were not just approximate to logic but were of the 
same order. 
For it will then also become clear what can lead us 
(and did lead me) to think that if anyone utters a 
sentence and means or understands it he is operating a 
calculus according to definite rules. (Original 
emphasis, Philosophical Investigations, 81) 
However, although the rules of a language can be invented, 
the terms of a language cannot refer to a purely subjective 
state of mind. It was a fundamental principle of 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy that the creation of meaning 
was a public event. This is the aspect of his theory that is 
relevant to SSM. The iterative debate in which the 
conceptual models are built is a public event that creates 
meaning. 
Contrary to the later Wittgenstein, subjectivist theories of 
meaning assert that the determination of meaning is 
essentially private. This needs to be qualified as the word 
"subjective" in information systems literature is apt to do 
more to confuse than to clarify. We find that "subjective" 
is sometimes use to stand for "private" and sometimes used 
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to stand for "individual" . That meaning is subjective in the 
sense of "individual" is hardly in dispute. It is obvious 
that different individuals mean different things by the same 
utterance and that to say that a term is meaningful is to 
imply the existence of at least some individual people. 
The contention that meaning is subjective in the sense of 
"private" is called "the ideational theory" by Grayling. He 
describes it as: 
The theory ... that language is an instrument for 
reporting thought, and thought consists of successions 
of ideas in consciousness. Ideas are private; only I 
have access to my own thoughts. Therefore to 
communicate our ideas to each other we need a system of 
intersubjectively available sounds and marks, so 
connected to ideas that the proper use of them by one 
person will arouse the appropriate ideas in the other 
person's mind. Accordingly what a word means is the 
idea with which it is regularly connected. (Grayling, 
1990) 
Ideational theories reached their most rigorous exposition 
in the theories of Logical Atomism and Logical Positivism 
which were propounded in the 1920s and 1930s. Wittgenstein's 
early work (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 1922) was very 
close to these movements. However, in the 1940s Wittgenstein 
changed his position and attacked the ideational theory. The 
main instrument of this attack was the private language 
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argument. In Anglo-American analytical philosophy this 
argument is generally regarded as having shown that 
ideational theories are false. However, they now seem to be 
appearing in writing relating to information system design. 
3.1.2 Outline of the argument 
Wittgenstein's argument against the ideational theory is an 
old one but quite complex. For those readers who are not 
familiar with the private language argument a summary set in 
its historical context is given in Section 3.2. 
Section 3.3 expresses a concern that ideational theories are 
beginning to appear in work on the connection between 
meaning and IS design. The work of Stamper is briefly 
discussed because despite a good deal of similarity between 
Stamper and Wittgenstein they differ in important 
particulars. The contrast between the ideational theory and 
Wittgenstein's is described. A consideration of 
Wittgenstein's theory of truth shows that even formal 
systems can be regarded as language games. The section seeks 
to establish that it is the language game theory of meaning, 
and not the ideational theory, that is correct. 
An argument for a Wittgensteinian account of SSM model 
building is given in Section 3.4. It is argued that one of 
the products of the SSM iterative debate is an agreement 
about how the problem situation should be described. 
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Understood'as a language game the debate is not merely a 
mechanism for the analyst to learn what the clients think 
but creates an agreed framework of stipulative definitions. 
The section seeks to establish that Checkland's descriptions 
of the logical status of SSM models and the actual process 
of building the models are both compatible with the language 
game theory but not with the ideational theory. 
Section 3.5 considers how the work in the previous sections 
can be developed toward a system for information system 
design. The shortcomings of the propositional calculus are 
described. The need to establish a system that will deal 
with the problem of mapping conceptual models on to the real 
world is pointed out. 
3.2 The history of private languages 
3.2.1 Logical Atomism 
To find an irrefutable foundation for human understanding 
has been the ambition of countless philosophers throughout 
history. Bertrand Russell was no exception. In the early 
part of this century he began developing a set of ideas that 
became known as "Logical Atomism" (Russell 1918,1924). 
Russell began with the standard empiricist idea that all 
knowledge comes through the senses. His next move was to say 
that the only thing we can be certain of is sense 
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experience. Knowledge is, he argued, built up entirely out 
of atomic units of sense experience. These units he called 
"sense data". The standard Platonic analysis of knowledge 
which is that it is true, justified belief. Russell was 
saying that only sense data justify belief and thereby turn 
it into knowledge. This was nothing particularly new, the 
sense datum theory can be traced back at least as far as 
John Stuart Mill. 
Russell's next move was rather unusual. He went on to say 
that not only was knowledge built up out of sense data but 
that meaning was also built up out of sense data. This was 
quite profound because if sense data are required for 
meaning they are also required for the formulation of 
belief. For Russell it was not possible to even believe 
anything that was not based on sense data. This, therefore, 
was a unified theory of knowledge and meaning. 
In the 1905 paper "On Denoting" Russell developed his theory 
of descriptions. This claimed that most names are in fact 
disguised descriptions. Names apparently refer to 
individuals but "On Denoting" hoped to show that names can 
be unpacked into logically equivalent descriptions which 
have sense but no individual reference. Russell (1918) went 
on to say that the only "logically proper names" have 
individual reference and these only refer to sense data. 
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The elegance of this theory was very appealing. 
Wittgenstein's Tractatus (1922) with its "picture theory of 
meaning" is firmly in this tradition. Rudolf Carnap and the 
Vienna Circle were working on similar ideas which were 
popularized in Britain by A. J. Ayer (1936) in his best 
selling book Language, Truth and Logic. More than any other 
text this book represents the views that people began to 
call "Logical Positivism". 
3.2.2 Empiricism and phenomenalism 
Taken independently of the theory of meaning, the sense 
datum theory is just one species of the philosophical 
position known as "phenomenalism". This comes from John 
Stuart Mill who held that objects were just "permanent 
possibilities of sensation" (Ayer, 1969, p. 224-5). The 
empiricist says that all knowledge comes from what we have 
experience of. The phenomenalist takes this fi. ýrther and says 
all knowledge is made up of experiences, for the 
phenomenalist what these experiences are experiences of is 
something we cannot know. 
The position known as "phenomenology" ends up being similar 
to phenomenalism in its account of the external world. 
However, phenomenologists, such as Edmund Husserl, get there 
by a different route. This is the route of rationalism which 
claims that knowledge is a priori, a result of thought 
rather than a result of experience. 
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The trouble with phenomenalists and phenomenologists it that 
they board up the window to the outside world leaving the 
subject completely alone. 
3.2.3 Language games 
By the 1940s Wittgenstein had changed his mind completely 
about the nature of language. In the Philosophical 
Investigations, which was not published until 1953, he 
produced an argument that was fatal to Logical Atomism, 
Logical Positivism and many of the ideas in his own 
T-ractatus. This became known as "the private language 
argument". The private language argument shows that it is 
not possible for a language to refer to objects that only 
one person can, as a matter of logic, know about. Sense data 
are logically private because only one person can know his 
own sense data. 
The private language argument is a complex one and the 
exposition here will be limited to an outline. Kenny (1973) 
considers that the crux of the argument is that the terms of 
a private language could not be defined. He identifies three 
prongs to the attack. First, it contends that a private 
object, a sense datum such as a pain, cannot be ostensively 
defined. That is, a person cannot merely fix his attention 
on a sensation and name it "so and so". -- 
98 
... what does it mean to say that he has 'named his 
pain'? - How has he done this naming of pain?! And 
whatever he did, what was its purpose? - When one says 
"He gave a name to his sensation" one forgets that a 
great deal of stage-setting in the language is 
presupposed if the mere act of naming is to make 
sense. (Investigations, 257) 
Secondly, a private sensation cannot be defined in terms of 
a previous sensation. 
We are supposing that I wish to justify my calling a 
private sensation 'S' by appealing to a mental table 
in which memory-samples of private objects of various 
kinds are listed in correlation with symbols ... To make 
use of such a table one must call up the right 
memory-sample: e. g. I must make sure to call up the 
memory-sample that belongs alongside 'S' and not the 
one that belongs alongside 'T'. But as this table 
exists only in the imagination, there can be no real 
looking up to see which sample goes with 'S', i. e. 
remembering what 'S' means. But this is precisely what 
the table was meant to confirm. In other words the 
memory of the meaning of 'S' is being used to confirm 
itself. (Kenny, 1973, pp. 192-3) 
Thirdly, a private sensation cannot be defined in terms of 
public events. 
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Let us now imagine a use for the entry of the sign 
in my diary. I discover that whenever I have a 
particular sensation a monometer shews that my 
blood-pressure rises. So I shall be able to say that my 
blood-pressure is rising without using any apparatus. 
This is a useful result. And now it seems quite 
indifferent whether I have recognized the sensation 
right or not. Let us suppose that I regularly identify 
it wrong, it does not matter in the least. And that 
alone shews that the hypothesis that I make a mistake 
is a mere show. (We as it were turned a knob which 
looked as if it could be used to turn on some part of 
the machine; but it was a mere ornament, not connected 
with the mechanism at all. ). (Investigations, 270) 
To replace the idea of language as something based on 
reference to logically private objects and events, 
Wittgenstein developed the idea of language as consisting 
essentially of rules. In the Investigations the notion of a 
language game is developed. A language is like a game. You 
cannot play the game if you don't obey the rules but the 
rules are no more that an agreement among the putative 
players about how to play the game. There are many games 
that you can play and new ones are being made up all the 
time. For the later Wittgenstein language is public, and the 
references in any language are learned from publicly 
observable objects and events. 
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3.3 Theories of meaning 
3.3.1 Connotation and denotation 
The word "meaning" has a wide range of usage in the English 
language and only part of that range will be relevant to the 
arguments in this chapter. We will be concerned with meaning 
only in so far as it is about the understanding of the 
elements in a language. These are for example, words, terms, 
sentences and statements. We shall not be concerned with the 
following types of usage: meaningful relations between 
lovers, a meaningful action, what a red sky at night means. 
Meaning can be broken down into sense and reference. Frege 
made this distinction with the terms "sinn" and "bedeutung" 
(1892), John Stuart Mill with the terms "connotation" and 
"denotation" (1843) and the terms "intension" and 
"extension" are also used to make the same distinction. This 
distinction is now included in standard logic textbooks. 
Proper names have denotation but no connotation, but general 
terms have both. "A general or class term denotes the 
objects to which it may correctly be applied ... The 
properties possessed by all of the objects in a term's 
extension are called the intension or connotation of that 
term" (Copi, 1968). A simpler way of putting this is that 
sense and connotation are concerned with the relation of 
terms to other terms, while reference and denotation is 
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concerned with the relation between terms and objects or 
events. 
3.3.2 The ideational theory revived 
The ideational theory has an intuitive plausibility for 
modern Western people, but as Grayling points out "The word 
"idea" entered into ordinary English usage only a few 
centuries ago, until which time it had been strictly a 
philosophical term of art. " It is not until the theory is 
worked through that its initial plausibility is seen to be 
chimerical. One would expect the ideational theory to appeal 
to a computer scientist who is just beginning to come to 
grips with the wider aspects of information system design. 
When the word "subjective" appears in the context of meaning 
in the information systems literature the author is often 
taking a tacit ideational stance. 
Nevertheless, a tendency towards the ideational position is 
not confined to writers unfamiliar with the theory of 
meaning. For example, a fairly recent paper on semiotics by 
Ronald Stamper (1987) seems, at first glance, very close to 
Wittgenstein. Stamper emphasizes agreement and context as 
essential to the understanding of meaning. He also 
explicitly disavows the ideational theory (the position he 
calls "psychologism"). However, a close attention to the 
paper indicates a tacit ideationalism. This is evident when 
we consider what he has to say about Tarski's theory of 
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truth. This theory can be expressed very crudely as the 
theory that a statement is true if and only if it refers to 
an actual state of affairs. Thus: 
"Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white. 
Stamper attacks this theory because he thinks it makes two 
big assumptions: 
There is a definite, independently existing world (for 
without it we cannot resolve semantic questions this 
way). There clearly is, or equally clearly is not, a 
correspondence between a sentence and any world of 
which it might be stated. The first is again the naive 
belief in one objective reality... " (Stamper, 1987) 
The first point to notice about this is that Stamper is 
overstating the theory, when he says that the correspondence 
must be clear, if he means that all claims to a 
correspondence are incorrigible. The theory makes no such 
assumptions. For example if all the swans I have encountered 
are white I will be justified in believing that "swans are 
white" and if I do this I will hold that "swans are white" 
is true. Later if I encounter a black swan I will realize 
that my earlier belief, although justified at that time, was 
in fact false. The main object of the correspondence theory 
is to show that justified belief and truth are not always 
the same thing. 
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Be this as it may, the main point is that it is difficuit to 
see how Stamper can avoid an ideational stance if he rejects 
the notion of an independently existing world. This is 
because we are forced to ask what "swans are white" refers 
to if there is no independently existing world. If there is 
no "independent" world then, presumably, there must be some 
sort of dependent world, and what sort of world is this? A 
passage at the beginning of the paper might help to clarify 
Stamper's position: 
Meanings express personal views of reality. When there 
is a firmly established consensus, and only then, we 
can pretend that meanings are independent of people. " 
(Stamper, 1987) 
What Stamper seems to be implying here is that the subject 
alone determines meaning - that public languages are a sort 
of Esperanto built up out of private languages. From this it 
follows that essentially "swans are white" refers to 
something subjective - one-of numerous personal realities. 
This is certainly ideational. If we agree with Wittgenstein 
then it is clear that Stamper has the boot on the wrong 
foot. Language is public and refers primarily to public 
events. References to subjective sensations are derived from 
a public language. I don't make up my own word for my pains 
and then translate it into English. I learn the use of the 
English word "pain" by observing public events and then 
apply the word to my own pains. This does not prevent people 
from giving different meanings to the same utterance or 
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symbol, this is because the same utterance or symbol is used 
in different language games. There can be symbols that mean 
a certain thing in coipputer jargon but mean something 
completely different in prison slang. This is because 
computer scientists and prisoners play different language 
games. Which language game is being played at a particular 
time will depend on the history of the players and the 
context in which it is being played. 
Stamper appears to assume that meaning must be entirely 
objective or entirely subjective. He reasons that meaning 
cannot be entirely ob3ective because words do not have 
meanings in themselves, and, therefore, meaning must be 
entirely subjective. But his assumption is wrong. Meaning is 
public and as such it is dependent upon the existence of at 
least two knowing individuals and dependent upon the 
existence of independent and observable objects and events. 
3.3.3 Truth and rules 
In the proceeding section a discussion of the correspondence 
theory of truth was used to draw out Stamper's tacit 
ideational position. A complication must now be added 
because Wittgenstein did not accept correspondence theories 
of truth either. However, his reasons were quite different 
from Stamper's. The later Wittgenstein subscribed to the 
redundancy theory of truth. This is the theory that saying 
105 
that "All swans are white is true" or saying that "It is a 
fact that all swans are white" is the same as saying ''All 
swans are white" 
I 
An objection to the redundancy theory of truth is that 
without a correspondence to facts sentences cannot form 
truth-functional compounds. Kripke gives Wittgenstein's 
answer as: 
We call something a proposition, and hence true or 
false, when in our language we apply the calculus of 
truth functions to it. That is, it is 3ust a primitive 
part of our language game... " (Kripke, 1982). 
This reveals an important part of Wittgenstein's thought. 
For Wittgenstein formal systems such as mathematics and 
logic are language games. For Wittgenstein reference was not 
possible outside a rule based language game. A new game can 
be devised and played by a group of people agreeing to a set 
of rules. In the same way a language game will produce rules 
and these rules can be formalized. In the following sections 
it is argued that the SSM conceptual model building process 
is, in part, a language game. As such it offers a viable 
alternative to attempts to design information systems on the 
basis of an ideational theory of meaning. 
Before proceeding I shall summarize the difference between 
Stamper and Wittgenstein. Stamper objects to the 
correspondence theory because he thinks there is no 
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independently existing world. For Wittgenstein there must be 
an independently existing world because language cannot 
refer to a logically private world. Wittgenstein's objection 
to the correspondence theory is that it is part of a 
language game not something that stands over and above all 
language games. However, whether Wittgenstein's objection 
fires or not depends on how we take the correspondence 
theory. If we do not take it as a supreme principle, but 
take it as something to distinguish between justified belief 
and knowledge within a certain system of definitions, then I 
do not think Wittgenstein would object to it. 
3.4 SSM and Wittgenstein 
3.4.1 SSM and subjectivity 
It seems that in information systems circles the term 
"interpretivist" is now being used to denote methods that 
imply that a social situation is open to more than one 
interpretation, while the term "positivist" is used to 
denote methods that imply that there is only one valid 
account of a social situation. In this sense SSM is 
interpretivist, as opposed to positivist, in its account of 
social events. This might lead one to believe that it must 
be ideational in its account of meaning, but this does not 
follow. An ideational account of meaning entails an 
interpretivist account of social events and this is why they 
tend to be found together. However, a rejection of the 
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ideational account of meaning does not entail that there is 
only one valid account of a social event. The language game 
theory of meaning is compatible with the idea that there are 
a number of equally valid ways of describing a social event. 
3.4.2 SSM as a language game 
Checkland has always been adamant that SSM conceptual models 
are neither true nor false, nor are they correct or 
incorrect. They are not intended to be a representation of a 
real world state of affairs. However, if they are neither 
true nor false they cannot be representations of anything. 
They cannot, for example, be a representation of the 
stake-holders' ideas. Nor can they be a representation of 
what the stake-holders mean by something. 
It is this fact that suggests that conceptual model building 
can be explained, at least partially, as a type of 
Wittgensteinian language game. If we take it that the 
stake-holders and the facilitator are playing a game in 
which a new language is created to describe the problem 
situation, then the validity of the model does not require 
that it has a truth value. Taken as a language game the 
building of a conceptual model is a public event in which 
the stake-holders come to an agreement about the terms that 
can be used to describe the problem. The model, therefore, 
has the logical status of an agreement and agreements are 
neither true nor false. A more formal explanation is that 
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the finalized conceptual model (the one that marks the end 
point of the iterative debate) is a definition of a 
desirable state of affairs. Here the definition is a 
stipulative definition, and once again by the standard 
account (see Robinson, 1954), stipulative definitions are 
neither true nor false. (This is an acceptable account if we 
limit ourselves to non-modal logics. Later, modal logics, 
which distinguish two types of truth, will be introduced. 
When this is done we will be able to say that stipulative 
definitions are "logically true" but factually neither true 
nor false. This is still compatible with Checkland as he can 
be understood as saying that conceptual models are not 
factually true or false. ) 
This mode of explanation is not open to ideationalists 
because for them meaning ultimately resides with ideas in 
the subject's consciousness. From this it would follow that 
a conceptual model would only be meaningful in so far as it 
represented ideas in a subjective consciousness. If this 
were the case it would be true to say that the model was 
meaningful if it did in fact represent the subject's ideas 
and it would be false to say it was meaningful if it did 
not. Thus for ideationalists a putatively meaningful 
conceptual model would be representational and, therefore, 
true or false. 
Although they cannot be true or false putative conceptual 
models can be valid or invalid. Validity is concerned with 
consistency within a set of rules rather than with 
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representation. We can talk of a valid agreement and by this 
we mean that the agreement conforms to certain rules and 
regulations for making agreements. A valid agreement in 
British law is one that conforms to British law on 
agreements. With conceptual models validity will consist of 
conformity to the rules of conceptual model building. For 
example, a rule for SSM conceptual model building is that 
every bubble must have an arrow going into it or an arrow 
coming out of it. 
The rules of SSM model building are a higher order language 
game. Before the stake-holders can start building a SSM 
model relevant to the problem situation they must accept the 
rules of SSM model building. If they do not want to accept 
these rules, that's fine - they can do something else; but 
they cannot build an SSM model and refuse to accept the 
rules. 
SSM rules are part of another language game and subject to a 
yet higher set of rules. These rules include'the basic laws 
of logic such as the law of non-self-contradiction. Once 
again it is up to the stake-holders whether they want to 
play this game. If they do not, and they are happy with 
self-contradiction, that's fine. But in this case they are 
hardly likely to want a computerized information system. 
This account is compatible with much of what is written 
about the models but also with the practice of SSM. One of 
the thrusts behind the development of SSM was the concern to 
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develop a way of dealing with messy problem situations, and 
its ability to do so remains its Principal attraction. One 
of the reasons that messy problems arise in organizations is 
because the stake-holders cannot, literally, understand each 
other. The stake-holders often have different functions, 
come from different backgrounds and have been educated in 
different disciplines. They rarely share the same 
vocabulary. The conceptual model building process enables a 
common vocabulary to be built up. 
3.4.3 Modal logic and truth in SSM 
To regard conceptual models as being valid but neither true 
nor false is one solution. However, a more elegant and 
potentially useful solution to the problem is offered by 
modal logic. Modal logics distinguish between necessarily 
true statements and contingently true statements. 
Necessarily true statements or formulas are prefixed by the 
"L" while contingently true statements are prefixed by the 
"M' modal operator. Another way of making this distinction, 
which avoids confusion with the notion of causal necessity, 
is to say that the "L" operator stands for what is logically 
true and the "M' stands for what is factually true. 
Logically true statements are true either by virtue of the 
sense of the words used in them "all bachelors are 
unmarried" or because they follow logically from other 
necessarily true statements. Although necessary statements 
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cannot be false they can be meaningless because they can be 
constructed in such a way that they refer to nothing. "All 
unicorns are unicorns" is necessarily true but meaningless 
because unicorns do not exist. 
Factual statements cannot be necessarily true because 
nothing in the real world is true because of the way words 
are defined. Therefore, it is always logically possible for 
any factual statements to be false, and, therefore, factual 
statements are always contingent. 
Modal logics are used to deal with counterfactual 
conditions. Such statements as "if Jones had listened to his 
accountant he would be rich today" are considered to be true 
in circumstances where Jones did not, in fact, listen to his 
accountant and where Jones is not, in fact, rich today. 
Modal logicians account for this by saying that in one 
possible world Jones did listen to his accountant and in 
that world he is rich. This analys is is known as "possible 
world semantics". The modal operator "L" is used to denote 
what has to be true in all possible worlds, while the 
operator "M' is used to denote what is false in at least one 
possible world. 
If we accept that conceptual models are stipulative 
definitions then they cannot be factually true. If they are 
to be truth functional and play a part in a logical calculus 
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they must, therefore, be necessarily true. We can now return 
to Checkland & Scholes remark, quoted in Chapter 1, about 
validity: 
Since the model does not purport to be a description 
of part of the real world, merely a holon relevant to 
debating perceptions of the real world, adequacy or 
validity cannot be checked against the real world. 
Such models are not, in fact, "valid" or "invalid", 
only technically defensible or indefensible. 
(Checkland & Scholes, p. 41, original italics). 
What is being stated here is that the model is not factually 
true or false. In modal logic we can accept this but still 
be able to say that the model is logically true. Modal 
logic, therefore, captures Checkland's sentiment very well. 
3.5 Conclusions about meaning and information . I- 
3.5.1 Meaningful foundations 
Logical Atomism and Logical Positivism are the most forceful 
attempts at a ideational account of meaning. The leaders of 
these movements all abandoned this position in their later 
writing. The ideational account of meaning takes us back to 
the beginnings of Logical Atomism. There is, therefore, a 
danger that the information systems literature will start to 
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rerun a futile debate that began in the 20s and finished in 
the 60s. This will not be necessary if due attention is 
given to the legacy of Wittgenstein. 
Understood as a language game the SSM iterative debate 
provides both a firm theoretical foundation and a powerful 
practical tool for the development of information systems. 
Computer systems are rule bound and formal. It has been 
argued above that there are rules implicit in SSM conceptual 
models, these rules can be developed and formalized in 
logico-linguistic models. This opens the way for the 
rigorous development of computerized information systems 
that will be meaningful not only to professional analysts 
and designers but also to the people who use and interact 
with the system. 
3.5.2 Improved logic 
This section has shown how conceptual models, understood as 
language games, could be formally expressed in modal logic. 
This overcomes one of the difficulties that were found in 
the use of propositional logic in Chapter 2. A second 
shortcoming is that propositional logic does not distinguish 
between universal statements and particular statements. This 
needs to be done, tacitly or otherwise, in every information 
system. For this the predicate calculus is required. 
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UNIVERSALS & PARTICULARS 
4.1 The need for predicate logic 
Chapters 2 and 3 indicated a general need for the use of 
predicate and modal logics in the analysis of SSM models. 
While Chapter 3 was concerned with the overall status of the 
models the present chapter continues the work of chapter 2 
by examining the technical details of the models. Attention 
to the technical details give a second line of argument for 
the use of predicate and modal logics. 
The Chapter begins with a discussion of Probert's (1991, 
1993) challenge to the fundamental basis of SSM Modelling. 
Wilson and Checkland & Scholes (1990) claim that their 
conceptual models show logical dependencies. Probert argues 
that their models cannot be logical in any sense of the 
word. This argument can be answered by the introduction of 
predicate logic with its distinction between universal and 
particular statements. However, making this distinction 
reveals a number of important facts about conceptual models. 
The first fact is that the conceptual models produced by 
Wilson and Checkland in their Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) 
are "logical" in a quite different way from the way in which 
the Multiview models are "logical". These two senses of 
"logical" can be distinguish by using modal logic. 
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The universal/particular distinction has implications for 
information system design. The rules for Knowledge Based 
Systems can be derived directly from universals. The 
argument, therefore, turns full circle. Objections to the 
logic of conceptual models prompts a deeper analysis, the 
deeper analysis shows how the models can reveal a logical 
structure suitable for information system design. 
In spite of this, there are ambiguities about the status of 
SSM models. This is brought out in section 4.3 which 
considers the origins of universals. Three types of 
universal are identified: inductive hypotheses, value 
statements and definitions. In section 4.4 an argument is 
made, complementary to the language game theory, that the 
SSM models are definitional. This creates problems in 
determining that a given model has any relation to the real 
world because to establish this would seem to require 
inductive hypotheses. Section 4.4 indicates that Multiview 
models, by contrast, are collections of inductive 
hypotheses. The section argues that Multiview is faced with 
a problem that is the opposite of SSM: a hypothesis can only 
be formulated in a language, a language requires definitions 
and the Multiview model building does not generate 
definitions. 
The chapter concludes by suggesting that a new type of model 
could be constructed. The new models would include 
definitions and inductive hypotheses thereby combining the 
advantages of the SSM method with those of multiview. A 
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further feature could be the inclusion of value statements. 
This would make the models logically comprehensive as well 
as adding a new dimension to the model building process. 
4.2 The "universal" solution 
4.2.1 Probert's Problem 
The word "logic" has come to mean a variety of things. The 
Collins English Dictionary gives seven definitions, only two 
of these will be relevant here: 1. the branch of philosophy 
concerned with analyzing the patterns of reasoning by which 
a conclusion is drawn from a set of premises, without 
reference to meaning or context. ... 6. the relationship and 
interdependency of a series of events, facts etc. 
The conceptual models in SSM are represented as words 
contained in bubbles which are joined by arrows. The arrows 
are intended to show a relationships of "logical 
contingency". Thus in figure 11 a bubble containing the 
words "Discharge patient" is connected by an arrow to 
another bubble containing the words "Apply treatment". A 
vital point here is that this could function on one of, at 
least, two levels. The arrows could be intended to show 
logical contingency between the expressions in the bubbles 
(first level) or logical contingency between real world 
events that correspond to these expressions (second level). 
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If the logical contingency is intended to be at the second 
level then this will be consistent with the definition of 
logic in sense 6. This is exactly what "logic" means in the 
Multiview conceptual models: "use arrows to join the 
activities that are logically connected to each other by 
information, energy, material or other dependency ... 
(Avison & Wood-Harper, 1990, p. 60). 
This is quite different from the account of conceptual 
models given by Wilson and Checkland. The language game 
explanation of SSM conceptual models not only fits well with 
mainstream writing but also allows us to describe the models 
as being "logical" in sense 1. This in turn allows the 
models to be expressed as being logically true in modal 
logic. Therefore, provisionally at least, we can take it 
that the SSM models are not logical in sense 6. and that the 
Multiview conceptual models are a different type of thing. 
Probert's argues that the arrows in the SSM models cannot be 
logical in sense 1. because the contents of the bubbles are 
imperatives, and logical relationships in sense I. can only 
hold between declaratives. "Discharge patient" is a command 
and standard logics only operate on statements or 
propositions. This point was anticipated in chapter 2 by the 
suggestion that the commands could be converted into 
parallel statements. Thus, "Discharge patient" could be 
converted into "The command Discharge the patient has been 
obeyed" or simply "The patient has been discharged". 
Similarly we can substitute "Treatment has been applied" for 
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"Apply treatment", and "Treatment has been prescribed" for 
"Prescribe treatment". This gives Figure 12 which can be 
expressed in the propcsitional calculus as: 
(t -> 
But Probert still does not find this satisfactory. His 
argument (1993, p. 240) can be paraphrased as follows "the 
patient has been discharged does not logically enta 1 
treatment has been applied. " His point depends on what we 
take t -> s to mean. There is a certain ambigiýity here that 
can only be resolved by using predicate logic. 
4.2.2 The hidden premise 
If we add a universal statement to the two statements given 
above, the problem is resolved: 
Major Premise: All cases where a patient has been discharged 
are cases where treatment has been applied. 
Minor Premise: A patient has been discharged 
Conclusion: Treatment has been applied (by Modus Ponens) 
Here we have the classic syllogism in which the major 
premise is a universal, the minor premise is a particular, 
and the particular conclusion follows by Modus Ponens. 
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Probert's Problem is that the conclusion here cannot 
logically follow from the minor premise without the ma3or 
premise. This means that the model shown in figure 12 is a 
logically contingent argument. It is not, as it stands, a 
logically valid argument. The universal given above is a 
hidden premise in the argument that the figure represents. 
It can be noted that this will usually be the case with 
figures such as figure 12. The statements in these types of 
figure are always particulars. It it is unusual that a 
particular conclusion can be drawn from particular premises. 
Normally a particular will be deduced from a particular 
premise and a universal premise. An exception is simple 
conjunction, we can deduce "Socrates is a tall man" from the 
particular premises "Socrates is a man" and "Socrates is 
tall". 
Although figure 12 is not logically valid it is not false, 
and it can be made into a logically valid argument by adding 
universals. This can be done using the predicate calculus. 
This involves the use of quantifiers. "A" will be used as 
the universal quantifier and "E" as the existential 
quantifier. Normally these are printed upside down but 
typographical constrains prevent this here. We can express 
figure 12 in predicate logic as follows: 
Domain: people who go to hospital 
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Tx: x is a patient who is discharged 
Sx: x is a patient who is treated 
RX: x is a patient foiý whom treatment is prescribed 
1 Prem (Ax) Tx -> Sx 
2 Prem (Ex) Tx 
3 (Ex) Sx From 1 and 2 by Modus Ponens 
4 Prem (Ax) Sx -> Rx 
(EX) Sx From 3 
6 (EX) RX From 4 and 5 by Modus Ponens 
This can be rendered in English as follows: 
1 For all patients, if a patient has been discharged then 
that patient has had treatment. 
2 At least one patient has been discharged. 
3 At least one patient has had treatment. 
4 For all patients, if a patient has had treatment then that 
patient has had a treatment prescribed. 
5 At least one patient has had treatment. 
6 At least one patient has had treatment prescribed. - 
The first three lines here repeat the syllogism given above. 
To this is added, at 4, another universal premise. Given 
this we can deduce 6. This is illustrated in figure 13 where 
the elements from figure 12 have been expressed in the 
predicate calculus and the two universals have been added; 
the arrows have been included only to show the general flow 
of the argument. 
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The example given here is a simple one because the domain 
contains only one type of object and the predicates are all 
one placed predicates. However, this does not effect the 
argument as the numerous distinct objects and n-placed 
predicates can be dealt with in essentially the same way. 
It is significant that with the universals included in this 
way, the arrows from figure 12 are no longer necessary. The 
universals replace the arrows. It is no longer necessary to 
state (p -> s) & (s -> r) because this is contained in the 
two universals. The whole of figure 11, and any other 
conceptual model, can be expressed entirely in terms of 
universals. 
4.2.3 SSM models as universals 
An interesting fact about universals is that they do not, in 
themselves, commit us to the existence of anything. (Ax) Tx 
-> Sx does not imply that anything exists. It could just as 
easily represent "All unicorns eat ambrosia", which does not 
imply the existence of unicorns or ambrosia. It is not until 
we add a particular statement that there is any commitment 
to existence. That is why (Ex) is called the existential 
quantifier. In the argument above, existential commitment 
begins with (Ex) Tx, the fact that there is at least one 
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patient who is discharged. Once existence has been 
introduced existential consequences follow, such as (Ex) sx, 
the fact that at least one patient has had treatment. 
Expressing SSM conceptual models in universals ties in well 
with the idea discussed above: that the models are elaborate 
definitions not models of what exists, necessarily, in the 
real world. The predicate calculus highlights this 
distinction and shows that the model will only map on to the 
real world if a set of particular statements are true. This 
prompts epistemological questions that will be fully 
addressed in a later section. 
4.2.4 Knowledge Based Systems 
A direct information systems application is now apparent. 
The type of formula given above has an immediate counterpart 
in Prolog programming. The universals correspond directly to 
Prolog "rules". Lines 1 and 4, above, would be: 
has-treatment (X) :- isdischarged (X). 
has treatment_prescribed (X) :- hastreatment 
the particulars would correspond to Prolog "facts". However, 
there could not be a direct counterpart to the existential 
quantifier. A Prolog program requires a value for the x in 
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(AX); to Put it more precisely, there must be an 
instantiation- instead of the object variable in a Prolog 
program. 
In the example, this would be satisfied by naming a person, 
say Socrates, who is discharged: 
is-discharged (socrates). 
Given this Prolog "fact", the program will return the answer 
"socrates" when asked who has had treatment prescribed. 
This, therefore, is a rudimentary Knowledge Based System. It 
can also be noted that there are parallels between 
universals and field structure, and between particulars and 
records, in traditional data base design. There are, 
therefore, good indications that a relational data base 
design can be derived from these predicate calculus 
formulas. How to do this will be shown in section 7.5. 
4.3 Three types of universal 
4.3.1 Inductive hypotheses 
Expressing SSM conceptual models in terms of universals 
escapes logical objections and thereby solves the immediate 
problem. Nevertheless, difficulties remain because the 
universals are, as they stand, contingent. All we have done 
is swap a contingent model in the propositional calculus for 
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a collection of contingent universals. The status of the 
model will, therefore, depend upon where these universals 
come from. The most natural answer would be that they are 
"factual statements", that is, inductive hypotheses about 
the real world and based on real world experience. But in 
this case the models would not be notional. However, this 
conclusion can be avoided because the universals in the 
model need not be inductive hypotheses. We can distinguish 
two other types of universal, these are value statements and 
definitions. 
4.3.2 Value statements 
Value statements include statements about personal tastes, 
such as "all of Shakespeare's plays are rubbish", and moral 
statements, such as "everyone ought to give to charity". 
Value statements can be distinguished from factual 
statements by a number of logical and epistemological 
properties. Evidence can be used to support or falsify 
factual statements but not value judgements. "All swans are 
white" is given supportive evidence by the observation of 
more and more white swans, and it falsified by the 
observation of one black swan. There is no evidence for 
"everyone ought to give to charity" nor can it be falsified 
empirically. 
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Value statements connote a certain form of behavior. If 
Icabod believes that "everyone ought to give to charity" 
then Icabod will approve of charitable acts. Although they 
cannot be falsified empirically, two value statements can be 
shown to be incompatible with each other when they connote 
contradictory behavior. Factual statements do not connote 
any form of behavior. 
From the logical point of view it is plausible to construct 
conceptual models entirely out of value statements. We can 
imagine what this would look like. With the universals "All 
people who drop litter are bad" and "All bad people should 
be punished", and an instantiation, "Icabod drops litter". 
we can draw the conclusion: "Icabod should be punished". 
Value statements alone, will not, of course, account for the 
models that are, in fact, produced in SSM. There is no way 
that "All cases where a patient has been discharged are 
cases where treatment has been applied" could be construed 
as a value statement. 
SSM prides itself on being able to deal with the human 
aspect of a problem situation. It is, therefore, surprising 
to find that value statements have a very small role in the 
building of conceptual models. Value statements are usually 
implicit in the criterion for effectiveness and they can 
sometimes, but not always, be found in the Weltanschauung 
part of CATWOE. More recently (Checkland & Scholes, 1990) 
Ethicality (is Ta moral thing to do) and Elegance (is T 
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aesthetically pleasing) have appeared as additional measures 
of performance making a total of five Es. However, people 
have complex systems of values and few people ever share 
exactly the same set of values. SSM has made no attempt to 
model values and show how a number of different sets can be 
accommodated into a consensual view of what is ethical or 
elegant. 
Apart from measures of performance values rarely appear. 
Despite the fact that the models are constructed in the 
language of imperatives these almost always turn out to be 
practical rather that value ridden imperatives. They are of 
the form "You should turn left if you want to get to the 
station" rather than "You should give to charity if you want 
to be good". 
Another crucial difference between value and factual 
statements is that value statements are not reducible to 
factual statements and factual statements are not reducible 
to value statements. What this means is that we cannot 
derive factual statements from value statements. If we are 
to draw a factual conclusion we must have at least one 
factual premise, factual conclusions cannot be drawn from 
value statements alone. The same is true of value 
statements, a conclusion that expresses a value cannot be 
derived from purely factual premises. This point is summed 
up in the dictum "you cannot derive ought from is". Given 
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this and SSM's anti-reductionist stance, it is even more 
surprising that value statement have such a small role to 
play in the models. 
4.3.3 Definitions 
If we accept that SSM conceptual models are not intended, in 
any straight forward way, to be models of things that are in 
the real world, then we are forced to the conclusion that 
the universals must be definitions. 
A distinction is made between definitions intended to 
establish an existing meaning, descriptive definitions, and 
definitions giving a proposed meaning for the future, 
stipulative or prescriptive definitions. 
Taking the SSM universals to be descriptive definitions has 
an initial plausibility. In this case the conceptual models 
would not be models of the real world but models of a 
language used to describe the real world. This could account 
for a lot of what happens in practice. Organizations tend to 
develop their own languages. The process of SSM conceptual 
model building could be taken to be a process whereby the 
stake-holders describe how this language is used. But if 
this were all that was going on the process would be quite 
simple and there would be no need for a lengthy iterative 
debate about the model. 
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Taking the SSM universals to be stipulative definitions is 
much more plausible and can be grounded in Wittgenstein's 
language game theory. Given this Figure 11 can be 
interpreted as a set of rules for the use of a language 
within a particular organization. The universals given in 
section 4.2.3 could be expressed-as rules: 
Rule 1: Nothing is to be described as "a discharged patient" 
unless it is preceded by something that can be described as 
"an application of treatment". 
Rule 2: Nothing is to be described as "an application of 
treatment" unless it is preceded by something that can be 
described as "a prescription of treatment" 
This account of conceptual models in terms of stipulative 
definitions fits well with the main thrust of SSM which is 
to address unstructured problems. Unstructured problems come 
about not because of a lack of structure in the real world 
but because of a lack of structure in descriptions of the 
real world. The creation of a cohesive set of definitions 
can provide the structure. 
For example, if we want to find out if all Christians know 
the Bible, then the main methodological problem is going to 
be deciding what Christians are (PeoPle who say they are? 
People who goes to church regularly? ) and what is meant by 
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"knows the Bible" (All of it? Most Of it? Some Of it? ) - Once 
these things have been decided, collecting the real world 
data will be, methodologically, fairly simple. 
4.4 Universals and the status of SSM models 
4.4.1 Implication and entailment 
Modal logic distinguishes two types of implication. These 
are material implication and strict implication or 
entailment (some logicians might hold that "strict 
implication" and "entailment" are not exactly the same 
thing, but for the purposes of this thesis the distinction 
is irrelevant). The difference between the two types of 
implication can be made using the two modal operators "L" 
and "M'. Suppose that "all cats are animals" is true as a 
matter of definition. Then it is not possible to find a cat 
that is not an animal. In modal logic we would say that x 
being a cat strictly entails x being an animal. In symbols: 
Cx: x is a cat 
Ax: x is an animal 
L (AX) Cx -> Ax 
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Suppose that "All cats like milk" is true as a matter of 
fact. Then in at it is at least possible, but it may never 
happen, that a cat cap be found that does not like milk. In 
modal logic we would say that x being a cat materially 
implies x liking milk. In symbols: 
Kx: x likes milk 
M (AX) Cx -> Kx 
4.4.2 Process definitions 
This brings us back to Probert. If the conceptual models are 
essentially causal in nature then material implication is 
the strongest relation we can use to express them. If 
conceptual models are essentially definitional, as is 
contended in this chapter, then the stronger relation of 
entailment can be used. 
The model represented in figure 11 looks like a cause and 
effect diagram and there is nothing in its logical 
expression that indicates that it is not. However, the 
manner of its construction shows that it is not a 
representation of a process of cause and effect but that it 
is a process definition. Most things are defined bY their 
qualities. A chair can be defined as an object with a seat, 
a back support and more than two legs. Other things are 
defined by the process of their production. Whiskey is a 
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spirit distilled from fermented malted grain. Týiis means 
that if you take some grain, malt it, ferment it and then 
distill it you end up with whiskey - no matter what it 
tastes like. By the same token something that has the same 
taste, alcohol content and colour as whiskey is not a 
whiskey unless it is produced by the defining process. For 
example, in Thailand there is a popular liquor called 
"Mehkong" which is made as a substitute for Scotch. 
Originally Mehkong was made from rice, which is a grain, and 
Mehkong was, correctly, called a whiskey. These days it is 
made from molasses, which is not a grain, and so Mehkong is 
now described as a "liqueur" despite the fact that it has 
the same alcoholic content and looks and tastes the same as 
it always did. 
Given that figure 12 is a process definition we can express 
the universals in figure 13 as relations of entailment: 
Prem 1. L (Ax) Tx -> Sx 
Prem 2. L (Ax) Sx -> RX 
The way is now clear for the construction of modal models. 
In Chapter 6 an enhanced logico-linguistic models, 
comprising entailment and excluding material implication, 
will be constructed. This is represented in figure 19. 
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4.4.3 Holons and modal models 
Checkland & Scholes (1990) use the term "holon" to denote a 
system of thought. As such a holon can be distinguish ed from 
a system in the real world. A similar distinction can be 
drawn with regard to logico-linguistic models, such as 
figure 19, which comprise only logically necessary 
relations. Such a logico-linguistic Model is an extended 
definition and as such need not have any correspondence with 
the real world; the model could just as easily be that of 
the family tree of a Greek God as anything in the real 
world. A second important point about the notion of a 
"holon" is that there is no single holon that is correct in 
regard to a given situation. There can be a number of 
equally valid holons relating to the same situation. The 
same is true of logico-linguistic models; the same situation 
could be described using a different set of definitions. 
There is also a similarity with axiomatic systems here. The 
mere fact that an axiomatic system has been formulated is no 
guarantee that it has any correspondence with the real 
world. We also find that the same system, such as the 
propositional calculus, can be formulated using different 
sets of axioms. 
Expanded into logico-linguistic models the SSM conceptual 
modeling method can be a way of producing axiomatic systems. 
This stands to be very useful because one of the problems 
with axiomatic systems is that there is no logical reason 
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for anyone to accept them. If there are reasons for 
accepting a statement then that statement must be some form 
of inference not an axiom. Generally it is said that axioms 
are self evident, but this is just another way of saying 
that they are accepted without reason. Admittedly some 
axiomatic systems, such as arithmetic, seem to be very 
useful whereas others do not. Nevertheless, before an 
axiomatic system can be shown to be useful it must be 
accepted, if only tentatively, and there is no reason to do 
this. SSM solves this problem pragmatically; as the 
stake-holders make up their own axioms the question of their 
acceptability does not arise. However, the question of their 
usefulness does arise, this will be addressed in Chapters 6 
and 8. 
4.4.4 The problem of reference 
This chapter has been concerned with meaning qua sense 
(connotation, intension) with the meaning of terms in the 
context of other terms. It has not dealt with the question 
of how we can establish that a term refers to an existing 
state of affairs. This is a fundamental issue that is 
formulated in different ways. In the language of SSM the 
question is: how can we tell when a conceptual model maps on 
to the real world? In the theory of truth it is: how do we 
establish that a statement corresponds to a fact? In 
Wittgenstein's philosophy it would be: how do we know when a 
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language game is useful? For Hofstadter (1980) it would be: 
how can we establish that an axiomatic system is isomorphic? 
Essentially all these questions are asking: how can 
something that has been made up help us to understand and 
describe something that has not been made up. 
4.4.5 SSM models and the real world 
If the universals that constitute the SSM models are 
definitions, then it follows that the models will be 
analytic rather than synthetic. That is, if they are true 
they are true by the meaning of the words alone. If this is 
the case, there is nothing in the conceptual model building 
process that guarantees that the models can refer anything 
that exists or could exist. There is nothing that prevents 
them from including references to unicorns, Greek gods and 
flying pigs. Obviously, models that contain these types of 
reference cannot be used as a basis for information system 
design or for organizational restructuring. 
Similar problems will arise for those people who consider 
that the only point in building a conceptual model is to 
change peoples' thinking. This is because a change in 
thinking can only be useful if it contains a reference, 
directly or indirectly, to an actual or potential real world 
state of affairs. Pragmatic and verificationist theories of 
meaning hold that without such a reference a change in 
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thinking is not just useless but is, literally, a 
meaningless notion (see, for example, Ayer, 1946). The same 
can be said about values; if a change in values does not 
indicate a change in behavior in response to some actual or 
potential event in the real world, then it is pointless to 
say that there has been any change in values. 
Establishing how an analytic system, such as arithmetic, 
maps on to the real world is the subject of complex and 
contentious theory. In the case of a conceptual model, such 
as that represented in figure 13, we would need to establish 
an instantiation for the object variable (Ex) Tx, i. e. that 
Socrates, or some other person, is discharged. Having 
established that Socrates is discharged, we can establish 
deductively that Socrates has had a treatment prescribed; 
this is true by definition. But if it is true by definition 
it cannot be true that Socrates is discharged and false that 
Socrates has had treatment prescribed. Therefore, in order 
to be sure that Socrates is, in fact, discharged we must be 
sure that he has had a treatment prescribed. But if we must 
be sure that Socrates has had a treatment prescribed before 
we can be sure that Socrates is discharged, then the 
deduction that Socrates has had a treatment prescribed tells 
us nothing new. 
Problems of this order are the basis of the claim by some 
empiricists that tautologies tell us nothing about the real 
world. However, this would appear to be false because 
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arithmetic is an analytic system, true by definition and a 
tautology, but arithmetic appears to tell us a lot about the 
real world. 
This vicious circle can be avoided if there is an 
independent criterion for a patient being discharged, that 
is, a criterion that is not a definition. Suppose the 
completion of Form PQ7 is such a criterion. The relation 
between Socrates is discharged and Form PQ7 has been 
completed for Socrates will be a contingent relation. Let us 
further suppose that there is a similar criterion for a 
patient having a treatment prescribed, say, the completion 
of Form RX5. Now, we find that Form PQ7 has been completed 
for Socrates from this we infer, contingently, that Socrates 
is discharged; from this we deduce that Socrates has had a 
treatment prescribed; and from this we infer, contingently, 
that Form RX5 has been completed for Socrates. More detailed 
examples will be given in later chapters. 
From this we can see how an analytic system has proven 
useful. It has allowed us to infer one contingent event from 
another, events that might otherwise not have been 
connected. But a stronger case than this can be made. It can 
be argued that definitions are not only useful for 
contingent inferences, they are logically necessary (see 
section 4.5.1 below). 
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4.4.6 The essential problem for SSM 
The essential problem for SSM is that there is no logical 
reason why the stake-holders should come up with conceptual 
models (a set of definitions) that map on to the real world. 
Connected to this is the fact that SSM has no way to 
determine whether or not these do or do not map on. 
It could be argued that the real world contingency is 
introduced at a later stage. In Wilson's method the real 
world seems to begin to enter when information inputs and 
output between activities are identified. However, it is not 
altogether clear whether these are meant to be notional 
information input/outputs between notional activities, or 
real world information input/outputs between real world 
activities. In either case there is still a problem. 
If the information input/outputs are notional we still have 
to establish that they can map on to the real world. If they 
are real world information input/outputs between real world 
activities, where did the real world activities come from? 
How was it established that the notional activities from the 
Conceptual Model map on to real world activities? 
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4.5 Universals and Multiview models 
4.5.1 Definitions & inductive hypotheses 
The importance of establishing definitions for universals 
will be readily apparent when it is realized that there is 
no intrinsic way of distinguishing between definitions and 
inductive hypotheses or a fool-proof intrinsic way of 
distinguishing between definitions and value statements. 
Given that a certain universal is not a definition we can. 
tell whether it is a value statement or an inductive 
hypotheses by certain key words that indicate values rather 
than objective facts about the real world. These include 
"should", "ought", "good", "bad", 11nice", "nasty", etc. 
There is no set of words that can identify a definition. 
Today "all men are mortal" would be considered an inductive 
hypothesis by most people. Most people would be likely to 
say that men are mortal because it has been observed that 
every man has died before, say, his 200th birthday. But for 
the Greeks "all men are mortal" was part of the definition 
of a man. The Greeks thought that some men-like beings lived 
for ever, but these were not "men" they were Gods. For us, 
"immortal men" is meaningful, it stands for a class that 
happens to be empty; but for the Greeks "immortal men" was a 
contradiction in terms. 
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Value statements entail certain forms of behavior. From tý. e 
use of the key value words in a given utterance a certain 
form of behavior will normally, but not always, follow. If 
Icabod says "all Christian are good people" then, if his 
utterance was sincere, we would expect Icabod to approve of 
Christians and act appropriately; if this is the case then 
Icabod's utterance was a value statement. However, Icabod 
might have made the utterance sincerely yet disapprove of 
Christians, we can imagine that Icabod prides himself on 
being a bad person; in this case the utterance was not a 
statement of Icabod's values but part of Icabod's definition 
of the words "Christian" and "good". 
A distinction can be made between intensive and extensive 
definition. An intensive definition gives the sense 
(connotation) of the definiendum. An extensive definition 
gives the reference (denotation) of the definiendum. In 
terms of classes an intensive definition will provide a 
criterion of class inclusion whereas an extensive definition 
will list all the members of the class. Thus, an intensive 
definition of "a human limb" would be any jointed appendage 
on the human body, an extensive definition would be an arm 
o-r a leg. 
An argument that definition is logically prior to inductive 
hypotheses can now be put forward. Empirical evidence of 
class inclusion require that the class is defined 
independently of that evidence. For example, if we say that 
all panthers are black then, if this is to be an empirical 
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statement, there must be defining criteria for panthers that 
are independent of their colour. If being black is one of 
the defining criteria-for panthers then "all panthers are 
black" must be analytic and cannot, therefore, be empirical. 
As a matter of fact, being black is a defining criterion for 
panthers. "Panther" is just the word for a black leopard. 
So, to say that "panthers are black" is just to say that 
"black leopards are black" and this cannot be established 
empirically. As it is logically impossible to observe a 
black leopard that is not black, observation could never 
falsify the statement "black leopards are black"; as 
observation can never falsify the statement, observation 
cannot provide inductive evidence for the statement either. 
If a term has been given an intensive definition we can 
establish the extension of the term empirically. Thus, if we 
intensively define "human 1-tmb" as any jointed appendage on 
the human body, then it can be established empirically that 
.. all human limbs are arms or legs. Likewise, if a term has 
been given an extensive definition we can establish the 
intention of the term empirically. If we extensively define 
"human limb" as an arm or a leg then it can be established 
empirically that all human limbs are jointed appendages on 
the human body. 
141 
This distinction between definitions inductive hypotheses 
and the fact that English grammar does not distinguish them 
is one that Wittgenstein made using the terms "criteria'' and 
11symptoms". 
The fluctuation in grammar between criteria and 
symptoms makes it look as though there were nothing at 
all but symptoms. We say, for example: "Experience 
teaches that there is rain when the barometer falls, 
but it also teaches that there is rain when we have 
certain sensations of wet and cold, or such-and-such 
visual impressions. " In defence of this one says that 
these sense-impressions can deceive us. But here one 
fails to reflect the fact that the false appearance is 
precisely one of rain is founded on a definition. 
(Philosophical Investigations, 354) 
What he is saying here is that we can only call something a 
false sensation of rain if we have defining criteria of rain 
that are independent of sensation e. g. in, terms of 
barometric pressure (it cannot be raining if the pressure is 
very high, therefore, if the pressure is high any sensation 
that is normally indicative of rain must be deceptive). 
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4.5.2 Constraints on the Multiview modei 
Having answered the immediate logical problems facing the 
SSM model by a somewhat tortuous route, it is appropr . late to 
point out that the Multiview model is not as simple as it 
might seem. At first glance the Multiview model seems to be 
a generalized model based on observation and as such 
theoretically unproblematic. On closer examination the model 
involves considerable logico-linguistic difficulties. 
Figure 14 is a Multiview conceptual model taken from a case 
study for a Distance Learning Unit. The large arrows 
represent flows of physical things, the small arrows 
represent information flows between the subsystems. If this 
was a model of an existing Distance Learning Unit it would 
not be problematic, nor would it be interesting. It would 
just be a generalized version of a materials flow diagram 
and a conventional data flow diagram. However, in this 
particular case the Distance Learning Unit did not yet 
exist. The Conceptual Model was, according to Avison & 
Wood-Harper, derived from a root definition. This root 
definition was: 
A system owned by the Manpower Services Commission and 
operated by the Paintmakers Association in 
collaboration with the Polytechnic of the South Bank's 
Distance Learning Unit, to provide courses to increase 
technical skills and knowledge for suitably qualified 
and interested parties, that will be of value to the 
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industry, whilst meeting the approval of the Business 
and Technical Education Council, and in a manner that 
is both efficient and financially viable. 
(Avison & Wood-Harper, 1990) 
We can express the double headed arrow between 
Administration System and Course Exposition System in figure 
14 as "there must be a mutual flow of information between an 
Administration System and a Course Exposition System". How 
could this be derived from the root definition? 
As with the SSM model there must be a hidden premise. This 
would be "Whenever there are courses to increase technical 
skills etc. there will be an Administration System and a 
Course Exposition System and a mutual flow of information 
between them". This is, of course, a universal. We can now 
ask: where does it come from? As Multiview statements are at 
the second level, referred to in section 4.2.1, it must be 
an inductive hypothesis based on the observation of other 
courses. 
As we saw above, inductive hypotheses cannot be separated 
from definitions. The universal here would seem to 
specifying part of the extension of the term "courses to 
increase technical skills etc. " this assumes that there is 
an intensive definition of the term. "Technical skill" needs 
to be defined outside of the full extension of the term 
"courses to provide technical skills etc. ". "Technical 
skill" could not be defined in terms of passing the exam, 
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for example; because, in this case, the only thing that 
"technical skill" would mean would be that the exam was 
passed. "Technical skill" needs to be defined in terms of 
some external factor such as the ability to paint a fence 
(presuming that painting a fence is not part of the 
extension of the word "course''). 
4.5.3 The limitations of Multiview 
There are two possible ways in which Multiview can work in 
practice. One is where the stake-holders already have a well 
defined common language. The other is where the definitions 
that an information system requires develop informally 
during Multiview systems analysis. 
The danger with Multiview is that in any given application 
the common language may fail to exist and may fail to 
develop. This danger is compounded by the fact that 
Multiview does not have the means to determine whether the 
common language is there or not. The danger can be avoided 
if definitions were included in the Multiview model building 
process. 
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4.6 A merger of models 
SSM conceptual models pose a dilemma. An adequate account of 
their logic requires the use of universals. If these 
universals are definitions, as Checkland and Wilson seem to 
suggest, then we are faced with the problem of how they can 
map on to the real world. If the universals are inductive 
hypotheses, as Avison and Wood-Harper seem to suggest, then 
we can have problems if there is not an agreed language to 
bind the inductive hypotheses together. 
A solution will be presented in the next chapter. This 
consists of building a logically enhanced model of the 
Checkland and Wilson type, a logico-linguistic model, and 
then adding elements from a Multiview type model to produce 
an empirical model. This method maintains the spirit and 
modus operandi of SSM while introducing logical rigor. The 
method enables modal logic to be introduced as a structured 
part of model building process- 
In the remainder of the thesis universals that express value 
statements will not be considered again. In modal logic a 
value statement can probably be treated as logically true 
because they cannot be falsified by real world facts. The 
neglect of value statements is not a result of lack of 
interest but because the interplay of definitions and 
inductive hypotheses is so complex that a detailed account 
will take up the remaining space. 
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5 REAL WORLD MAPPING 
5.1 The mapping problem 
This chapter will address the real world mapping problem 
that was discussed in Chapter 1. It will use the modal logic 
that was introduced in Chapter 4 to show how SSM conceptual 
models can be mapped on to the real world. The narrative 
will be based around an extremely abstract example and this, 
hopefully, will illustrate the abstract nature of the 
problem. The method will be repeated in Chapter 6 where the 
example will be more concrete. 
Section 4.5 showed that real world mapping was not an 
immediate problem with Multiview models. Nor is it an 
immediate problem for Checkland. With Checkland it is the 
building of the model as much as the model itself that 
solves the organizational problem. Checkland is concerned 
with changing the way the stakeholders think about their 
problem rather than with producing a detailed plan for a 
problem solution. In practice the problem sometimes simply 
disappears during the model building process. Other outcomes 
might be the identification of an organizational raison 
d'etre, or the definition of a new role for a department. In 
the context of information systems Checkland's models tend 
to be models of how to set up an information system or 
models of the organizational context of the information 
system, they are not models of the information system 
itself. 
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Wilson takes the models further and uses them as the basis 
for information system design. With Wilson the conceptual 
model is developed until it becomes the information system. 
While Checkland's models are fairly well accepred as being a 
useful front end to IS design, Wilson's work is more 
contentious. There are those that think it is not possible 
to produce an information system design from a conceptual 
model (see Mingers, 1992). It is not difficult to see why 
they are concerned. Wilson starts with a notional model and 
ends up with a system that handles information about real 
world entities such as stock in a warehouse (Wilson, 1984, 
pp. 195 - 208). It is common sense that our notions do not 
always correspond to reality and that what is desired cannot 
always be achieved. 
This is not to say that any information system designed by 
Wilson, or designed using Wilson's method, will inevitably 
fall into error. In practice Wilson has designed a lot of 
perfectly good systems. The question is whether Wilson's 
method will always produce good systems in circumstances 
where good systems can be built. Wilson's successful results 
might just be a result of the fact that real world mapping 
has not been a particular problem with the systems he has 
built. These would be circumstances where the stakeholders 
conception of a desirable system happens to coincide with 
what can be achieved. This idea becomes credible when we 
consider how Wilson came to undertake his projects. 
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Wilson and Checkland worked together in the Department of 
Systems at Lancaster University for more than a decade. The 
main impetus to their research was the programme of action 
research. It is interesting to note that Checkland tended to 
take on the more unstructured, abstract and human centered 
research projects while Wilson took on the more structured, 
concrete and practical ones. The stake-holders in Wilson's 
projects were likely to be "down to earth" types whose 
concepts tend to coincide with the physically possible. 
Another factor is that, compared to Checkland, Wilson's work 
has been more concerned with practice than with theory. It 
is quite possible that attention to the real world mapping 
problem has been made tacitly, perhaps even unconsciously, 
during Wilson's projects. 
This and the following chapter will be concerned to make 
explicit what must be implicit in any method of information 
system design that is based on a conceptual model and is 
intended to operate with information about the real world. 
5.2 The logico-linguistic model 
When the idea of Logico-linguistic modelling was presented 
at United Kingdom System Society seminar on the subject of 
SSM and IS (Proceedings in Systemist Vol 14, No 3, Aug. 
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1992) Prof. Checkland suggested that one be constructed on 
the basis of the Gor Tonking model. This model is given 
along with the root definition and CATWOE in figure 15. 
This is particularly appropriate to the real world mapping 
problem because: 
The model ... cannot possibly include unjustified 
real-world knowledge since it is, deliberately, an RD 
[root definition] without meaning. It is included to 
show how a defensible logical structure for a model can 
be created from an RD, even though the RD does not 
refer to the everyday world. " (Checkland 1989). 
Another way of putting this is to say that the model has 
sense but no reference. If the language game explanation is 
accepted all conceptual models are like the Gor Tonking 
models in this respect; at the time of their completion 
(stage 4 in the learning cycle) they will have sense but 
reference will have to be established later (stage 5). The 
SSM learning cycle (Checkland, 1989) is shown in figure 18. 
The real world mapping problem is concerned with whether the 
model can have reference. In the following the Gor Tonking 
model will be used to illustrate a procedure to determine 
whether a model can have reference. We will not assume that 
the model does not have reference but imagine that we are 
facilitators building a model for stake-holders who use a 
slang that we do not as yet understand. In the example we 
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will try to map the Gor Tonking model on to a system to 
re-spray scratched cars. In principle the facilitator could 
come up with the mapping idea on his own initiative, in 
practice it would be better to have the stake-holders 
construct the entire model as they will know how their ideas 
are intended to map on to the real world. 
To first step towards real world mapping is convert and 
expand the conceptual model into a Logico-linguistic model. 
As in previous chapters the commands are turned into 
statements. Thus the command "Tonk gors meeting the 
criterion" is replaced with "Gors meeting criteria gog are 
tonked". "Ascertain which gors meet criteria gog" is 
replaced with "Gors meeting criteria gog are selected". 
Figure 16 is a partial Logico-linguistic development of just 
one arrow from the Checkland model - the arrow between 
element 5. and element 6. in figure 15. Two new statements 
11 r Tonking materials are available" and "s A competent agent 
is employed to tonk gors" are introduced to make a set of 
sufficient conditions for "p Gors meeting the criterion are 
tonked". Two new logical devices are introduced. These are 
the biconditional and the AND containing box. The AND 
containing box stands for conjunction. In the figure it 
means "q and r and s". The double headed arrow stands for 
the biconditional or mutual implication. In the 




It comprises two relations of implication: 
(q &r& s) -> p 
and 
r& s) 
This can be expressed in English as "Gors meeting criteria 
gog are tonked if and only if Gors meeting criteria gog are 
selected and Tonking materials are available and a competent 
agent is employed to tonk gors" 
If we accept the language game interpretation the gor 
tonking model will be a set of stipulative definitions. 
Given this and the distinction between material implication 
and entailment made in the last chapter it is clear that 
both "(q &r& s) -> p" and "p -> (q &r& s)" are cases of 
entailment rather than material implication and can be 
expressed in modal logic as: 




When two proposition entail each other we can say that each 
is strictly equivalent to the other. This can be compared to 
material equivalence where two propositions that materially 
imply each other. So "(q & -r 
& s) <-> p" must be a case of 
strict equivalence, and can be expressed as: 
r& s) 
Modal operators can now be included in the diagrammatic 
technique. Figure 17 has an "L" symbol next to the double 
headed arrow to indicate that this is a case of strict 
equivalence rather than material equivalence. In layman's 
terms it means that the relation between "q &r& s" and "p" 
is one of definition rather than a relation that holds as a 
matter of fact. 
With this the logico-linguistic conceptual model is complete 
for this limited example. It should, however, be noted that 
in chapter 6 two more logical connectives will be introduced 
into the logico-linguistic models in order to accommodate a 
more complex example. 
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5.3 Fixed and incorrigible rules 
As was pointed out in section 4.3-3, logico-linguistic 
models can be understood as a set of linguistic rules. They 
have the status of being logically true and they are 
incorrigible by real world facts. We must now consider 
whether these rules can be changed at all. 
Let us consider two people, Icabod and Isabel, are playing 
chess. They agree that the game has become boring and they 
think they would have more fun if the rules were changed. 
They decide to change the rules for the movement of the 
Queen. This is that the Queen should be able to move to any 
unoccupied square on the board in any single move. The two 
people then play a game with the new rule. In these 
circumstances does it make sense to say that they are 
playing chess? It would make more sense to say that they are 
playing a new game - we might call this "QChess". The 
interesting parallel with conceptual modelling here is that 
chess playing readers will easily be able to imagine what a 
game of QChess will be like, even though a game of QChess 
has never been played. 
Now suppose that every chess player in the world decides to 
adopt the new rule after December. Will we be justified in 
saying, after December, that they play chess? We might be; 
but a better way to describe this situation would be to say 
"the games played before December and the games played after 
were both called "chess" but they were different games". 
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There is, therefore, a good case for saying that the rules 
of a language cannot be change without it becoming a 
different language game. 
In itself it is not that important whether we say it is the 
same game with different rules or whether it is a new game 
with new rules. What is important is how the change of rules 
or new game comes about. The game does not change itself, 
changes come about because the players decide to play a 
different game. This is quite different from changes in a 
particular game of chess where changes happen because pieces 
are moved in accordance with the rules. A change in the 
rules of chess cannot be brought about by the rules of 
chess. A change in the rule of chess is of higher order than 
a game of chess. 
A logico-linguistic model has the same status as the rules 
of chess. It lists the rules of a language game that the 
stake-holders have agreed to play. It is not intended to be 
a representation of the way the stake-holders speak. 
It might be that the physical world is governed by immutable 
laws. But if it is these laws are quite different from the 
rules of chess. They are not made up by people. If they 
exist they are discovered by people. The rules of chess can 
tell us only about games being played by people who obey the 
rules of chess and even this is difficult. 
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Fixed rules cannot be mapped directly on to particular facts 
or events. Suppose we observe Icabod and Isabel playing a 
game with chess pieces. They have made five moves and each 
move has been in accordance with the rules of chess. This 
may give some evidence that they are playing chess but it 
does not entail that they are playing chess. On the sixth 
move Icabod might move his Queen from DI to E8. This would 
show that it is not chess, but might be QChess, that they 
are playing. Even if the game was over and had been played 
in accordance with the rules of chess this would still not 
entail that it had been a game of chess. Icabod and Isabel 
might have been playing QChess and moving in accordance with 
QChess strategy but neither found it expedient to make one 
of the peculiar QChess Queen moves. The statement "Icabod 
and Isabel have been playing chess" is therefore contingent 
and not logically necessary. It is not, therefore, a 
straight forward mapping of the logically necessary rules of 
chess. 
5.4 A scientific model 
The method that will be used to map the logically necessary 
model shown in figure 16 onto the real world will be to 
insert contingent universals, inductive hypotheses, between 
the necessary universals and the particular statements of 
real world fact. In this way the required contingency is 
introduced into the model but the necessary universals still 
serve a useful function. 
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The particulars and contingent universals will be expressed 
in English. This is for ease of exposition. Particular 
statements and contingent universals could be developed in 
the gor tonking language but to achieve particular reference 
would require ostensive definition or an observable language 
game. That is, to establish a direct reference for the term 
f1gor" we would need to point to one. This canrot be done in 
a essay, it can only be done in the-real world. Thus we 
shall have to use English terms which already have an 
established reference. 
Figure 16 shows what must be true, as a matter of logic, if 
the desired state of affairs is to come about. Figure 17 is 
an attempt to describe a real world state of affairs that 
will bring it about. This state of affairs may happen to 
exist. If it does not, the next stage, stage 6 in the 
learning cycle, is to make changes in the real world that 
will actually bring it about. The figure 17 model will tell 
us when and if the desire state of affairs exists. 
The figure 17 model consists of particular statements u, v, 
a, b, d, e and g which are putatively true and have real 
world reference. In addition there are contingent universal 
statements t, w, c and f, these are the inductive 
hypotheses. In contrast to definitions, they are always open 
to falsification by particular events. For example, if U, 
v, a, b, d, e are true and g is false then we know that at 
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least one of the inductive hypotheses, t, w, 
false. We know this because the fact that "q 
imply p" is true by definition and so cannot 
The letter "M" alongside the broken arrows ii 
they are contingent relations. The model can 
modal propositional logic as follows: 
u& v) -> 
M(w&a 
M 
L (q& r& s) <-> p 
mp -> g) 
c or f, must be 
and -r and s 
be false. 
idicates that 
be expressed in 
The model would be better expressed in a modal form of the 
predicate calculus and we have now developed the apparatus 
for doing this. However, the complications of using this 
powerful but unfriendly logic will be left to the next 
chapter where its connection with Prolog will be more easily 
perceived. 
The inductive hypotheses allow contingency into the system 
and this gives the model the logical flexibility to map on 
to a contingent world. It is also "scientific" in Popper's 
sense of the word because the figure 17 model is always 
capable of being falsified by particular events. This solves 
the problem of how a conceptual model that is true by 
definition can map on to a contingent world - the answer is 
that the mapping itself is contingent. 
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This has profound consequences for information s-; stem 
design. Information system design methodologies do not 
distinguish between inductive hypotheses and definitions. 
What actually happens is that they treat inductive 
hypotheses as though they were definitions - they make them 
fixed in the system. When this is done statements of the 
type t, w, c and f become necessarily true and the broken 
arrows in figure 17 change from having the "M' modal 
operator to having an "L" modal operator. When this happens 
the particular statements u, v, a, b, d and e cannot be true 
when g is false. Given that a computer systems configured in 
this way accepts that g is false it will refuse to accept u, 
v, a, b, d and e as true, even when they are in fact true. 
In other words it will only map on to the real world when it 
wants to; but in this case it does not really map on to the 
real world at all. The only reason that such computer 
systems can ever work in a changing world is because the 
human operators apply informal mapping techniques. 
It might be thought that it is the inductive hypotheses that 
are the important thing and that the definitions can be 
dispensed with, but this is not so. The argument that 
definitions are logically required in the formulation of any 
inductive hypothesis was given in section 4.5.1. The 
usefulness of the definition in the gor tonking language, "L 
(9 & Ir & s) <-> p", is demonstrated because certain 
deductions cannot be made without it. For example we can 
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deduce gf rom f&t&u&v&w&a&b&c&d&e; but we 
could not do this without "(q &r& s) <-> p" 
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6 KNOWLEDGE ELICITATION & REPRESENTATION 
6.1 The thesis as a language game 
The solution to the real world mapping problem given in 
chapter 5 can now be use as a principle in the design of a 
knowledge based system. The logical apparatus that has been 
built up in response to theoretical requirement in chapters 
2 through 5 will be used as a practical method. The previous 
chapters have been largely concerned with showing what is 
logically required in a method of information system design. 
It is contended that if any procedure for information system 
design is to be successful these requirement must either be 
fulfilled before the procedure takes place or must be 
fulfilled, tacitly or overtly, by the procedure. The method 
that will be put forward in the following sections aimed to 
make explicit what must be assumed or implicit in any method 
of information system design. 
This might sound as though the method is being put forward 
as the definitive method of information system design. It 
needed to be emphasized that th-e method is just one way of 
making the implicit explicit. The language game theory 
applies to this writing of this thesis just as much as it 
does to any other form of language based activity. The 
thesis is part of a language game that is played by 
philosophers of the Anglo-American analytical school. This 
is the school that forms the main stream of philosophy 
teaching in British universities. A good deal of the 
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foregoing chapters have been devoted to explaining how the 
game is played. Hopefully some computer scientist and some 
members of business studies departments will be able to 
understand this game. Even more hopefully some of them might 
decide to start playing the game. 
There might or might not be one definitive method of 
information system design. If there were such a method there 
would not be just one way of describing it. The case is well 
illustrated by Checkland's writing on information. Checkland 
is not an analytical philosopher or a logician nor, for the 
most part, are his readers. Checkland is playing a different 
language game. Thus the word "valid" has a different meaning 
in Checkland's game from the meaning it has in the game of 
analytical philosophy. Thus in section 3.4.3 there was no 
attempt to say that Checkland has got it wrong because his 
usage of the word "valid" does not conform to the usage in 
the logic textbooks. Instead the section attempted to 
translate the sentiment from one language game into another. 
It attempted to show what Checkland would have said if he 
had been playing the analytical philosophers' language game. 
The thesis is written in the language of analytical 
philosophy and in modal predicate logic because the author 
believes that these are the most powerful tools to address 
the problem. 
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6.2 Modular structure of the method 
This chapter will attempt to put forward suggestions for 
practical methods and to give the theoretical justification 
for them. It consists of six main sections. These are 
concerned with systems analysis, language creation, 
knowledge elicitation, knowledge representation, 
codification and verification. Each section begins with a 
model, then the shortcomings of the model are explained and 
a remedy suggested, leading to the model in the following 
section. The method has a modular structure. Each model has 
a number of uses and need not be merely a stepping stone to 
the next model. In practice some stages might be unnecessary 
or they might be achieved by other methods. 
In stage one SSM is used for systems analysis. In stage two 
the consensus SSM model is then developed into a 
logico-linguistic model by the continuation of the 
stake-holders iterative debate. In stage three the 
logico-linguistic model gives a logically precise artificial 
language that provides an essential framework for knowledge 
elicitation and the construction of an empirical model. In 
stage four the empirical model is expressed in the formulas 
of a modal predicate logic in which formal inferences can be 
made and which can provide a formal specification for a 
program for a knowledge based system. In stage five a Prolog 
program is written based on the modal predicate logic. This 
program is capable of distinguishing between definitions, 
i. e. rules taken from the artificial language, and inductive 
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hypotheses, i. e. empirical rules take from the knowledge 
elicitation process. This enables the program to accept data 
entry in the form of particular facts that conflict with its 
empirical rules. In stage six empirical rules that have been 
falsified by particular facts are recognized as data is 
entered into the system. 
6.3 The six stage method 
6.3.1 Systems analysis 
Provided "systems analysis" is understood in a suitable 
broad sense, SSM is primarily a methodology for systems 
analysis. It claims to be relevant to any problem situation 
involving human activity. The early stages of the method are 
more concerned with the identification of who is involved in 
the problem and what the problem is than with the solution 
of the problem. SSM is not an information system design 
method as such but a general problem solving method which 
may be used in the production of an information system 
design as one of many possible solutions. 
SSM therefore has a versatility not found in main stream 
information system design methodologies. The use of an 
information system design method should be based on some 
form of system analysis that indicates that an information 
system will be a solution to the problem. In the case where 
the system analysis is a front end part of an information 
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system design methodology the work of systems analysis will 
tend to be wasted if an information system is not required. 
In the case where the method of system analysis is distinct 
from the information system design method they will tend to 
use different tools and have different perspectives, as a 
result little of the information gained in system analysis 
will be used in the design process. 
There is another possibility - one in which there is a 
continuity between the general systems analysis of SSM and 
the design process. The idea of preserving this continuity 
is implicit in Wilson's work and in Multiview. But while 
Wilson and Multiview add to the stake-holder constructed 
conceptual models in order to create information system, the 
method described below seeks to increase the logical power 
and content of these models to the point where an 
information system design can be derived by formal methods. 
The next stage is, therefore, to develop the SSM models into 
a logically precise language. 
6.3.2 Language creation 
The vocabulary of the new language will be provided entirely 
by the stake-holders. We shall take a modal predicate logic 
as the syntax of the language. This will require an increase 
in the number of logical connectives used in the model 
building process. The model will need to have logical 
connectives, described in chapter 2, capable of expressing 
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causal sequences. There are two reasons. One is that these 
connectives will be needed later when we come to build the 
empirical model. The other is that they are needed 
immediately to express process definitions. The result will 
be a logico-linguistic model. Figure 19 shows a 
logico-linguistic model that has been built out of the 
connection between "Apply treatment" and "Discharge patient" 
in the Wilson model shown figure 11. 
Chapter 5 introduced an "AND" containing box representing 
conjunction (p and q). Figure 19 and 20 introduce two new 
types of containing box. These are an "ANDOR" containing box 
representing inclusive disjunction (p or q or both) and an 
"OR" containing box representing exclusive disjunction (p or 
q but not both). "AND" is denoted by the logical symbol "&" 
"ANDOR" by "V". The "OR" connective can be expressed as "(p 
& -q) v (-p & q). Figure 19 can be expressed in the 
propositional calculus as follows: 
( (s &a& b) <-> t) &(s <-> (uvYv w) ) 
This can be rendered in English as "Patients are discharged 
if and only if they are alive, have been signed out and have 
been treated; and Patients will have been treated if and 
only if they have had surgery, medicine or therapy". 
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6.3.3 Knowledge elicitation 
The logico-linguistic model provides a framework that will 
enable us to build an empirical model without ambiguity. In 
the empirical model putative facts about the real world will 
be added to the logico-linguistic model. 
It was established in chapter 4 that there are two types of 
definition: connotative or intensive definition and 
denotative or extensive definition. An intensive definition 
will give a criterion or criteria for class inclusion. An 
extensive definition will specify the members of the class. 
Thus in figure 19 "patient is discharged" is given an 
intensive definition. What it says is that anything that 
fulfills the criterion of being a treated patient, a living 
patient, and a signed out patient is a member of the class 
of discharged patients, and vice versa. "Patient is treated" 
is given an extensive definition. The figure states that 
this class has three member classes (u, y and w) and only 
three member classes. Therefore, anything that is a member 
of one or more of the member classes will be a member of the 
class of patients treated, and anything that is a member of 
the class of patients treated must be a member of at least 
one of the member classes. 
It is contended that any term that is given a useful 
intensive definition will have an empirical extension, and 
any term that is given a useful extensive definition will 
have an empirical intension. Knowledge acquisition, 
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therefore, is simply finding the intension for an extensive 
definition and the extension for an intensive definition. 
Knowledge elicitation will amount to the process of the 
specification of the intension for the extensive definitions 
and the extension of the intensive definitions by the 
stake-holders. 
The intension of "Patient is treated" might be that eve-ry 
patient has been attended to by a doctor or nurse who has 
taken some action that is believed to improve the patient's 
health. Empirical intensions are not always particularly 
useful. Far more important are the empirical extensions of 
intensive definitions. In figure 20 we will take the 
extension of "Patient is discharged" to be the class that 
comprises the class of patients who return home and the 
class of patients who are transferred to other institutions. 
These classes are mutually exclusive in that a member of one 
cannot be a member of another, as such they are included in 
an "OR" bubble. This extension is putatively true as a 
matter of empirical fact not as a matter of definition. It 
is, therefore, marked with the "M' modal operator. These 
empirical counterparts of definitions are the inductive 
hypotheses. 
The fact that bubbles c and d are linked to bubble t by a 
double headed arrow indicated that we think that the formula 
11c v d" forms the full extension of t. In this case we have 
full knowledge of t. In practice the knowledge of the 
stake-holders may be insufficient to give the full empirical 
168 
extension for every intensive definition in the system. In 
this case there three possible courses of action. One is to 
conduct empirical research in order to find the full 
extension. A second is to build a system with incomplete 
knowledge; if this is done the system will be logically 
incomplete and there will be statements that are undecidable 
- that is the system will not be able to determine whether 
they are true or false. A third possibility is for the 
stake-holders to make an educated guess and hope that the 
system will detect any errors. A system of non-monotonic 
logic is introduced below which makes this third possibility 
viable. 
6.3.4 Knowledge representation 
In this section figure 20 will be expressed in predicate 
logic. What the model actually states is expressed in three 
premises. From these premises formal inferences can be made 
which leads to a conclusion (this is (15) below) that is not 
immediately obvious. This conclusions is added to figure 20 
to produce figure 21. Although readers might be able to 
infer this conclusion intuitively, in larger models there 
would be inferences that were far from being intuitively 
obvious. 
The formal rules of inference and replacement for the 
predicate inferences that will be used here are fairly 
standard and conform closely to those found in Copi (1968), 
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Newton-Smith (1990) gives a similar set. To determine the 
modal operators four meta-rules are used that follow from 
the axioms of the modal system "S5". The meta-rules will be 
expressed using the syntactic turnstile which will be 
indicated by the symbol ": -". In this system "A :- B" means 
B can be derived from A, or to express this another way B is 
provable from A. These meta-rules are: 
Meta-rule one: if A :-B then L(A) :- L(B) 
Meta-rule two: if A :-B then M(A) :- M(B) 
Meta-rule three: if A, B :-C then L(A), L(B) ý- L(C) 
Meta-rule four: if A, B :-C then M(A), L(B) :- M(C) 
That these meta-rules apply is intuitively obvious. However, 
for those interested in formalism a formal proof is provided 
in Appendix 2. Meta-rule one simply states that if B can be 
derived from A then if A is logically true then B must be 
logically true. Meta-rule two states that if B can be 
derived from A then if A is contingently true then B must be 
contingently true. Meta-rule three states that if C can be 
derived from A and B then if A and B are logically true then 
C must be logically true. Meta-rule four states that if C 
can be derived from A and B then if A is contingently true 
and B is logically true then C must be contingently true. 
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Figure 20 can be formally expressed in modal predicate logic 
as follows: 
Domain: people who go to hospital 
Sx: x is a patient who is treated 
Ax: x is a patient who is alive 
Bx: x is a patient who is signed out 
Tx: x is a patient who is discharged 
Ux: x is a patient who has surgery 
Yx: x is a patient who has medicine 
Wx: x is a patient who has therapy 
Cx: x is a patient who returns home 
Dx: x is a patient who is transferred to another institution 
Prem (1) L (Ax) Tx <-> (Sx & Ax & Bx) 
Prem (2) L (Ax) Sx <-> (Ux v Yx v Wx) 
Prem (3) M (Ax) Tx <-> ((Cx & -Dx) v (-Cx & Dx)) 
(4) L (AX) (Tx -> (Sx & Ax & Bx)) & ((Sx & Ax & Bx) -> 
Tx) 
From (1) by Material Equivalence and Meta-rule one 
L (AX) (Sx -> (Ux v YX v WX)) & ((Ux v YX v Wx) -> 
SX) 
From (2) by Material Equivalence and Meta-rule one 
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(AX) (Tx -> ( (Cx & -Dx) v (-C-x & Dx) ))&(( (C-v & 
-Dx) v (-Cx & Dx)) -> Tx) 
From (3) by Material Equivalence and Meta-rule two 
(7) L (AX) Tx -> (Sx & Ax & Bx) 
From (4) by Simplification and Meta-rule one 
(8) L (Ax) -Tx v (Sx & Ax & Bx) 
From (7) by Material Implication and Meta-rule one 
(9) L (AX) (-Tx v SX) & (-Tx v AX) & (-Tx v Bx) 
From (8) by Distribution and Meta-rule one 
(10) L (Ax) -Tx v Sx 
From (9) by Simplification and Meta-rule one 
(11) L (AX) Tx -> Sx 
From (10) by Material Implication and Meta-rule one 
(12) L (AX) Sx -> (Ux v YX v Wx) 
From (5) by SimPlification and Meta-rule one 
M (Ax) ((Cx & -Dx) v (-Cx & Dx)) -> Tx 
From (6) by SimPlification and Meta-rule two 
(14) L (Ax) Tx -> (Ux v YX v Wx) 
From (11) and (12) by Hypothetical syllogism and 
Meta-rule three 
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(AX) ( (Cx & -Dx) v (-CX & Dx) ) -> (U-. -. V Y: ý ,, W:, -) 
From (13) and (14) by Hypothetical Syllogism and 
Meta-rule four 
Premise (1) can be expressed in English as "For all x, x is 
a patient who is discharged if and only if x is a patient 
who is treated and alive and signed out. Formulas which 
being with (Ax) are known as "universals" as are the English 
statements that correspond to them. The formula (15) can be 
deduced from the three premises, it is shown in figure 21 by 
the dotted arrow and the solid single headed arrow. This 
completes the system of universals, but so far it is only 
about object variables, in this case "x". It says nothing 
about the real world, not even that anything exists. The 
real world connection is made when particulars and 
existential statements are added to the system. We shall not 
introduce particulars into this system of predicate logic 
instead we shall move on to Prolog where the universals 
shall become "rules" and particulars will become Prolog 
"f acts" . 
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6.3.5 Codification 
6.3-5.1 The Prolog model 
The horn clauses that form the logical format of all Prolog 
rules could be derived from the predicate logic given above. 
As a practical method this would not be very useful. For 
example, the formal derivation of (15) from the premises 
given is very lengthy. It is easier to look at figure 21 
when writing the Prolog or to look up the relevant Prolog 
rule in the dictionary given at 11.3.2. Also it is open to 
question whether all logico-linguistic models can be 
expressed in horn clauses. The formal logic is useful in a 
number of respects as will be seen in later sections. 
However, a full discussion of the relationship between 
predicate logic and Prolog is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
The program given here is written in Turbo Prolog. There are 
two serious difficulties in converting the logic, or a 
logical model like figure 21, into Prolog: one is with 
negation the other is with the biconditional. Turbo Prolog 
will not compile rules which begin with the "not" predicate. 
Therefore, there is no straight forward way to express horn 
clauses with a negative consequent. This is a problem 
because some formulas in predicate logic cannot be expressed 
in horn clauses with positive consequents. The 
biconditionals express mutual implication as is indicated by 
the double headed arrows in figure 21. As it works on the 
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chaining principle Prolog is unable to run a program that 
contains mutual implication, or any substitute for it, 
without going into an infinite loop. For example, if we want 
to express the biconditional between t and b&a&s from 
figure 21 we would expect to be able to express it in a 
logically equivalent form such as (t -> (b &a& s)) & (b 
t) & (a -> t) & (s -> t) this is done alone with 
instantiations in Program 1. 
Program 1 
discharge (X) if signout (X) and alive (X) and treated (X). 
discharge (icabod). 
signout (X) if discharge (X). 
signout (isabel). 
alive (X) if discharge (X). 
alive (isabel). 
treated (X) if discharge (X). 
treated (isabel). 
Although Program 1 will compile it will not run. Prolog 
looks for a value for discharge (X) and sees that it will 
have the same value as signout (X) and alive (X) and 
treated (X); it then looks for a value for sign_out (X); on 
the third line it sees that sign_out (X) has the same value 
as discharge (X); returning to the first line it tries to 
repeat the process infinitely. 
175 
The solution is to replace straight forward negation, which 
is troublesome anyway, with a substitute program in the 
Prolog programs. This, can be achieved in the same way in 
which subtraction is eliminated from commercial accounts by 
a system of double entry book-keeping. We shall use 
artificial predicates prefixed by "not" to express 
negation. Corresponding to these will be artificial objects 
also prefixed by "not". A positive predicate will always be 
paired with a negative predicate and a positive object 
paired with a negative one. Thus if we which to say Isabel 
is alive we will also say that not-Isabel is not alive: 
alive (isabel). 
not-alive (notisabel). 
The two negatives can be understood as cancelling each other 
out. We can also use this method to specify events that have 




Program 2 can be put together on the basis of the same 
particular facts as Program 1, no additional data is 
required. 
discharge (icabod). 
not-discharge (X) if not-sign_out (X). 
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not--. discharge (X) if notalive (X). 
not-discharge (X) if not treated 
not-discharge (noticabod). 
signout (X) if discharge (X). 
signout (isabel). 
alive (X) if discharge (X). 
alive (isabel). 





In Program 2 one half of the biconditional is expressed in 
"not_" predicates the other half in normal predicates. This 
solves the infinite loop problem and the program will run. 
The program will return the same information as would 
Program 1, if Program 1 could run, but sometimes twice the 
number of queries are required. For example the query "Goal: 
discharge (X)" returns only "icabod". We can find out that 
Isabel has also been discharged by "Goal: not-discharge (X)" 
which returns "not-isabel" and "not-icabod". This can be 
read as "it is not the case that Isabel has not been 
discharged" or simply "Isabel has been discharged". Other 
queries function as normal, "Goal: treated (X)II returns 
"icabod" and "isabel". Prolog can work out from its rules 
that icabod has been discharged even though this has not 
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been specifically stated. The program therefore confers all 
the advantages of a Prolog style program over an SQL and 
data base system. 
Some Prolog programmers might consider that synonyms should 
be eliminated prior to writing the program. This would 
certainly save space but increases the amount of logical 
work that the programmer needs to do. Ultimately even more 
space could be saved by not writing the program at all; this 
is because there is nothing that Prolog can work out that 
could not be worked out manually using the predicate 
calculus. A logic program that does not do much logic is not 
much of a logic program. 
These double entry procedures will enable us to express the 
three biconditionals from figure 20 in Prolog. However, they 
do not produce concise programs. Indeed the Prolog given at 
6.3.5.2 represents what can be expressed in four lines of 
predicate logic e. g. the three premises and the conclusion 
(15) from section 6.3.4. 
A second difficulty is that although the double entry 
proceedure solves the immediate problem with the 
biconditional, it does not solve all the problems of 
expressing predicate logic in Prolog (see section 10-3.4). 
The last four lines of the Prolog are concerned with 
verification. 11 
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6.3.5.2 A Prolog program 
Clauses 
surgery (not_jack). 
surgery (X) if not-medicine (X) and not-therapy (X) and 
returns-home (X). 
surgery (X) if notmedicine (X) and not-therapy (X) and 
anotherlnstitution (X). 
medicine (not_jill). 
medicine (X) if notsurgery (X) and not-therapy (X) and 
returns-home (X). 




therapy (X) if not_surgery (X) and not-medicine (X) and 
returns-home (X). 


















--not -therapy__and -returns- 
home 
if notsurgery (X) and notm edicine (X) and 
not therapy (X) and returns- home (X). 
incorrecthypothesis 1, 
(surgery_lf-not-medicine_not 
_therapy_and -another _lnstitution) 
if not-surgery (X) and not-m edicine (X) and 
not-therapy (X) and another institution (X). 
incorrecthypothesis 
(medicine_if_not_surgery_not 
_therapy_and _returns -home) 
if not-medicine (X) and not- surgery (X) and 
not-therapy (X) and returns- home (X). 
incorrecthypothesis 
(medicine_if_not_surgery_not 
_therapy_and _another _institution) 
if not-medicine (X) and not- surgery (X) and 
not-therapy (X) and another institution (X). 
incorrecthypothesis 
(therapy_if_not_surgery_not_ medicine_and _returns -home) 
if not-therapy (X) and not-s urgery (X) a nd 





if not-therapy (X) and not-surgery (X) and 
not-medicine (X) and anotherinstitution (X). 
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6.3.6 Verification 
Validation of the program is not a theoretical problem in 
this system because the rules can be formally derived from 
the predicate calculus. Any error will be the result of 
either mistakes made during the construction of the 
empirical model or mistakes made in entering particular 
facts into the program. Errors in both respects can be 
picked up by the double entry system. For example our 
program in the box produces: 




This says that Jack has and has not had surgery. This could 
have been a result of a mistake at a data entry level but in 
this case it is not. The mistake is in the empirical model. 
The last three lines of the program are designed to detect 
these errors. The incorrect-hypothesis predicate picks up 
inductive hypotheses that have been falsified by particular 
facts: 







-nottherapy and another 
ins t itut 1ýDn 
therapy_ if 
-not- surgery_ 
not-medic ine_and_another institution 
Jack has not had surgery, medicine or therapy; he has not 
returned home but he has been transferred to another 
institution. The formula: 
M (AX) ((Cx & -Dx) v (-Cx & Dx)) -> (Ux v Yx v Wx) 
which represents the broken arrow and the single headed 
arrow in figure 3, is therefore, incorrect. It follows from 
this that one of the three premises (1), (2) or (3) must be 
incorrect. As premises (1) and (2) are logically true it 
must be premise (3), the one with the "M' modal operator, 
that is false. In simple terms the hypothesis that all 
patients who return home or are transferred to an other 
institution are discharged patients, has been falsified by a 
particular event. This event is Jack being transferred to 
another institution wýlthout having surgery, medicine or 
therapy. The Prolog program has been configured in such a 
way that the entry of data about Jack has enables us to 
detect this. This is a form of non-monotonic logic; the 
program has learned that one of its premises is false. 
The benefits of the earlier sSM work can now be seen. The 
modal distinctions were made using SSM and without the modal 
distinctions we would not be able to determine which of the 
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three biconditionals in figure 3 is false. Without the mo,: 13.1 
distinctions all three biconditionals would have the same 
status. If they all had the status of inductive hypotheses 
then the fact that Jack been has transferred to another 
institution without having surgery, medicine or therapy 
could be equally well explained by "all discharged patients 
are treated, alive and signed out" being false or by "all 
treated patients have surgery, medicine or therapy" being 
false. If they all had the status of logical truth the 
situation would be even more unsatisfactory. 
Consider what would happen if the three biconditionals had 
the status of logical truth. If this were the case the 
system would only accept those empirical particulars that 
are consistent with its in-built logical configuration. All 
other particulars would be rejected. Consider the 
biconditional between the t bubble and the bubble containing 
11c or d", which is expresses as (Ax) Tx <-> ((Cx & -Dx) v 
(-Cx & Dx)) in predicate logic. If this were a logical 
truth, then before we could establish that Jack has been 
transferred to another institution we would have to 
establish that he had not returned home and that he has been 
discharged. To establish that he has been discharged we 
would have to establish that he has had treatment and to do 
this we would have to establish that he has had surgery, 
medicine or therapy. In other words to establish that Jack 
has been transferred we must first establish that Jack has 
had surgery, medicine or therapy. We need to do this because 
having surgery, medicine or therapy is part of the extended 
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definition of a patient who has been transferred. But in 
this case the model does not enable us to infer anything new 
about Jack at all. All that it says is that if Jack fulfils 
all the defining criteria then each defining criterion will 
be true of Jack. 
If (Ax) Tx <-> ((Cx & -Dx) v (-Cx & Dx)) is contingent, as 
it is in the figure, then we can establish that Jack has 
been transferred by a defining criterion that is independent 
of the system shown in figures 20 and 21. In this case the 
system can be genuinely informative and tell us some real " 
world facts about Jack. 
Verification unlike validation is only possible if parts of 
the system is open to falsification. The hypotheses in the 
system will be verified with the addition of each particular 
fact that does not falsify them. Systems that can not be 
verified, even if they can be validated, cannot in 
themselves refer to real world objects and events. Real 
world event are contingent and therefore any statement about 
the real world must also be contingent. As was contended in 
chapter 5 systems that do not contain contingent elements 
will only map on to these real world events that they want 
to and as such do not really map onto the real world at all. 
Inductive hypotheses form an indispensable buffer between 
definitions and real world particular facts. 
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6.3.7 Automatic deletion 
In their book on Prolog Clocksin & Mellish (1987, p. 116) 
describe a "built in" predicate called ''retract" which is 
not present in Turbo Prolog. It is not clear which versions 
of Prolog contain this "retract" predicate because it not 
clear which version of Prolog they are describing. 
In this book we have presented a version of Prolog that 
does not correspond exactly to any existing system. 
Rather, it is supposed to represent a "core" Prolog 
that will have a lot in common with any system you 
might encounter. (Clocksin & Mellish, 1987, p. 260) 
The resources available during the research for this thesis 
were limited to Turbo Prolog where the "retract" predicate 
is restricted to removing facts. However, it is easy to 
imagine what a program would look like if it contained the 
"retract" predicate that could also remove rules. The 
"retract" predicate functions as follows: in "retract (X)", 
X will be matched with the first clause (fact or rule) that 
it can be matched with and that clause will be removed. So 
it would seem that: 
retract (surgery (X) if not_medicine (X) and nottherapy (X) 
and 
returns-home (X)) if notsurgery (X) and not_medicine (X) 
and 
not-therapy M and returns-home W. 
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would delete the rule: 
surgery (X) if notmedicine (X) and nottherapy (X) and 
returns-home (X). 
given an instantiation for: 
not-surgery (X) and not-medicine (X) and 
not-therapy (X) and returns-home (X). 
Therefore, instead of an incorrect inductive hypothesis 
merely being identified, it could be removed by a Prolog 
program. This would then be a program that embodied 
Popperian falsification. Inductive hypotheses could removed 
by particular facts that falsified them. 
however, the practical use of a Prolog program that 
contained this automatic deletion function would be limited 
to applications where mistakes would not occur in data entry 
and where the data is reliable. In a normal business system 
keyboard mistakes would result in the rapid deletion of 
perfectly good rules. However, in the days of punched cards 
methods, such as check digits, were developed to prevent 
this sort of error. 
Mistaken beliefs about particular facts would also cause the 
deletion of perfectly good rules. For example, if it was 
mistakenly believed that Jack had not returned home when in 
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fact he had, then the perfectly good rule "surgery (7i. ) if 
notmedicine (X) and nottherapy (X) and returnshome (7)" 
would be deleted. 
6.4 Other types of knowledge representation 
A comparison of the foregoing with previous work on 
knowledge elicitation and representation is difficult to 
accomplish due to the fact that the dozens of different 
methods differ in many significant respects. Sowa's 
conceptual graphs have a bubble diagram style, are concerned 
with concepts and can be expressed in the predicate 
calculus; they are, therefore, superficially very similar to 
logico-linguistic models. Instead of trying to consider all 
the different forms of knowledge representation the 
following comparison will be limited to Sowa's conceptual 
graphs. 
Like many other semantic net style graphs the logical and 
epistemological status of Sowa's graphs is not perfectly 
clear. He recently described them as "a graphic system of 
logic ... equivalent to predicate logic" 
(Sowa, 1992), yet 
earlier he described them as "a method of representing 
mental models" (Sowa, 1984, p. 4). 
As a graphic system of logic Sowa's graphs differ from 
logico-linguistic models firstly, in that they do not 
include modality which is one of the principle features of 
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logico-linguistic models. The second difference is that 
Sowa's graphs contain the plethora of detail needed to 
capture the vagaries of English syntax. For example, the 
verb "to run" is represented by ten bubbles and ten arrows 
in a conceptual graph (see Nogier & Zock, 1992). Such detail 
is not essential for the construction of a knowledge based 
system nor is it practical as a stake-holder driven 
modelling device. 
It is clear that conceptual graphs are a tool for an analyst 
intending to represent discourse in a natural language. 
Logico-linguistic models, by contrast, are not intended to 
represent a natural language but are intended to be an 
artificial language. Logico-linguistic models are not, 
therefore, dependent on lexicographical science nor are they 
prone to the paradoxes of self reference which are a feature 
of natural languages. It is pertinent to point out here that 
it may, as both Frege and Tarski believed, be impossible to 
formulate a theory of truth for natural languages (Grayling, 
1990) . 
It must be made clear here that there is a difference 
between a computer program that is based on a language and a 
program that deals with a language. Logico-linguiStic models 
are an artificial device intended to form the basis of a 
computer language; they are not intended to represent an 
existing language. In order to represent and deal with an 
existing language it is not necessary to baSe., the computer 
program upon that language. For example, we can give a set 
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of instruction in English about how to answer French 
questions in French; here our program equivalent is English 
and the coherence of our instructions will be dependent on 
the coherence of English not French. Sowa's graph might be 
useful as a description of a natural language that could 
form the subject matter of a computer language that would 
deal with queries in the natural language. Unfortunately the 
language game theory shows that there is no absolute natural 
language just language games played by individual players. 
Of course conceptual graphs could be used to represent an 
existing language game but in this case they would be the 
same sort of thing as the SAMPO method developed by Auramaki 
(1988). As was pointed out in chapter 3 this is not suitable 
for green field situations as is the SSM/logico-linguistic, 
modelling technique. 
If Sowa's conceptual graphs are intended to be mental models 
then it seems they are very different from logico-linguistic 
models. The Wittgensteinian theory of language contends that 
mental models, if they are anything other publicly 
observable neurological states or elements of a public 
language, simply do not exist. Sowa's discussion of 
"percepts" (Sowa, 1984, p. 24) sounds very similar the sense 
datum theories that were discredited by Wittgenstein's 
private language argument. Logico-linguistic models are not 
intended to be representations of mental models nor are they 
representations of anything, they are just records of an 
agreement to uses words in a certain way. 
189 
It seems that the theory of meaning which forms the basis of 
Sowa's graphs is fundamentally different from the one that 
is assumed here. This could explain the fact that Sowa's 
graphs lack the modal operators that form vital components 
of empirical models such as figure 21. 
6.5 The attribution of meaning 
Checkland & Scholes claim that an information system: 
11 will always have to include the attribution of 
meaning, which is a uniquely human act. An information 
system, in the exact sense of the phrase, will consist 
of both data manipulation, which machines can do, and 
the transformation of data into information by the 
attribution of meaning. " (Checkland & Scholes, 1990) 
Traditional methods of information system design, such as 
SSADM and Information Engineering, produce systems in which 
tacitly all the universals are incorrigible. This prevents 
them from making statements that refer to the real world. It 
is up to the human operators to determine reference. If the 
operators do this, they will do so by formulating inductive 
hypotheses as well as by observing particular facts. 
This paper has provided a description of the logic that 
would be required for the creation of a computer system that 
will be able to make statements in a language belonging 
190 
clients and users. While particular facts need to be entered 
into this computer system by human beings, the system is 
able to learn and this one can argue requires some 
attribution of meaning. In Program 3 we could say that the 
system knows that the hypothesis "all discharged patients 
are patients that have returned home or been transferred to 
another institution" is false because it knows that ''patient 
is discharged" means "patient is treated, alive and signed 
out". Effectively Program 3 is able to distinguish between 
sense and reference a thing that systems designed by 
traditional methods cannot do. 
Checkland & Scholes contention that the attribution of 
meaning is a uniquely human act might be true in the context 
of systems design by traditional methods but it less 
plausible in the context of systems such as Program 3. 
6.6 The value of the Prolog program 
The fact that a Prolog program with automatic deletion of 
falsified inductive hypotheses can delete perfectly good 
rules if a mistake is made about a particular fact must be 
weighed against a conventional system. In a conventional 
system a particular fact cannot enter the system if it 
conflicts with one of the rules. Both have their demerits. 
Suppose that all crows are black is a rule of the system. 
The automatic delete system will delete the perfect good 
rule that all crows are black if the person entering data 
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has mistaken a white pigeon for a crow. The conventional 
system will be unable to process the data if the person has 
in fact observed a white crow. 
The respective merits of the two systems depend on which is 
more important in the context - rules or particular facts. 
In conventional business systems, such as order processing, 
rules tend to be more important than particular facts. It is 
better to reject an order without an order number than to 
delete the rule that all valid orders have order numbers. 
However, in safety critical systems, such as intensive care, 
the opposite can apply. It is better to falsify the rule 
patient is dead if heart has stopped for ten minutes when 
the patient is in fact dead but the doctor mistakenly thinks 
the patient still alive, than it is for the system to refuse 
to process data about a patient that has recovered from a 
ten minute heart failure. 
Another possible application is in the "find the murderer" 
problems that have long been a stock example of the power of 
Prolog. In Warwick Business School students on the 
operational research course are required to write a program 
to play Cluedo. Cluedo is a board game in which there are a 
number of suspects (Colonel Mustard, Miss Scarlet, etc. ) for 
a murder. As the game proceeds clues are revealed and 
ultimately the winner can work out which of the suspect is 
the murderer by a process of elimination. It is easy to see 
how the methods proposed in this chapter could be used to 
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write a program for this game. The rules of the game would 
form the definitional rules of the program, the inductive 
hypotheses would take the form "Colonel Mustard is a 
suspect", the particular facts would be the clues. As more 
and more clues"are entered into the system more and more of 
the inductive hypotheses would be delete. In the end there 
would only be one left and that suspect would be the 
murderer. 
Of course, a Prolog program for Cluedo can be written, and 
no doubt many have, that are more economical than the one 
suggested here. Also the knowledge elicitation methods 
suggested here are not required for a writing a Cluedo 
program. However, the point here is that the definitional 
rules of the program are fixed by the rules of Cluedo. In 
the real world there are no self evident definitional rules. 
To find a real world murderer one would have to determine 
what to count as fixed rules and what to count as hypotheses 
and for this one would need something of the same logical 
order as the method of'knowledge elicitation described in 
this chapter. 
There is no doubt that there are more powerful learning 
programs than that presented in this chapter. Methods of 
decision tree induction such as Quinlan's ID3 (Forsyth, 
1990, p. 202) are able to generate and well as delete 
inductive hypotheses (Forsyth, 1990, p. 202). However, this 
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is all ID3 does, it cannot handle the database queries and 
knowledge based system solutions that the program in 6.3.5., 2 
can. 
Therefore, there may be some application for a Prolog 
program of this type. There would be wider applications if 
the program is limited to the incorrect hypothesis function 
and excludes the retract function. Against this it has been 
argued that other systems written in, for example PASCAL, 
can do much the same thing. If a program in another language 
does do the same thing then there will be an implicit 
distinction between definitions and inductive hypotheses in 
the system. Given this the language in which the system is 
written will be capable of representing modality and can be 
substituted for Prolog at stage five of the method. 
It should be strongly emphasized at this point that Prolog 
is used in this thesis only as an example to show that it is 
possi-ble to represent the knowledge drawn from the knowledge 
elicitation method in a computer system. Prolog is used 
because its near English format makes it easy to read and 
its proximity to predicate logic make it easy to see how it 
can be derived from modal logic. 
The main problem to be overcome was the real world mapping 
problem not to achieve a practical artificial intelligence 
solution to practical problems. If these can be obtained 
from the use of Prolog programs like 6.3.5.2 then this is an 
added bonus. 
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7 LOGICO-LINGUISTIC MODELLING IN PRACTICE 
7.1 Summary of the study 
7.1.1 Theory and practice 
The work in the previous chapters has been driven by theory 
and very abstract theory at that. This has been in 
accordance with a methodology of philosophy. The aim has 
been to show that information systems should be designed in 
a certain way because, given a set of assumptions, it can be 
proven as a matter of logical necessity that they must be 
designed in that way. Empirical research has little or no 
bearing upon these arguments. However, the reason the 
philosophical analysis has been undertaken is because it is 
believed that this will lead to a practical method for 
information system design. It is at this point that 
empirical research comes into play. 
If "information systems"-is widely defined they will effect 
almost all human activities and we will find a large number 
of human activities that are solely concerned with 
information systems. All languages could be described as 
information systems. If "information system design" is 
given a similarly wide definition then, again, this will 
encompass a wide range of human activity. A family deciding 
what name to give a new pet, the election of a new secretary 
for the cricket club, a student deciding how to structure an 
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essay and a journalist reporting a wedding could all be 
described as exercises in information system design. We can 
call this "informal information system design" 
Against this we have "information system design" as in 
information systems engineering. This is an area for the 
professional -a person who has passed examinations in 
SSADM, or some other methodology, and goes through a set 
procedure that always results in a computer system. We can 
call this "formal information system design" 
The aim of this thesis is to identify suitable principles 
for formal information system design and one of the 
requirements of a formal information system design method is 
that it must be capable of being implemented in practice. So 
far the thesis has put together a formal method indicated by 
philosophical analysis. It has been contended that something 
analogous to the formal method must be implicit in 
successful practice. What has yet to be demonstrated is that 
the formal method can be put into practice as a formal 
method. It might be that these methods can only be 
accomplished in informal information system design. That is, 
although the philosophical analysis has shown the procedures 
that must take place it does not follow that these 
procedures can take place as part of a formal practical 
method; it might be that they need to be left as informal 
procedures. 
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A second point is that a number of devices might be capable 
of fulfilling the same logical requirement. Some of these 
may be practical and some might not. Empirical research is, 
therefore, necessary to determine whether the finding of the 
previous chapters can be used in a practical context. 
Empirical research is also necessary in the development of 
the proposed method from a theoretical framework into a tool 
honed for practical requirements. 
However, this sort of research is not like experimental 
science. A single case study will neither prove nor falsify 
the method. Requirements for information systems are so 
varied that the fact that it works well in one case provides 
little inductive evidence that it will work in others. 
Conversely the fact that it fails in one case will provide 
little inductive evidence that it will fail in all. 
This chapter gives an account of how logico-linguistic 
modelling was used in practice. The project ended with the 
construction of an empirical model. Sections 7.5 and 7.6 
show the techniques that could have been used to convert the 
model into a relational database or into Prolog. This, 
however, was not part of the project. 
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7.1.2 The context 
In early 1993 logico-linguistic modelling techniques were 
used for problem structuring in the context of a public 
relations firm. The company was located in an Asian country. 
There was no funding available for the project and the 
analyst/facilitator, who is also the author of this thesis, 
was constrained by a limited amount of time in the country. 
The duration of the project-was less than five weeks in 
elapsed time. The model building took place during a series 
of discussions with the Chairman of the company. 
The analyst was, naturally, looking for an opportunity to 
apply logico-linguistic models in the context of knowledge 
based system design. In the event a knowledge based system 
was inappropriate due to the small size of the project and 
the limited number of people involved. The useful outcome of 
the project was more general. This, however, can be seen as 
a vindication of the use of SSM in the context of knowledge 
based system design. There were useful results for the 
customer. If a traditional knowledge engineering approach 
had been used the work would have been wasted. 
The main theoretical finding was that logico-linguistic 
models can be easily understood by a customer who has no 
previous knowledge of SSM or of logical modelling. A second 
finding was that the modelling technique is just as suitable 
for highly abstract human activities as it is for the 
physical activities that constitute most of the examples 
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that were used to develop the method. The project was an 
exercise in action research rather than an attempt to prove 
the validity of the methods advocated in this thesis. It 
represents a first step in the extension of theoretical 
validity to practical applicability. 
The client requested complete confidentiality and, 
therefore, neither the identity of the client and the 
location of the project cannot be revealed. In the following 
account the term "the Country" will be used to denote the 
nation where the public relations project was located, the 
term "the Company" will be used to denote the public 
relations company for who the logico-linguistic modelling 
was undertaken, "the Client" will be used to denote the 
company for who the public relations were undertaken, "the 
Products" will denote the items that the client was having 
trouble with. 
The project began at the behest of the Chairman who 
expressed I an interest in using soft methods and 
logico-linguistic models. The company was newly formed and 
had been in existence for about two years. The routine 
running of the company was unproblematic. Most of the 
projects were handled by in-house staff and administered by 
the Chairman's partner. The company was operating smoothly 
at this level and the Chairman spent little time on the day 
to day running of the Company, the difficulty was with the 
special projects that he administered himself. 
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There were two types of special project. The first type were 
contracts that fell outside the capacity and capability of 
in-house staff. With these projects the Chairman would put 
together a team of specialists from outside the company and 
personally direct the project, other companies would also be 
involved as sub-contractors. The size of these projects were 
in the medium range - for example, the most recently 
acquired contract was worth approximately one million US 
dollars. The second type of special project were for 
particularly valuable clients, these the Chairman handled 
personally. 
7.1.3 The problem situation 
There were a number of on-going projects and all of them 
were suitable for logico-linguistic modelling. After some 
preliminary model building of various projects, the most 
complex project was chosen as being the most appropriate. 
This was a public relations project for a multinational 
client involved in the processing and distribution of food 
and other consumable products. They were concerned because 
the Country had recently introduced regulations detrimental 
to the sales of one of their range of products and certain 
factions in the government were proposing even more 
detrimental legislation. The Company was hired to undertake 
public relations that would prevent further legislation 
against the products and, if possible, help to repeal the 
regulations that had just been passed. 
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The remit for the Company was to undertake research into the 
social and political situation with regard to the Products 
and to keep the Client appraised of this situation. On the 
basis of this research the Company would develop a public 
relations strategy for the Products. The main vehicles for 
the implementation of the strategy were likely to be 
arranging for the case against regulations to be presented 
in the media and the hiring of lobbyists to influence 'public 
opinion. 
7.1.4 Modus operandi 
The model building process took place in a number of long 
sessions in which only the Chairman and the analyst 
participated. In the first session the Chairman described 
the situation and the analyst took notes. In subsequent 
sessions the analyst would present models based on the notes 
from the previous session, the models were then discusses 
and the Chairman would proceeded to talk about areas of the 
situation not covered in the models. The analyst was in fact 
merely returning the Chairman's ideas in a structured form. 
The learning, therefore, derived from the structuring alone. 
This can be contrasted with most SSM projects where the 
learning derives from the exchange of stake-holders' views. 
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A salient point is that the general Checkland style models 
which started the model building process held little 
interest for the Chairman. It was only in the construction 
of the more complex logico-linguistic models that he thought 
he was getting somewhere. This was probably due to the fact 
that there was only one Weltanschauung, that of the 
Chairman, being represented. The analyst's role was more or 
less confined to representing the Chairman's viewpoint. Thus 
there was no real debate or language game in this project. 
Stage two of the six stage process advocated in Chapter 6 
did not conform to the normal pattern and the 
logico-linguistic modelling was a representation of an 
existing language rather than a dynamic process of language 
creation. 
The modelling was undertaken without any clear idea about 
what might result. One possibility was that 
logico-linguistic modelling might help to find out what 
would be required for the legal environment to be improved. 
In the event the empirical model could not be completed in 
sufficient detail because of lack of knowledge. However, 
areas where the Company did not have sufficient knowledge 
could be identified and this was a useful result. It 
indicated areas where the Company needed to conduct 
empirical research and also identified some potential 
benefits that would follow from the research. 
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7.1.5 The outcome for the Company 
The most immediate outcome for the Company was a list of 
bullet points representing areas where research or action 
was indicated. These were: 
1. Identify Minister's close associates and political 
allegiance. 
2. Identify groups in favor of repealing legislation. 
3. Bring these groups to the attention of the Minister (by 
publicity in the press). 
4. Create new or stronger groups (by providing facilities). 
5. Map Product cultivation and processing areas against the 
constituencies of Members of Parliament. 
6. Conduct a survey to determine whether the general public 
is for or against more stringent regulations and the reasons 
for their opinion. 
7. Use the survey results for strategy design. 
8. Use the survey as a lobbying device if appropriate 
results are obtained. 
9. Determine the position of the dominant local religion 
with regard to legislation effecting the Product. 
Most of these points had already occurred to the Chairman. 
He had spent considerable time thinking about the problem 
situation and had also used some Harvard strategy methods, 
such and strengths and weakness analysis, to structure the 
problem. However, some ideas were new and an outcome of the 
model building process. 
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During the model building and ancillary discussions it 
became clear that the vested interest of Members of 
Parliament would tend to be in favor of the Product in those 
constituencies where a large number of constituents were 
employed in the cultivation or processing of the Product. 
Therefore, the Chairman determined to compile a list of MPs 
representing these areas and to give them special attention. 
The lack of knowledge about public opinion was of particular 
concern. A survey would stand to provide information for the 
development of project strategy and the results might also 
be useful as a lobbying device. The Chairman determined to 
put a forward a proposal for a survey of public opinion at 
his next meeting with the Client. However, such surveys are 
expensive and he doubted that it would be approved. As the 
model is a form of information requirements analysis the 
Chairman recognized that the model would form an excellent 
basis for questionnaire design. This is an idea that had not 
previously occurred to the analyst. 
A less tangible outcome was that the Chairman profited from 
the structured debate that the model building process 
provided. As the debate comprised only the Chairman and the 
analyst the change of perspective was less significant that 
would normally be the case in an SSM project where numerous 
stake-holders are involved. The limitations of the debate 
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can, however, be taken as a vindication of the usefulness of 
the greater detail of logico-linguistic modelling compared 
to traditional SSM models. 
7.1.6 Theoretical findings 
The fact that the empirical model could not be completed 
made apparent interesting implications for the use of SSM in 
information system design. The foregoing chapters have shown 
the need for an empirical model if the information system is 
going to support real world activities. The completion of 
the six stage process of chapter six assumes that the 
stake-holders will have the real world knowledge necessary 
to build the system, if they don't then the method cannot 
proceed beyond stage two. In traditional knowledge based 
system design this will not be a problem because the people 
who built the model will be selected as domain experts - 
thus the term "expert system". 
In the modular structure of the six stage method this is not 
a problem. If the stake-holders have insufficient knowledge 
then the method will stop in stage three. The stake-holders 
can then branch off into empirical research and the 
logico-linguistic model will help to structure this 
research. If the research is successful then the six stage 
process can be resumed. 
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In traditional uses of SSM for information system design 
this is a very serious problem. Wilson states that the 
conceptual model should not represent an existing state of 
affairs, from this model along with some analysis he 
produces an information system to support the new 
activities. Wilson assumes that all knowledge that is needed 
for the construction of the new information system is 
already available. There is no place in Wilson's method for 
empirical research outside the organization. 
Suppose we have an organization that makes and retails 
ice-cream. The stake-holders are not happy with this and 
construct a conceptual model of a desirable system. Lets 
suppose the desirable system is a system to make and retail 
pizza. From this model Wilson then goes through the stages 
of information categories, Maltese cross and data flow 
diagrams. When these are completed the programmers can put 
together a computer system to support the activities 
involved in the manufacture and retail of pizza. 
The stake-holders might like pizza and know that there is a 
good market for it. But why should we assume that they know 
how to make it? Why should we assume that they even know 
anything about what is involved in making it. There is 
nothing in Wilson's method that will enable them to find 
out. There is not even anything in Wilson's method that will 
enable them to find out what type of thing they need to find 
out. So how can an information system be designed to support 
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these activities? The answer is that cannot. Wilson's method 
can only work when the stake-holders know everything they 
need to know about the new activities. 
7.2 Model Building 
7.2.1 Company level models 
In order to illustrate the model building process for the 
Chairman, and to set the project in context, a generic model 
of a public relations project was constructed. Following 
discussion and iteration with the Chairman a root 
definition, CATWOE (in keeping with the image conscious 
nature of public relations the mnemonic was changed to 
ACETWO), measures of performance and a two level conceptual 
model were formulated. 
Root Definition: 
A system owned by a client and operated by the Chairman 
and the Company to obtain and complete a public relations 
contract within the Country's social situation and in which 
project income exceeds project expenditure. 
ACETWO 
Actors: Chairman and staff of the Company 
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Customer: The Chairman 
Environment: The Country's social scene 
Transformation: Contract available --> Pro3ect complete 
and fees paid 
Weltanschuung: Every company can benefit from good 
public relations 
Owner: The client company 





Effectiveness (E3): High standard of living and enjoyable 
work for members of the Company 
On the basis of this two models were constructed. One 
(figure 24) was of the ongoing company activities, the other 
(figure 25) took the "undertake project" element to a higher 
resolution level. These general level models were successful 
in acquainting the Chairman with the model building process. 
The next stage was to select a project for more detailed 
modelling. This occasioned considerable discussion. There 
were some half dozen on-going projects but none were of 
sufficient size or permanence to justify the creating of a 
computerized information system. Nor was there sufficient 
time available to build a working system though a 
demonstrator system was still a possibility. It was, after 
some preliminary model building of various projects, decided 
to proceed by modelling the most complex project in the hope 
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that the model building process would, itself, be 
enlightening. This was the public relations project for the 
multinational worried about detrimental legislation. 
7.2.2 General project models 
Figure 26 and Figure 27 give higher level models for the 
project. Figure 26 is a standard human activity system 
conceptual model. It is the only one that contains measures 
of performance. Subsequent models grow out of this model and 
can be understood as inheriting the measures of performance 
from it. Figure 27 is element 1 from figure 26 taken to a 
higher resolution level. 
Figure 28 is the beginning of the model itself. It is at a 
lower order to figures 26 and 27 which are about model 
building. This is apt to be confusing for people unfamiliar 
with logical hierarchies. Figures 26 & 27 are at the same 
level as Checkland's ILSD model (Checkland, 1989b) which is 
a system to build an information system not a model of the 
information system itself. 
A short example might help to make this clear. Suppose we 
want to build an information system to support pizza retail. 
We could build a model of a system to build the information 
system (figure 27 is of this type). This might include 
activities such as "buy computer" and "model the activities 
the information system will support". The model of the 
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activities the information system will support will be tuil-_ 
within the wider model of the system to build an information 
system. The model of the activities the information system 
will support (figure 28 is of this type) will contain 
activities such as "obtain tomatoes" and "cook pizza" it 
will not contain activities such as "buy computer". By a 
series of additions Wilson develops this type of model until 
it is represented in computer code. In logico-linguistic 
modelling the stake-holder driven process is extended until 
it is capable of becoming (by derivation rather than 
addition) computer code. 
The distinction between system to build an information 
system and information system starts to overlap when the 
information system contains non-monotonic logic, self 
verification and learning ability. When this is the case, as 
it is in the chapter 6 model, the information system starts 
to build itself. 
The logico-linguistic model shown in figure 28 is a model of 
the state of affairs in which the criterion for efficacy 
(El) is met. In figure 26 this given as "legal environment 
improved or maintained" this is rendered in element 1 of 
figure 28 as "Existing regulations repealed and no new 
regulations introduced". The logico-linguistic model is the 
model that will show us how to solve the problem while 
figures 26 & 27 show us how to build the logico-linguistic 
model. 
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7.2.3 The logico-linguistic model 
Figure 28 gives a pure logico-linguistic model. Figure 29 
gives a model that is partially empirical because it 
comprises an inductive hypothesis, indicated by the ''M' 
modal operator, in addition to definitions, indicated by the 
"Y modal operator. A good deal of time was spent 
constructing figures 28 and 29 the construction was 
complicated by the fact that it was not easy to determine 
how laws and rules should be represented in modal logic (see 
section 7.3). Figure 29 contains what is necessary to build 
an inductive knowledge based system. 
Figures 30,31,32,33 and 34 are not complete in the sense 
that they do not contain the modal operators needed to 
construct an inductive system. By the time these model were 
built it had become evident that there would not be enough 
time to build even a demonstrator computer system. It was, 
therefore, decided to use the time available to expand the 
model in terms of extent rather than in terms of detail. 
In figure 30 modal flags are absent because it was never 
determined whether elements 19,20,21 and 22 were an 
extensive definition of 17 or whether their conjunction 
represented a hypothesis as to the full extension of 17. If 
they were a hypothesis then a corresponding intensive 
definition would need to be added. That is, we might be 
saying that, as a matter of fact, the only time an official 
is willing to make a proposal is when it is of direct gain 
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or when it will help his career or when it supports his 
friends or when he likes the Product. In this case we could 
be wrong because some other factor might cause him to be 
willing to make the proposal. And if this is true we need 
some criterion to determine that he is willing that is 
independent of the four conditions already specified. 
In figures 31,32,33 and 34 neither modal operators nor the 
biconditional are used. They are similar to traditional SSM 
models and contain either incomplete defining criteria or 
empirical causal conditions. The work needed to covert these 
into full definitions with their full extensions was not 
undertaken. 
The model represented in figures 28 through 34 contains 49 
elements. More could be easily constructed by following some 
of the branches which have been ignored for the sake of 
brevity. For example, figures 29 onwards only develop 
element 7, "Proposals for repeal are made and passed at 
Ministerial level". The development of element 6, "Proposals 
for repeal are made and passed at Parliamentary level" would 
be very similar to that of element 7. The main difference 
would be that the word "Parliament" would replace "Ministry" 
and "Member of Parliament" would replace "Ministry 
Official". The development of elements 9 and 8 would also 
follow a similar pattern except that we would be talking 
about proposals not being passed rather than proposals 
Passed. 
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In each of these four forks many the motivating factors 
would end up being the same i. e. personal gain, ethical 
reasons etc. The model grows exponentially in the first 
instance and then begins to converge. For example, if it is 
a fact that the Product has little bad effect on people then 
this could be part of the cause of Officials or Members of 
Parliament thinking that a proposal for the repeal of 
legislation is ethical. It could also be part of the cause 
of the majority of the public being in favour of repeal 
which in turn could cause Ministry Officials and Members of 
Parliament to think that it was in their career interests to 
propose repeal. 
It was this convergence that produced the idea of 
identifying Members of Parliament with constituencies in 
Product growing and processing areas. The convergence also 
indicated that a survey of public opinion stood to be the 
most valuable piece of research. 
7.2.4 Findings from the modelling process 
In chapter 6 the logico-linguistic model and the empirical 
model were presented as distinct stages in the six stage 
process. This was the most convenient method of exposition 
as the two types of model are logically distinct. In the 
project the logico-linguistic model building and the 
empirical model building were not separated. 
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The Chairman did not have much difficulty with the notion of 
modality but there was difficulty in determining whether any 
given double headed arrow was a definition or an inductive 
hypothesis. This should not be surprising as people tend to 
assent to propositions without knowing whether they are 
definitions or not. Inferences can still be made without 
this distinction. Failure to make the distinction is just as 
common among academics as it is among uneducated people. The 
author is reminded of a discussion at a United Kingdom 
Systems Society seminar in which the question of whether 
information is physical was being discussed. The 
participants engaged in lively debate but it was by no means 
clear what the debate was about - it could have been about 
whether "information" should be defined in terms of physical 
attributes or whether "information" independently defined is 
in fact physical. 
In this instance the analyst felt that it was better to get 
on with extending the model and to flesh out details later. 
However, this procedure might not normally be the most 
suitable. This implementation detail is something that will 
have to be determined over a number of real world projects. 
The rapid growth of the number of elements might be 
disturbing for someone used to sSM modeling. But the design 
of a moderate knowledge based system design will require 
thousands of rules; and data flow diagrams of moderate size 
operations often need hundreds of pages. It is obviously 
impractical for stake-holders to spend the same amount of 
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time debating the details of a thousand element empirical 
model that they would spend on debating the details of a 
Checkland model. However, it seems unlikely that this much 
debate would be needed in practice. The most time consuming 
part of the modelling process is the debate about the 
relevant system. One this is agreed the time spent on each 
additional element becomes less and less. It becomes 
increasing obvious how the model should develop and more and 
more of the work can be undertaken by the analyst. 
One can expect that the role of the analyst will change as 
the project proceeds. Initially the analyst will mainly be 
concerned with Checkland style group facilitation. As the 
model proceeds more time will be spent with individual 
experts supplemented by desk research. As the model grows it 
can be submitted to the stake-holders for comment but it can 
be expected that approval will become increasingly automatic 
as the project proceeds. 
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7.3 Law, rationality and modality 
The Chairman chose this particular project as the case for 
study because of all his on-going project this was the most 
difficult to structure. Another way of saying this is to say 
that the project was the most difficult to model. The 
difficulty arose not because of problems with the modelling 
tools per se but because of inherent difficulty in 
understanding this type of situation. There were two 
fundamental problems: one was in representing law in terms 
of modal logic the other was concerned with the problems of 
modelling belief systems. 
Modal distinctions are fairly simple when we are dealing 
with statements about physical events. With abstract 
entities the case is more difficult and contentious. The law 
is a case in point. We can distinguish between a statement 
of the law and a statement about the law, for example the 
following on a sign in Kenilworth: 
Littering is forbidden 
would be a statement of the by-law in Kenilworth. This 
statement could be taken to be true but it is true as a 
matter of stipulation rather than as a matter of empirical 
fact. As such it should be expressed as follows: 
Fx: x is an act of littering in Kenilworth 
Gx: x is a forbidden act 
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(Ax) Fx -> Gx 
However, if somebody asserts "Littering is forbidden in 
Kenilworth" then this is contingent as the person that 
states it could be mistaken. It should presumably be stated 
as: 
M (AX) Fx -> Gx 
This is not just a problem with modal logic but part of a 
set of philosophical problems concerned with intentionality. 
An intensional act, such as a belief, is one directed 
towards an object, such as a proposition. (Intentionality 
here is not the used in the same sense intension and 
extension). A solution is well beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
The second major problem with the model was that it was 
largely concerned with what is believed rather than with 
what is a fact. In the case of rational belief we can 
undertake some procedure to determine the cause. But this is 
not possible with irrational belief as literally anything 
can be the cause of irrational belief. As hardly anybody is 
rational all the time, and some people are irrational most 
of the time, this makes for difficulties in the construction 
of the model. The same difficulty occurs in determining the 
movement of share prices as these movements are caused by 
beliefs rather than facts. In economics the normal solution 
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is to use Rational Expectations as the basis for stock 
market modelling. The same might be appropriate with other 
belief systems such as public relations. 
These problems have a theoretical and a practical aspect. 
From the theoretical point of view the fact that the 
logico-linguistic method encounters problems with the law 
and with belief can be seen as a vindication of the method. 
This is because the method surfaces problems that other 
methods are incapable of recognizing. SSADM treats 
everything as logically necessary. This does not solve the 
problem it simply ignores it. When systems designed on the 
basis of SSADM start to go badly wrong, because of a failure 
to make modal distinctions or because belief systems are 
represented in the computer system, the designers are quite 
incapable of understanding the problem. 
When a theoretically sound solution is not possible a 
practical accommodation can still be reached. If the project 
had proceeded to the creation of a computerized knowledge 
based system, the analyst would have suggested that the 
model be built with laws treated as logically true and 
beliefs modeled on the basis of rational expectations. 
However, it would have been explained to the stake-holders, 
with considerable emphasis, that such a system could fall 
into error if the laws were not correctly represented or if 
the laws change. The system would also fall into error when 
the people represented in the system did not behave 
rationally. Given that the stake-holders knew how the system 
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could go wrong they would be more able to recognize when it 
did go wrong and be more able to compensate or correct such 
errors. 
The increased number of logical connectives in 
logico-linguistic modelling, therefore, cause a range of new 
modeling problems not found in traditional SSM. They raise 
questions that give philosophers and economists endless 
trouble and we cannot expect stake-holders or analysts to be 
able to solve all them. 
There are limits to the client driven design here because 
the client will not know what the model should look like. 
The analyst will need to be far more active than in 
traditional SSM and will often need to draw on modelling 
solutions drawn from other disciplines. 
7.4 Converting the model into predicate logic 
The bubble diagrams from figure 29 of the case study can now 
be expressed in the predicate calculus. The numbers will 
stand for the contents of the bubbles. The logical form of 
the arrows between the bubbles will be indicated by a slash. 
Thus 7/10,11 is the arrow between bubble 7 and the box 
containing bubbles 10 and 11. The contents of the bubbles 
will always be particular existential statements while the 
arrows will always be universals. We shall only need three 
object variables. 
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In accordance with Ockham's razor (entities must not be 
increased beyond necessity, see section 7.5-4) we will only 
have three objects. The Minister could be formulated as a 
object but there is no need to do so. For any given Ministry 
there is one and only one Minister. 
Hx: x is a proposal for repeal 
Ix: x is a proposal passed 
Kx: x is a proposal made at Ministerial level 
Lx: x is a proposal sanctioned by the Minister 
Mx: x is a proposal approved by Cabinet 
Rz, x: x is a proposal that is made by Ministry Official z. 
Oz, x: z is a Ministry Official in a position to make a 
proposal x. 
Nz, x: z is a Ministry Official willing to make a proposal x. 
Pz, x: z is a is a Ministry Official who thinks the proposal 
x is ethical 
Qz, x: z is a Ministry Official who thinks making proposal x 
will result in personal gain. 
Sz, x: z is a Ministry Official who registers proposal x 
(EX) Kx & Hx & Ix 
10: (Ex) (Ez) Rz, x 
11: (EX) Kx & Ix 
12: (EX) Lx 
13: (EX) Mx 
14: (EX) (EZ) Nz, x 
15: (Ex) (Ez) Oz, x 
220 
16: (Ex) (EZ) PZ, x 
17: (Ex) (EZ) QZ, x 
18: (Ex) (Ez) Sz, x 
7/10,11: L (AX) (Az) (Kx & Hx & Ix) <-> (Rz, x & (Kx & Ix)) 
10/14,15: L (Ax) (Az) Rz, x <-> (Oz, x & Nz, x) 
11/12,13: L (Ax) (Kx & Ix) <-> (Lx & Mx) 
14/16,17: M (Ax) (Az) Nz, x <-> (Pz, x v Qz, x) 
Rule 14/16,17: is an inductive hypothesis. So, by the 
arguments made in chapter 4 it requires an independent 
defining criterion. This can be established by bubbles 15 
and 18. 
L (Ax) (Az) (Sz, x & Oz, x) -> Nz, x 
This means that, as a matter of logic, it will be true to 
say that an official is willing to make a proposal if he is 
in a position to make the proposal and if he registers the 
proposal. Establishing that an official is in a position to 
make the proposal and establishing that he has registered it 
will be established independently of establishing that the 
official thinks the proposal is ethical or will result in 
personal gain. We include the statements about ethics and 
personal gain because we are looking for the cause of an 
official being willing. The defining criterion is there to 
check if were right in our causal account. 
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7.5 Deriving a relational database 
7.5.1 Entity-relationship modelling 
The fundamental principle behind Relational Database design 
is to maximize the efficiency of computer storage, retrieval 
and update of particular facts. However, what constitutes 
the most efficient computer configuration of particular 
facts does not necessarily constitute something that 
corresponds to the configuration of the real world. 
Information Engineering uses entity-relationship modelling 
as part of the methodology for relational database design. 
This is a tool for the analyst. It is not something that 
laymen can easily understand. Indeed the those people that 
are good at entity relationship modelling are usually those 
that are familiar with the operation of a relational 
database. Unlike conceptual models, and to a lesser extent 
data flow diagrams, are not intended to be part of the 
client interface. 
Data flow diagrams represent a stylized vlew of the physical 
world and predicate logic could be said to represent valid 
arguments. It is difficult to see what entity-relationship 
models represent because relations, like propositions, do 
not exist in the real world. Relational database designers, 
however, speak of them as if they do. 
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The construction of normalized relational database ---Ioes no-c 
require entity-relationship modelling it can instead be 
constructed from an empirical model such as that represented 
in figure 29. The advantages of using logico-linguistic 
modelling techniques are threefold: the models can be 
understood by the clients and therefore they stand a better 
chance of understanding the computer system; the models 
provide a more powerful and more standard logic upon which 
to base the design; the model has an explicit real world 
connection. 
7.5.2 Terminology 
The theory behind normalized relational database design is 
expressed in set theory (Codd, 1970). Set theory could be 
loosely described as the equivalent of predicate logic and 
even cautious authors note "strong affinities to logic" 
(Haack, 1978, p. 6) However, converting a model in predicate 
logic into third normal form involves a number of 
difficulties. The first of these concerns the vocabulary 
that database designers use to describe their work. Database 
Terminology (let us call it "DBT") borrows words from logic 
but gives them completely different meanings. This can be 
seen in the following table: 
Logic Database Terminology (DET) 
Instantiated object Value 
223 







Attribute, data item, 
domain, field. 
Entity, tuple 
Set of tuples 
No term 
No term 
The difference in terminology might seem trivial but DBT is 
so bizarre that it is suspicious. It is to be remembered 
that the terminology of logic tries to remain as close as 
possible to the terms used in English grammar and to 
ordinary English usage. DBT appears to be trying distance 
itself from logic and ordinary usage. Whatever the reasons 
for the emergence of DBT its effect is to provide a smoke 
screen that obscures some dubious logical maneuvers. 
7.5.3 Predicates into objects 
It is interesting to note that three or more placed 
predicates are quite common in relational database design 
but comparatively rare in ordinary logic. Relational 
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database designers like to turn predicates into objects. For 
example, if we wanted to say that x is a proposal that is 
made quickly by Ministry Official z, then in logic we would 
just define a new predicate: 
Tz, x: x is a proposal that is made quickly by Ministry 
Official z 
But a database designer would tend to define a new object: 
Rz, x, y: x is a proposal that is made by Ministry Official z 
at speed y 
The reason they take this counter intuitive approach is 
technical. Computers can process an inquiry more quickly if 
there are a small number of relationship tables containing a 
large number of objects than if there are a large number of 
relationship tables containing a small number of objects. 
The maneuver of turning predicates into objects would be 
quite innocuous if it was undertaken as a deliberate bodge. 
It would be satisfactory if one took a model like figure 29 
converted it into 3rd normal form, undertook operations on 
the database and then converted the results back into the 
form of the original model. But this does not appear to be 
what happens. Relational databases are built out of entity 
relationship models. These models which for database 
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designers have acquire the status of representations of tne 
world have the peculiar relational logic built into them. 
7.5.4 Ontology of the object 
Ockham's razor is a principle of ontological economy. It is 
stated as "Entities are not to be multiplied beyond 
necessity". Relational database design clearly employs an 
opposite principle. 
Quine's theory of predicate logic states that objects in 
correctly formed quantified statements carry an ontological 
commitment (see Haack). That is, they refer to past, present 
or future, physical objects or events. As objects in 
database design are created as and when the designers 
choose, relational database design is incompatible with 
these ideas. Quine's theory is contentious but it is a major 
contender to explain truth and meaning. 
Relational database design is, therefore, far from neutral 
with regard to ontology, the theory of meaning and the 
theory of truth. This is disturbing because writers on the 
subject of relational databases seen quite unaware of this 
fact. The problem comes home to roost when we consider time. 
Normally temporality will be expressed as a relation between 
events. Expressing temporal relations in the predicate 
calculus is not a serious problem. However, for the 
relational database designer time becomes an object that 
226 
stands in some sort of relation to an event. Ideally a 
relational database requires an infinite number of time 
objects ready to stand in a relation to any new event. In 
practice only those time objects relevant to event objects 
are stored in the system. However, database designers have a 
problem deciding which and how many time objects are 
relevant to an event. This is one of the reasons that 
relational databases need to go through the troublesome 
process of being validated; a process that would be 
unnecessary if they were based on normal predicate logic. 
7.5.5 Deriving a relational database 
There are three ways our model can be used in the design of 
a relational database. The first is to take a model such as 
figure 29 and express it in a form of the predicate calculus 
that uses a minimum of relations, this will not be 
considered. The second is to use a conventional predicate 
formulation, the one given in section 7.4 above, and obtain 
a database that is not in third normal form. The third 
method is to take the database design obtained using the 
second method and convert it into third normal form. 
If we which to make a relational database from figure 29, we 
need take only those bubbles on the outside Of the figure. 
That is 16,17,15,12,13,7 and 18. The internal bubbles 
(14,10 and 11) are all logically equivalent to one or more 
of the outside bubbles but the outside bubbles taken 
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together contain more predicates. Any instantiation in the 
set of predicates in the outside predicates will enable us 
to deduce any instantiation in the set of internal 
predicates. The internal predicates are, as far as an 
information processing system is concerned, redundant. In 
database jargon this means that attributes that are 
functionally dependent on other attributes have been 
removed. 
It is a good idea to give each instantiation of an object 
variable a unique description in the relational database. 
This can be achieved by giving every instantiation a unique 
number. An artificial predicate is, therefore, created for 
every object variable. As there are only two objects in our 
model, i. e. x and z, only two artificial predicates need to 
be created. These are "Proposal number" and "Official 
number". These unique predicates (called key attributes in 
DBT) can then be substituted for all the ordinary 
predicates. A subject - predicate structure is called a 
"relation" in DBT even if the subject - predicate structure 
is only one-placed. This is in stark contrast to logic where 
the term "relation" is only used for a two or more placed 
predicate. 
Thus when the substitution of key attributes is made for 
ordinary predicates we will find that a one-placed predicate 
has one key attribute, a two-placed predicate has two key 
attributes, and an n-placed predicate will have n key 
attributes. 
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With an asterisk to denote the key attributes figure 21 can 
be laid out as follows: 
PROPOSAL 
* Proposal number 
proposal name 
OFFICIAL 
* Official number 
Official name 
PROPOSAL REGISTERED 
* Proposal number 
Proposal name 
OFFICIAL THINKS ETHICAL 
* Official number 
* Proposal number 
OFFICIAL THINKS PERSONAL GAIN 
* Official number 
* Proposal number 
OFFICIAL IN POSITION TO MAKE PROPOSAL 
* Official number 
* Proposal number 
SANCTIONED BY MINISTER 
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* Proposal number 
APPROVED BY CABINET 
* Proposal number 
PROPOSAL PASSED 
* Proposal number 
Here our objects have become the first two relationship 
tables and our predicates make up the rest. In this form the 
database is logically and ontological sound. 
The move to third normal form is made by eliminating the 
relationship tables with only one attribute and making the 
attribute a truth function in a table that share the same 
primary key: 
PROPOSAL 
* Proposal number 
proposal name 
sanctioned by minister Yes/No 
approved by cabinet Yes/No 
proposal passed Yes/No 
proposal registered Yes/No 
OFFICIAL 
* Official number 
Official name 
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OFFICIAL THINKS ETHICAL 
* Official number 
* Proposal number 
OFFICIAL THINKS PERSONAL GAIN 
* Official number 
* Proposal number 
OFFICIAL IN POSITION TO MAKE PROPOSAL 
* Official number 
* Proposal number 
This move is motivated by considerations of efficiency. 
Considering the ontological commitment of objects in 
predicate logic the result is quite bizarre because truth 
and falsity, represented by "Yes/No", have become objects. 
7.5.6 Disadvantages of relational databases 
The derivation of a relational database design from the 
empirical model, such as that expressed in figure 29, looses 
the modality and is, therefore, an extremely inelegant 
solution. Once modality is lost the problem of real world 
mapping once again begins to appear. 
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Relational database design is primarily a method of 
automating a bureaucracy. Designers generally use office 
forms as their main ipput for entity-relationship models. A 
paper based bureaucracy is itself an information system that 
may or may not map onto the real world. Like a paper based 
bureaucracy a relational database will only map onto the 
real world if it is part of a wider human activity system 
that can effect the mapping. Any falsified inductive 
hypotheses that are implicit in the relational database may 
be detected and removed during software maintenance. In this 
case software maintenance will be as vital a part of the 
information system as the software itself. Effective 
maintenance will involve tacit modal distinctions. 
It is significant that Codd's seminal work (1970) begins 
"Future users of large data banks must be protected from 
having to know how the data is organized in the machine (the 
internal representation)". On the surface this would seem 
very different from the emphasis on client led design that 
is in vogue today. However, few people would demand that 
clients and users must understand machine code. What is 
desirable is that the clients understand, and determine, the 
assumptions about the organizational context that systems 
analysts, database designers and programmers make in order 
to produce this code. The internal logic of the machine 
should reflect the wider logic of the human activity system. 
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In cases where, say the amount of data, makes a relationa. 
database the only practical solution, logico-linguistl-- 
modelling might not only provide a basis for design but also 
a blue print that could make explicit the modal distinctions 
needed in the maintenance of the software. 
7.6 Another method for converting into Prolog 
7.6.1 Problems with Prolog 
Chapter 6 was concerned to quickly demonstrate the potential 
of a method. It was demonstrated how one model could be 
converted into Prolog. It also showed how the problem of 
converting biconditionals could be solved. However, the move 
from modal predicate logic to Prolog is not always as smooth 
or as simple as it appeared in that chapter. There are 
difficulties in this procedure that must now be considered. 
Although we can derive a Prolog program from any formula in 
predicate logic, in many cases we cannot derive a Prolog 
program the is the equivalent of a formula in predicate 
logic. That is, if we take "PL" is stand for statements in 
predicate logic and "PO" to stand for statements that will 
run in Prolog, then PO -> PL will hold for all statements 
(every statement that can be expressed in Prolog can be 
expressed in predicate logic). However, PL -> PO will not 
hold for all statements (some statements that can be 
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expressed predicate logic cannot be expressed in statements 
that will run in Prolog). Therefore, PO <-> PL cannot hold 
for every statement. 
The "Dictionary" given in the appendix shows that many 
formulas in predicate logic can be expressed in alternative 
ways. These alternatives cannot be combined in a single 
program without the program entering into a vicious 
circularity. Given the same set of facts each alternative 
will be capable of queries that the other one cannot. Thus 
each alternative has only part of the power of the formula 
in predicate logic. 
For example (Ax) (Rx & Tx & Bx ) -> Px can be expressed in 
Prolog in such a way that it will maximize information about 
Px or in such a way that it will maximize information about 
Rx, Tx and Bx (see Appendix 11.3.2.4). This means that we 
must determine what we need information about and what 
information is going to be available before deciding which 
way to write the Prolog. 
The remainder of this chapter describes another way of 
converting modal predicate logic into Prolog. In Chapter 6 
the biconditional was handled by introducing "not" 
predicates and "not" objects. In this chapter the 
biconditionals will be converted into two sets of formulas 
each representing one half of the biconditional; these 
formulas are then converted into horn clauses with a 
positive antecedent, the Prolog rules follow from these. 
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The Dictionary shows two ways mutually exclusive, and none 
equivalent, Prolog expressions for most of the logical 
connectives used in logico-linguistic models. One logical 
connective is shown to have three exclusive Prolog 
expressions. The Dictionary makes no claim to completeness 
there may be many others. Thus there is no optimal way of 
expressing logico-linguistic models or even predicate logic 
in Prolog. The best way of writing the Prolog will depend on 
what questions it will need to answer. This will not be a 
problem in traditional applications such as deciding whether 
to approve or reject a request for a loan. Nor will it be a 
problem when the type of data available is always the same 
as in making deductions from sales figures. 
The problem arises in the construction of a general model in 
which the questions that will need to be answered and the 
type data available are not known or will vary from time to 
time. Such a model can be constructed in using 
logico-linguistic models and expresses in modal predicate 
logic, but it cannot be fully expressed in Prolog. 
7.6.2 Converting the logic into horn clauses 
We will try to avoid the problems referred to above by 
writing two Prolog programs. One will contain a direction of 
implication going one way the other will be the opposite. 
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The formulation of the model in modal predicate logl,, 
-- was 
given in section 7.4. We have four main universals to 
contend with: 
L (Ax) (Az) (Kx & Hx & Ix) <-> (Rz, x & Kx & Ix) 
L (AX) (Az) Rz, x <-> (Oz, x & Nz, x) 
L (Ax) (Kx & Ix) <-> (Lx & Mx) 
M (AX) (Az) Nz, x <-> (Pz, x v Qz, x) 
Program 1 
L (AX) (Az) (Rz, x & Kx & IX) -> (Kx & Hx & Ix) 
L (Ax) (Az) (Oz, x & Nz, x) -> Rz, x 
L (AX) (Lx & Mx) -> (Kx & IX) 
M (AX) (Az) (Pz, x v Qz, x) -> Nz, x 
Program 2 
L (Ax) (Az) (Kx & Hx & Ix) -> (Rz, x & Kx & IX) 
L (AX) (Az) Rz, x -> (Oz, x & Nz, x) 
L (Ax) (Kx & Ix) -> (Lx & Mx) 
M (Ax) (Az) Nz, x -> (Pz, x v Qz, x) 
We will concentrate on Program 1 for the moment. The first 
thing to do is to convert it into horn clauses. The result 
is: 
L (AX) (Az) (Rz, x & Kx & IX) -> Kx 
L (AX) (Az) (Rz, x & Kx & IX) -> Ix 
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(These two horn clauses are true but trivial and can be 
dropped from the program. As a conditional is only false 
when the antecedent is true and the consequent false, these 
clauses must always be true. The logical import of the 
biconditional from which they were derived is only felt in 
program 2) 
L (AX) (Az) (Rz, x & Kx & IX) -> Hx 
L (Ax) (Az) (Oz, x & Nz, x) -> Rz, x 
L (Ax) (Lx & Mx) -> Kx 
L (Ax) (Lx & Mx) -> Ix 
M (Ax) (Az) (Pz, x v Qz, x) -> Nz, x 
As the last formula is an inductive hypothesis we need to 
include rules that will falsify it given counter indicating 
particulars. These will taken from the definition L (Ax) 
(Az) Nz, x <-> Sz, x. Thus we can say that the hypothesis 
M (Ax) (Az) Nz, x <-> (Pz, x v Qz, x) will be false if 
Pz, x & Qz, x & Oz, x & -Sz, x. 
7.6.3 Horn clauses into Prolog (Program 1) 
The logical predicates and the predicates used in the 
program will be as follows: 
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Hx: proposalforrepeal (symbol) 
Ix: proposalpassed (symbol) 
Kx: proposalmadeatministry (symbol) 
Lx: proposal-sanctioned-by--mlnister (symbol) 
Mx: proposal_approved_by_cabinet (symbol) 
Rz, x: proposal-madeofficial (symbol, symbol) 
Oz, x: officlal_ln_position_to_make-proposal (symbol, symbol) 
Nz, x: official_willing_to_make-proposal (symbol, symbol) 
Pz, x: official-thinksproposal ethical (symbol, symbol) 
Qz, x: official thinks-proposalpersonalgain (symbol, symbol) 
Sz, x: proposalregistered (symbol, symbol) 
The rules for Program 1, will therefore be: 
proposalforrepeal (X) if 
proposal-made_official (Z, X) and 
proposal-madeatministry (X) and 
proposal_passed (X). 
proposal-made_official (Z, X) if 
official_in_position_to_make_proposal (Z, X) and 
official-willing_to_make_proposal (Z, X). 
proposal-made-at_ministry (X) if 
proposal-sanctioned_by_minister (X) and 
proposal_approved_by-cabinet (X). 
proposalpassed (X) if 
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proposal-sanctioned__by_mlnister (X) and 
proposal__approved_by__cabinet (X). 
official-willing_to-make_proposal (Z, X) if 
official__thinks___proposal_ethical (Z, X) or 
official thinksproposalpersonal-gain (Z, X). 
The falsification criterion can be formulated in two rules 
as follows: 
incorrecthyp (official-willing_iff-ethical_or_personal) if 
official-thinks_proposal_ethical (Z, X) and 
official-thinks_proposal_personal_gain (Z, X) and 
official-in_POsition_to_make_proposal (Z, X) and 
not (proposal_registered (Z, X)). 










proposal_made_official (smith, propl). 
proposal_made_official (smith, prop3). 
proposalmadeofficial (jones, prop6). 
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official_thinks__proposal_ethical (smith, propi). 
officlal_thinks__proposal_ethical (smith, prop3). 
official-thinks_proposal_personal-gain (jones, prop6). 
Given these and a nominal instantiation for "incorrecthyp" 
(in this case "nothing") Prolog will answer the following 
queries: 
goal: proposal-madeofficial (Z, X) and 
proposal-sanctioned-by-minister (X) 




Which means that the Minister has sanctioned propl and prop3 
made by Smith and prop6 made by Jones. A more detailed query 
might be: 
goal: proposal-made_official (Z, X) and 
proposal-sanctioned_by_minister (X) and 
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not (proposalpassed (X)) 
Turbo Prolog answers: 
Z=smith, X=prop3 
Which means only prop3 made by Smith has been sanctioned by 
the Minister but not passed. 
Given a much larger system these types of query could be 
very useful, but it would seem that a similar result could 
be obtained from using a relational database and a standard 
query language. More interesting is the ability of the 
system to show that some of the hypotheses used in its 
construction are false. Given: 




The "nothing" is just Prolog returning the nominal 
instantiation. the important thing is that Prolog has told 
us that our hypothesis that officials who think that a 
proposal is ethical or that it will result in personal gain 
are not always willing to make the proposal. Prolog knows 
this because there is a case, i. e. Jones and Prop4, where an 
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official was in a position to make a proposal that he 
thought ethical and would result in personal gain, but which 
was not registered. This could not have happened if he was 
willing to make the proposal. 
7.6.4 Horn clauses into Prolog (Program 2) 
Program 2 
L (Ax) (Az) (Kx & Hx & Ix) -> (Rz, x & Kx & Ix) 
L (AX) (Az) Rz, x -> (Oz, x & Nz, x) 
L (Ax) (Kx & Ix) -> (Lx & Mx) 
M (AX) (Az) Nz, x -> (Pz, x v Qz, x) 
Converted into non-trivial horn clauses this is as follows: 
L (Ax) (Az) (Kx & Hx & Ix) -> Rz, x 
L (Ax) (Az) Rz, x -> Oz, x 
L (AX) (Az) Rz, x -> Nz, x 
L (AX) (Kx & IX) -> Lx 
L (AX) (Kx & IX) -> Mx 
M (Ax) (Az) (Nz, x & -(Pz, x)) -> QZ, X 
M (AX) (Az) (Nz, x & -(Qz, x)) -> Pz, x 
In Prolog these are: 
proposal_made_official (Z, X) if 
proposal_made_at_ministry (X) and 





(Z, X) if 
proposalmadeofficial (Z, X). 
official-willing-to_make_proposal (Z, X) if 
proposal_made_official (Z, X). 
proposal_sanctioned_by_minister (X) lf 
proposalmadeatministry (X) and 
proposalpassed (X). 
proposal_approved_by_cabinet (X) if 
proposal_made_at_ministry (X) and 
proposal_passed (X). 
official_thinks_proposal_personal_gain (Z, X) if 
official-willing_to_make_proposal (Z, X) and 
not-official-thinks_proposal-ethical (Z, X). 
official-thinks_proposal-ethical (Z, X) if 
official-willing_to_make_proposal (Z, X) and 
not_official_thinks_proposal_personal-gain (Z, X)). 
Prolog's inability to handle negation correctly has forced 
us to introduce two new negative predicates these need to be 
declared as predicates: 
not_official-thinks_proposal_ethical (symbol, symbol). 
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not_offlclal_thinks__proposal_personal__galn (symbol, symbo-, -). 
We can give some instantiations: 
not__official_thinks_proposal__ethical (smith, prop6). 
not-official-thinks_proposal_personal-gain (smith, prop5). 
The falsification criterion can be formulated the opposite 
way from the way it was formulated in Program 1. That is we 
can say that the hypothesis M (Ax) (Az) ((Nz, x) <-> (Pz, x v 
Qz, x)) will be false if Sz, x & Oz, x & -(Pz, x) & -(Qz, X). 
Thus: 
incorrecthyp (official-willing_iff_ethical-or_personal) if 
proposal_registered (Z, X) and 
official_ln_position_to_make_proposal (Z, X) and 
not(official-thinks_proposal-ethicai (Z, X)) and 
not (official-thinks_proposal_personal_gain (Z, X)). 
Prolog will now answer queries: 






The fact that Smith thinks proposal 5 is ethical can be 
deduced from the fact that he has made the proposal official 
but does not think it will result in personal gain. 
As it stands there is nothing to stop self contradictory 
data being entered into this program. We can enter: 
official-thinks_proposal-ethical (smith, prop7). 
not_official_thinks_proposal_ethical (smith, prop7). 
This could be-safeguarded against by including a new 
predicate: 
incorrectdata(proposal ethical) if 
official-thinks_proposal-ethical (Z, X) and 
not-official-thinks_proposal-ethical (Z, X). 
A clause to this effect would have to be added to each 
predicate beginning with "not". The "incorrectdata(X)" goal 




8 SCIENTIFIC APPLICATIONS 
8.1 Systems of modal logic 
The connection between modal logic and science has already 
been made in section 5.4. However, chapters 5 and 6 were 
mostly concerned with how a language can be mapped on to the 
real world in a scientific way. The present chapter will be 
concerned to show that logico-linguistic models can be used 
in the process of scientific investigation. First some 
points about modal logic must be reconsidered. 
The formal aspects of modal logic are both difficult and 
complex. The notation for, and the interpretation of, the 
propositional and predicate calculi may vary but both form 
unitary systems that are generally and uniformly accepted. 
There are different ways of axiomatizing the predicate 
calculus but they really amount to the same thing. That is, 
in system A we will have axioms that are theorems in B and 
in B we. Will have axioms that are theorems in A. It doesn't 
matter much which system of axiomatization we choose because 
what can be proven in one system is the same as what can be 
proven in another. The case is quite different with modal 
logics. There are dozens of different systems, each has 
different axioms and what can be proven in one is often very 
different from what can be proven in another. 
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Before using modal logic it would seem to be a good idea to 
specify which system is being used. Unfortunately a huge 
amount of work would be necessary to decide which system 
would be the most appropriate to the form of knowledge 
representation needed in section 6.3-4. The deduction of 
just one intuitively obvious conclusion required a lot of 
work and that needed to be backed up by the difficult logic 
in Appendix 2. 
There is a deeper problem here because there are different 
ideas about what modality means. Chellas gives a semantic 
definition of modality: 
... a proposition is necessary if it holds at all 
possible worlds, possible if it holds at some. 
(Chellas, 1980) 
This is his only explanation of it. In chapter one of this 
book truth conditions are explained semantically in terms of 
formulas prefixed by the semantic turnstile (which can be 
translated as "is a semantic consequence of") rather than 
the syntactic turnstile (which can be translated as "is 
deducible from"). 
Hughes & Cresswell are not so committed to possible word 
semantics: 
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Among true propositions we can distinguish between 
those that happen to be true and those which are bound 
to be true ... A proposition which is bound to be true 
we call a necessarily true proposition ... one that is 
bound to be false we call an impossible proposition 
... and one that is neither necessary nor impossible 
we call a contingent proposition. (Hughes & 
Cresswell, 1972, p. 22) 
Hughes & Cresswell define modal notions in terms of logical 
necessity and logical contingency. They use the syntactic 
turnstile in their introduction of modal system "T". 
In chapters 4,5 and 6a case has been made to show that 
stipulative definitions and factual statements can be 
distinguished by modal operators. The validity of this 
depends on how modal operators are interpreted. The 
interpretation given by Chellas is too narrow the one given 
by Hughes and Cresswell less so. 
There are problems at the level of the interpretation of the 
formulas. Chellas gives L(A) -> M(A) as a valid formula in 
S5 (actually he gives it as an exercise for students to 
prove). Suppose we take A to be "All panthers are black" 
then following Chellas' interpretation L(A) -> M(A) will 
mean: 
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"If if it is true that panthers are black at all possible 
worlds then it is true that panthers are black at some 
actual world. " 
This makes sense. But if "L" is taken to mean true by 
definition and "M' is taken to mean is true as a matter of 
fact then we have: 
"If it is true that all panthers are black by definition 
then it is true that all panthers are black as a matter of 
f act" 
This creates epistemological difficulties. As was pointed 
out in section 4.5.1 if a statement is true as a matter"of 
definition it cannot be established empirically - it cannot 
be established as a matter of fact. A similar problem occur 
in the modal system "T" where Hughes & Cresswell give the 
following rule: 
M 
Which would be interpreted as "if p is true then p is true 
as a matter of fact". 
However, there are also a host of epistemological problems 
with possible world semantics. How can we establish that 
panthers are black in all possible worlds? We cannot, as a 
matter of fact, visit all possible worlds and it is doubtful 
if it is even logically possible to visit all possible 
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worlds. Nor could we observe that panthers are black in a 
number of actual worlds and then formulate an induction to 
the effect that panthers are black in all possible worlds. 
An induction is always open to falsification by particular 
facts but any statement governed by the "L" modal operator 
is not. 
There are more problems for possible world semantics when we 
come to consider extension and intension. The extension of 
"logically true" must be "at all possible worlds" but this 
cannot be an extensive definition because the members of the 
class of possible worlds has not been specified. Therefore, 
if "at all possible worlds" is to be defined at all it must 
be given an intensive definition. That is, if we are going 
to say that X is true in all possible worlds, then, because 
we cannot specify all the worlds in which it is true, we 
must have a criterion for judging that it is true in all 
possible worlds; and surely that criterion will be what "at 
all possible worlds" means. But possible worlds semantics 
does not provide such a criterion. 
Although a formalization of the method advocated in this 
thesis could be undertaken in one of the existing modal 
systems, it is doubtful whether this would be worthwhile. It 
might be better to develop a new system of modal logic that 
includes a new interpretation of the modal operators. This 
in turn might require a new theory of truth. 
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Such a theory of truth could be constructed out of elements 
of Wittgenstein's rule based language games and -larski's 
distinction between object language and meta-language. 
Stipulative definitions could be taken as meta-linguistic 
statements about an object language that refers to the real 
world. Statements in the object language would be true or 
false in so far as they correspond to the real world. They 
could would conform to the correspondence theory of truth 
and be denoted by the "M' modal operator. Statements in the 
meta-language would not refer to the object language but 
would be statements of the rules of the object language. 
They would conform to a coherence theory of truth and be 
denoted by the "L" modal operator. 
This line of thought will be taken a little further in 
chapter 10. The use of SSM in information system design has 
hitherto lacked any formal basis. Other systems of 
information system design do not make modal distinctions. 
While the case for modal logics is a good one a single 
system has yet to be universally accepted And this indicates 
that existing systems are contentious. Possible world 
semantics is one attempt at basing modal logic in a theory 
of truth but this is also contentious. 
Enough attention has been paid to formalism and highly 
abstract theory. In the next section an informal system of 
modal rules will be put forward and worked through as a 
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practical tool in the design of a scientific knowledge based 
system. It might be possible to formalize this system but 
the work required is far beyond the scope of the thesis. 
8.2 Informal rules for a modal system 
The operator "L" will be used to denote a stipulative 
definition or a statement that is deducible from one or more 
stipulative definitions. The operator "M' will be used to 
denote a statement that is not a stipulative definition nor 
deducible from one or more stipulative definitions. We will 
call these "contingent". The rules of formulation and 
production and the axioms will be the same as for the 
predicate calculus to these will be added the meta-rules 
from section 6.3.4 and the following additional rules: 
Al All particular statements are contingently true or 
contingently false. 
A2 All statements that are necessarily true or necessarily 
false are universals. 
A3 Any conclusion derived from a set of statements that are 
all necessarily true is necessarily true. 
A4 Any conclusion that is derived from a set of premises 
that are not all necessarily true is contingently true. 
A5 All axioms are necessarily true. 
A6 If the disjunction of a necessary statement and a 
contingent statement is false then the contingent statement 
will be false. 
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A7 If the dis3unction of a universal contingent statement 
and a particular contingent statement is false, for example 
-((Ax) Fx v (Ex) Gx), then the universal statement will be 
false. 
The justification for these rules is as follows: 
Al: Particular statement are prefixed by the existential 
quantifier i. e. (Ex). This indicates that at least one x 
exists. Existence is contingent and, therefore, all 
particulars are contingent. 
A2: All statements are either particulars or universals, 
therefore, as all particulars are contingent, if any 
statement is necessarily true it must be a-universal. 
A3: In the absence of contingency, necessity remains by 
default. Thus necessary premises can only lead to a 
necessary conclusion. 
A4: If a statement is contingent it cannot be true or false 
by logical necessity. Therefore, any statement derived in 
whole or in part from contingent statements cannot be true 
or false by logical necessity. 
A5: Axioms are regarded as necessary in order to distinguish 
them from other premises which might be contingent. 
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A6: The truth of axioms and the theorems derived from them 
must be preserved at all cost. Contingent universals are 
hypotheses and can be shown to be false without falsifying 
the whole system. 
A7: Contingent universals are hypotheses about what can be 
observed, contingent particulars can correspond to what is 
actually observed. 
This system of logic will be called "NC". A system generated 
using these "NC" will be consistent. Which means that no 
thesis (axiom, premise or theorem) will be the negation of 
any other thesis. It is not claimed that "NC" is complete in 
the sense that every well formed formula can be derived as a 
thesis. In fact it is doubtful that "NC" could be called an 
axiomatic system. It is more of an axiomatic shell in which 
premises can be added as required. It is not claimed that 
"NC" can deal with all the coherent statements of a natural 
language. Thus it is not intended to resolve many points of 
philosophical interest. It is only intended. to deal with the 
statements produced in a logico-linguistic conceptual model. 
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8.3 A Scientific example 
8.3.1 Modelling an inductive hypothesis 
A scientific relationship between definitions and inductions 
can be clarified by means of an example, let us take g from 
figure 22. To build the figure the first requirement is to 
get the stake-holders to establish a defining criterion for 
"a patient has measles". In this example "n virus alpha in 
patient blood stream" and "k Alpha antibodies are not in 
patient blood stream" are taken as a necessary conditions of 
a patient having measles. The conjunction of n and k are 
taken as an N&S condition of a patient having measles. As 
this is a defining criterion it is flagged with "L" in the 
igure. 
Here n and k are clearly intensive defining criteria for g. 
The extension for e will be all the members of the class of 
patients who have measles. In Table 1 individual members of 
this class are listed: Adam, Betty, Colin, Dianna etc. 
Formally we can represent these defining criteria as 
Domain: Hospital patients 
Gx: x has measles 
Nx: x has virus alpha in the blood stream 
Kx: x has no alpha antibodies in the blood stream 
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Axiom (1) L (Ax) Gx <-> (Nx & Kx) 
In other words we shall take it that any hospital patient 
that has measles has virus alpha and no alpha antibodies in 
their blood stream. A number of theorems follow from this: 
Theorem (2) L (Ax) Gx -> (Nx & Kx) 
from (1) by material equivalence, simplification and A3 or 
meta-rule one. 
Theorem (3) L (Ax) Gx -> Nx 
From (2) by material implication, distribution, 
simplification, material implication and A3 or meta-rule 
one. 
Theorem (4) L (Ax) Gx -> Kx 
From (2) by material implication, distribution, 
simplification, material implication and A3 or meta-rule 
one. 
Theorem (5) L'(Ax) (Nx & Kx) -> Gx 
from (1) by material equivalence, simplification and A3. 
Given this we can begin to formulate inductive hypotheses. 
The inductive hypothesis shown in figure 22 is that every 
patient that has measles has a runny nose, a high 
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temperature, inflamed eyes and a skin rash, and that E-ývery 
patient that has a runny nose, a high temperature, inflamed 
eyes and a skin rash has measles. The formal expression is: 
Fx: x has a runny nose 
Hx: x has a high temperature 
Ix: x has inflamed eyes 
Jx: x has a skin rash 
Prem (6) M (Ax) Gx -> (Fx & Hx & Ix & Jx) 
Prem (7) M (Ax) (Fx & Hx & Ix & Jx) -> Gx 
Theo , rem (8) M (Ax) Gx <-> (Fx & Hx & Ix & Jx) 
from (6) and (7) by Material Equivalence and A4. 
The biconditional, which is indicated by the symbol "<->", 
is sometimes known as identity. What (8) says in effect is 
that having measles is the same thing as having a runny 
nose, a high temperature, inflamed eyes and a skin rash. 
However, (8) has an "M' modal opera tor which means that this 
identity is contingent not logical as it is in Axiom (1); it 
is not a definition and is claimed to be true only as a 
matter of fact. 
Other inferences are: 
Theorem (9) M (Ax) (Fx & Hx & Ix & Jx) -> Nx 
from (3) and (7) by Hypothetical Syllogism and A4. 
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Theorem (10) M (Ax) (Fx & Hx & Ix & Jx) -> Kx 
from (4) and (7) by Hypothetical Syllogism and A4. 
8.3.2 Incomplete information 
Figure 22 is a useful model because it enables us to make 
inferences on the basis of incomplete information. The 
presence of virus alpha is a necessary condition of measles 
but it is not a sufficient condition. This means that it is 
possible for a patient to have virus alpha present but never 
develop measles. Therefore, testing for virus alpha can not 
tell that a patient has or will get measles, but it can tell 
us that the patient has not got it. 
The same is true of independently testing for alpha 
antibodies. The absence of alpha antibodies will not tell us 
that the patient has measles but the presence of alpha 
antibodies will tell us that the patient does not have it. 
It is only when we have the results of both tests that we 
can say that the patient has measles. Thus, in Table 1 we 
can be sure that Adam has measles but we cannot be sure that 
Betty has. 
With measles the runny nose, high temperature and inflamed 
eyes are the first symptoms followed a couple of days later 
by the rash. Now from Table 1 we know that Dianna has 
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measles without the results of a blood test because she has 
all the symptoms. We know this because of Prem (3) above. 
With Harry we cannot tell if he has measles because he may 
develop a rash later. In spite of the fact that Colin has 
the same symptoms as Harry we know that he has not got 
measles because he does not have virus alpha; this follows 
from Axiom (1). 
8.3.3 Causal Consequences 
The model's ability to deal with incomplete information is 
of comparatively minor importance when compared to the fact 
that it shows how measles can be cured. 
As the state of affairs that makes n true is a necessary 
condition of g it follows that if we can bring about a state 
of affairs that makes n false, then g will also become 
false. That is, if we can bring it about that there is no 
alpha virus in the patient's blood stream then we will bring 
about the patient's not having measles. However, it must be 
understood that this is more of linguistic move than a way 
to alleviate a real world malady. The absence of virus alpha 
just means that whatever is wrong with the patient we are 
not going to call it "measles". 
The real world significance lies in the contingent identitY 
between g (measles) and f&h&i&j (the con3unction of 
the four symptoms). If this identity holds then the absence 
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of virus alpha will mean that the patient cannot have all 
four symptoms, ergo the elimination of the virus will 
eliminate at least one of the symptoms. 
8.3.4 Falsification 
We are entitled to say that the model is scientific in the 
Popperian sense (Popper, 1992) because it could be falsified 
by conceivable real world events. Suppose we find a patient, 
Isabel, who has the four symptoms, f&h&i&j, but does 
not have virus alpha in her blood stream. This can be 
expressed as: 
Prem (11) M (Ex) Fx & Hx & Ix & Jx & -Nx 
This is incompatible with Theorem (9), so by rule A7, 
Theorem (9) is false; but the fact that (9) is shown to be 
false allows us to assert its negation, this becomes theorem 
(14). 
Prem (11) is also incompatible with either Prem (7) or 
Theorem (3) from which Theorem (9) is derived. So by rules 
A6 and A7, Prem (7) is false; and this means that its 
negation is true this becomes theorem (12). 
Theorem (8), which implies Prem (7), must also be false; so 
its negation becomes theorem (13). 
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Although Theorem (10) has not been shown to be false it can 
no longer be derived from the axioms and premises and thus 
it no longer a theorem. With the false premises and invalid 
theorems removed the system is now as follows: 
Axiom (1) L (AX) Gx <-> (NX & Kx) 
Theorem (2) L (Ax) Gx -> (Nx & Kx) 
Theorem (3) L (Ax) Gx -> Nx 
Theorem (4) L (Ax) Gx -> Kx 
Theorem (5) L (Ax) (Nx & Kx) -> Gx 
Prem (6) M (Ax) Gx -> (Fx & Hx & Ix & Jx) 
Prem (11) M (Ex) Fx & Hx & Ix & Jx & -Nx 
Theorem (12) M -(Ax) (Fx & Hx & Ix & Jx) -> Gx 
Theorem (13) M -(Ax) Gx <-> (Fx & Hx & Ix & Jx) 
Theorem (14) M -(Ax) (Fx & Hx & Ix & Jx) -> Nx 
Of the original system Axiom (1) and the Theorems derived 
from it remain unaffected as does Prem (6). This is still 
useful because it shows that measles is be a sufficient (but 
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not a necessary) condition of the symptoms. This will prompt 
us to look for other conditions that are sufficient, see 
figure 23. 
With the exception of Axiom (1) and its derived theorems 
the model would be further falsified by finding a patient, 
Johnny, who did have virus alpha, did not have alpha 
antibodies but did not have all of the symptoms, see Table 
1. However, a reduced hypothesis that measles was a 
sufficient condition of a high temperature, inflamed eyes 
and a skin rash would still be tenable. 
It is only if we found a person, Karen, that has virus 
alpha, no alpha antibodies and none of the symptoms that we 
can say that the real world mapping attempt for the 
conceptual model has been completely falsified. 
This example could be written in Prolog but there is little 
point as it would not be substantially different from the 
previous example given in section 6.3-5.2. 
8.4 The necessity of necessity 
The question that now needs to be addressed is whether 
inductions of the type made in the previous section can be 
made without the definitions. The answer is that they 
cannot. The contention that a runny nose, a high 
temperature, inflamed eyes and a skin rash are an N&S 
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condition of measles is an inductive hypothesis. This means 
that it can be tested and the nature of a test demands that 
there is more than one logically possible result. With 
induction each new datum corresponds to a test. In the 
example the hypothesis failed the test because of the new 
data. But the new data could not have been included in the 
system without the definition. If the defininq criteria in 
Table 1 were not present the hypothesis could not have been 
falsified. Instead the cases where the symptoms were not 
present would be judged to be cases where the patient did 
not have measles. An inductive hypothesis needs something to 
be tested against and this can only be provided by a 
definition. 
An inductive hypothesis cannot be tested against another 
inductive hypothesis. If the "presence of virus alpha and 
absence of alpha antibodies" criterion of measles were an 
inductive hypothesis rather than a definition, then the new 
datum in figure three would not tell us wh-ich hypothesis was 
wrong. We would know that either the virus hypothesis or the 
symptoms hypothesis was wrong but we would not know which. 
Also no amount of new data would enable us to decide which. 
The notion of measles could be abandoned and an induction 
could be made solely on the basis, of the continuous 
concomitance of the particulars i. e. presence of virus alpha 
and absence of alpha antibodies always being accompanied by 
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the symptoms. But this would just move the problem one level 
back. We would still need definitional criteria to determine 
that virus alpha was present and alpha antibodies absent. 
However, it must be said that some inductions are possible 
without definitions for the simple reason that something 
kindred to induction is possible without language. Pattern 
recognition based on particulars is enough to justify 
certain expectations. A language is not required to observe 
that a runny nose, a high temperature and inflamed eyes is 
always followed by a skin rash. Even Pavlov's dogs were 
capable of induction in this sense. But inductions of this 
type would be limited to observation made by an individual 
subject. The understanding of reports of observations made 
by other subjects would require a definitional framework. 
Inductions at this level might have significance in 
connectionist work in artificial intelligence but they play 
little part in building a system based on existing human 
knowledge. 
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9 ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS 
9.1 Confusion arising from Hume and Quine 
9.1.1 Philosophy's Holy Trinity 
The kernel of modern Anglo-American analytical philosophy 
consists of the theory of meaning, the theory of knowledge 
(epistemology) and the philosophy of logic. Any area of 
philosophical inquiry will either be a sub-species of one of 
these, as the philosophy of science is a sub-species of 
epistemology, or will fall back on the three. These three 
areas of study are so closely interwoven that it is 
virtually impossible to gain an understand of one without an 
understanding of the other two. Any theory in one of these 
areas will inevitably imply certain theories in the other, 
it is, therefore, impossible to separate them completely. 
One of the main arguments in this thesis is that SSM 
conceptual models are definitional. In chapter 3 the main 
weight of the argument drew upon the theory of meaning, 
chapter 4 drew mainly upon the philosophy of logic, the 
present section will largely be concerned with arguments 
drawn from the theory of knowledge. The main epistemological 
considerations have been left to this late section for two 
reasons: one has been ease of exposition; the other is that 
the epistemological arguments are, in this context, the 
least powerful. The arguments put forward in this section 
w ere formulated before the Wittgensteinian interpretation of 
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SSM was developed. They return to issues concerning 
causation and to a certain extent arguments that have been 
in previous sections are repeated. However, these arguments 
are set in a slightly different context and may add to the 
clarity of the thesis. 
9.1.2 Information theory and SSM 
Two different approaches to information system design can be 
distinguished on the basis of information theory. One 
approach takes information to be physical the other takes it 
to be logical. Information as physical is closely associated 
with the information theory of Shannon (1948, Shannon & 
Weaver, 1949) though the theory itself is just concerned 
with the amount of information and is not committed to any 
ontological position. Here information is taken to be a 
signal of some sort and the amount of information in any 
given signal can be measured by Shannon's well known 
mathematical formula. Sayre (1976) who uses Shannon's theory 
as the basis for his philosophy of mind says 
information content may be an attribute of possible as well 
as actual events". But here we can take him to mean 
"physically possible" not "logically possible" that is 
possibility ý4ith an "M" modal operator not possibility with 
an "L" modal operator. 
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Carnap and Bar-Hillel (Bar-Hillel, 1953, Carnap, 1950) took 
a fundamentally different view, a view in which information 
is defined in terms of propositions or statements. The 
amount of information associated with any given proposition 
is, according to them, a function of the number of 
propositions that imply it and the number of propositions 
that it implies. A proposition will have minimal information 
if it is implied by many other propositions and it, itself, 
implies few. A proposition will have maximum information if 
it is implied by few other propositions and it, itself, 
implies many propositions. 
If information is physical an information system design can 
be based on physical objects and events. Structured methods 
take this approach. The raw material is documents, behavior, 
messages and anything else that is associated with 
information and can be known empirically. A manual systems 
flowchart represents these raw materials in a systematic 
way. A data flow diagram is normally abstracted from a 
manual systemý; flowchart in much the same way as the 
stylized map of the London Underground is abstracted from a 
scale map of the underground rail routes. Computer 
scientists are apt to call data flow diagrams "logical" but, 
as traditionally produced, they are no more logical than the 
Underground Map. Shannon's theory suggests empirical methods 
of information system design. As all information is physical 
it can be understood by observation. 
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We can follow Kant (1890) and distinguish between an 
analytic truth and a synthetic truth. An analytic truth is 
one that is true by virtue of words and logic alone (a cat 
is a cat, for example) while a synthetic truth is true for 
other reasons. Carnap & Bar-Hillel's theory suggests an 
analytic method of information system design. From the 
foregoing chapters it should be clear that SSM belongs to 
the analytic rather than the empirical school of information 
theory. (This distinction will be explained in greater 
detail in the latter parts of this chapter). 
Figure 35 compares the analytical and empirical approaches 
to information systems. SSADM follows the right hand route 
and is empirical throughout. The method advocated in this 
thesis follows the left hand route and is analytic until the 
empirical models are constructed. Wilson's method is to move 
from the Conceptual Model to information categories, then to 
the Maltese Cross. The Maltese cross with its information 
processing procedures and inputs and output has the same 
sort of connectives as data flow diagrams. However, the 
Maltese Cross is not derived (I use the word strictly here) 
from the Conceptual Models but is the product of the 
Conceptual Model plus empirical knowledge that enters the 
method at the information category stage. The problem with 
Wilson is that in his description of his method he does not 
acknowledge that the line is crossed, nor does he explain 
how the empirical input is to be obtained. 
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9.1.3 Three philosophical problems 
There are three potential problems with regarding SSM models 
as analytic. The first is connected with information theory. 
It is the contention that if anything is analytic then it is 
tautological and if it is tautological it must be 
uniformative. We can accept that anything that is analytic 
is tautological but not that anything that is tautological 
is uninformative. The contention that tautologies are 
uninformative can follow from the Shannon/Sayre account of 
information but not from the Carnap/Bar-Hillel account. 
Previous chapters have attempted to show how tautologies can 
be informative but there are many other examples that 
indicate that they are. 
The second is the problem of induction. This derives from an 
interpretation of David Hume, which will be shown to be 
mistaken. The problem of induction states that there is no 
rational grounds for induction. This contention if true 
would not invalidate the analytic account of SSM models, it 
would, however, invalidate the inductive hypotheses that 
were used in earlier chapters to explain how SSM models can 
be informative about-real world event. 
The third is more complex. It is the contention that if a 
logical structure is to map onto causality then causal 
sequences must have the same property of necessity that the 
logical structure has. In other words there must be causal 
necessity. This is a potential problem for three reasons: 
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(i) Some people, notably Hume, have held that there is no 
such thing as causal necessity. 
(ii) The modal logic, as expounded in previous chapters, 
states that causal relations are always contingent not 
necessary. 
(iii) Causal necessity would seem to imply determinism and 
the anti-reductionist stance of SSM is committed to 
indeterminism. 
It will be argued that causal necessity and indeterminism 
are not incompatible. Modal logic can distinguish between 
logically necessary, logically contingent, causally 
necessary and causally contingent. Hume was wrong about 
causal necessity. 
9.1.4 Conceptual models and tautologies 
In a narrow sense it is correct to say that Conceptual , 
Models are tautologies. Just as it would be true to say that 
arithmetic is a tautology. But this does not mean to say 
that arithmetic does not add to knowledge or that arithmetic 
is of no use when dealing with the real world - the same is 
true of Conceptual Models. 
The formula "2 +3= 5" could be said to be tautologous, but 
it can still be used to understand the real world. If we 
take a box containing two billiard balls and then we throw 
three billiard balls into it then (presuming that there are 
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no holes in the box and that billiard balls cannot reproduce 
themselves etc. ) by taking the balls that were already in 
the box as an instant--Lation of "2" and the balls that were 
thrown in as an instantiation of "3" and applying the 
formula "2 +3= 5" we can determine that there are five 
billiard balls in the box. This can be verified by counting 
them. 
In the same way some Conceptual Models will map onto the 
real world. But there is a difference here because not all 
Conceptual Models will map on. This needs to be made clear. 
If a Conceptual Model is correctly constructed and there are 
particular instantiations of every element that requires an 
instantiation then the Conceptual Model will Map on. 
However, many Conceptual Models may be constructed where the 
required instantiations cannot be found and these, of 
course, will not map on. An example would be a model of a 
system to feed unicorns with ambrosia. This might be a 
properly constructed model, the problem is that we cannot 
find instantiations of unicorns or ambrosia. 
The example need not be fabulous. We might model a system to 
purchase a fried chicken franchise for less than a thousand 
pounds. The model might be perfectlY well constructed but it 
might turn out that there are no franchises for sale at less 
than a thousand pounds. 
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The point here is that arithmetic is one type of formal 
system that happens to map onto the world. There are many 
similar formal systems that do not (see the MU-puzzle in 
Hofstadter (1980)). My point is that it is not Conceptual 
Models per se that are analogous to a formal system but that 
each Conceptual Model is analogous to a formal system. Thus 
each Conceptual model may be isomorphic or not, just as each 
formal system may be isomorphic or not. To put 'It another 
way: the fact that something is a Conceptual Model does not 
mean that it will apply to the world just as the fact that 
something is a formal system does not mean that it applies 
to the world. In this sense it is contingent that a formal 
systems or a Conceptual Model will apply to the world. 
There is another problem with my analytic account of 
Conceptual Models and this problem is connected to the worry 
about tautologies. Given that a completed Conceptual Models 
is analytic, that is, given that the elements follow 
tautologically from one an other, we can still ask the 
question how do we get a Conceptual Model? Are the building 
blocks of the conceptual models (the conceptual model 
equivalents of the premises, axioms and definitions of a 
formal system) analytic or synthetic? To answer this 
question we need to consider some basic philosophical 
distinctions. 
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9.1.5 Hume's fork 
Hume's fork is a popular name for his fundamental 
distinction between propositions that state the relations 
between ideas and those that state matters of fact. This 
notion has been expanded to cover three ways of describing 
propositions: 
a pri orl a posteriori 
analytic synthetic 
necessary contingent 
The distinction between a priori and a posteriori is perhaps 
the most simple, it is concerned with how things are known. 
Propositions, arguments or ideas can be known to be true a 
priori if they can be known by the mind alone. To know that 
a proposition is true a posteriori requires reference to 
experience. Effectively the more modern term "empirical", can 
be substituted for a posteriori. 
Kant (1890), who originally made the distinction between 
analytic and synthetic, said that a statement was analytic 
if the predicate was contained in the subject, otherwise it 
was a synthetic truth. According to Flew's dictionary (entry 
under "analytic") this was later revised to two accounts 
which are non-equivalent: 
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"2 A statement is an analytic truth or falsehood if it can 
be proved or disproved from definitions by means of logical 
laws... " which Flew's dictionary attributes to Frege, the 
logical positivists and Wittgenstein. 
"13 A statement is an analytic truth if it is true in virtue 
of the meanings of the words it contains it 
All three accounts agree that a synthetic statement is any 
true statement that is not true analytically. 
It is not difficult to see why 2 and 3 are non-equivalent. 
The contention in this thesis is that Conceptual Models 
consist of stipulative definitions and the logical relations 
between them. By 3 they are completely analytic because 3 
can include definitions. By 2 only the logical relations are 
analytic so the stipulative definitions themselves must be 
synthetic. 
Which brings us to the distinction between necessary and 
contingent. Here there is no need for a technical account as 
these are commonly used concepts. Indeed, to offer a 
definition of these concepts would beg a question that be 
considered later when it will argued against Hume that there 
can be two types of necessity, causal necessity as well as 
logical necessity. 
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The conservative view (which Flew's dictionary attributes to 
the Logical Positivists, see entry under "Hume's fork'') is 
that these types of statement form groups of three such that 
if a statement is known to be true a priori it must be 
analytic and necessary, whereas if a statement is known to 
be true empirically it must be synthetic and contingent. If 
the truth of a statement can be determined analytically, it 
must be necessary and can only be known a priori. If a true 
statement is determined synthetically, it must be contingent 
an can only be known empirically. If a statement is 
necessarily true then it must be analytic and can only be 
determined a priori. If a statement is only contingently 
true then it must be synthetic and can only be known 
empirically. 
Now, by 2 above Conceptual Models would be synthetic. This 
is because they contain definitions and definitions are not 
analytic by 2. Because the definitions are synthetic the 
whole Conceptual Model must be synthetic. In this respect 
the property of "being synthetic" functions 11 ke contingency 
in that it is transitive. To make this clear remember that 
in a deductive inference the conclusion will be contingent 
if one or more of the premises are contingent. 
Also by 2 we can stick to the conservative view and say that 
Conceptual Models are contingent, but we can not stick to 
the conservative view and say that Conceptual Models must be 
empirical. People can think up conceptual models by 
themselves. And this is what happens, the facilitator builds 
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a number of models, these are then put before the 
stakeholders to initiate a debate about what type of model 
is appropriate. To know that the stakeholders have agreed to 
a model might require empirical evidence but this is the 
same thing as saying that the agreement is based on 
empirical evidence. So, by 2 Conceptual Models are 
synthetic, contingent but can be built on the basis of a 
priori knowledge. 
The conservative account can be maintained, however, if we 
decide that stipulative definitions should not be regarded 
as statements or propositions (until now I have used the 
terms propositions and statements interchangeably). This 
might seem like a. good idea at f irst glance but there are 
problems with it. If stipulative definitions are not 
propositions then they cannot be true or false (propositions 
are truth bearers). And this means that they cannot function 
in a logical calculus. Take our favorite syllogism: 
All men are mortal 
Socrates is a man 
Therefore: 
Socrates is mortal 
If mortal has been stipulated as a defining property of men 
then our first premise here could not be true (nor false). 
In which case, even if it was factually true that Socrates 
is a man, we would not be able to deduce the truth of the 
conclusion. What is just as bad is that if we are able to 
277 
deduce the conclusion then we would have to be able to 
determine that the first premise was not a stipulative 
definition. This runs counter to common sense which suggests 
that we can make the above inference without considering 
whether the first premise is a definition or not. 
Therefore, it is best to regard stipulative definitions as 
being true. To a certain extent this is arbitrary. But then 
a stipulative definition, like a name, is arbitrary. 
If then we take it that stipulative definitions can have 
truth values and we accept 2 as a definition of "analytic" 
we must deviate from the conservative account. Deviating 
from, the conservative account is by no means new. Kant held 
that synthetic a priori judgement are possible. More 
recently Kripke (1971) has argued that logically necessary 
truths can be known empirically. 
The conservative position can, just, be maintained if we 
take 3 as the definition of analytic. Taking Conceptual 
Models as analytic we can agree with the conservative 
position that they can be built on the basis of a priori 
knowledge and that they are logically necessary. In fact 
knowledge hardly enters into it; if we take knowledge as 
being true, justified belief, then we could say that a 
stipulation justifies itself and that it is true (logically 
true) by virtue of its being formulated. This does, however, 
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involve a rather unusual account of truth, this will be 
described in the final chapter. 
9.1.6 The problem of induction 
In order to answer the objection that logical relations 
cannot map onto causal relations, it will be necessary to 
show that there are two types of necessity i. e. logical 
necessity and causal necessity. 
Hume held that there was no such thing as causal necessity: 
that experience neither reveals nor produces any necessity 
in the objects; that is, does not provide materials for any 
rational inference from cause to effect (or vice versa) in a 
new instance (Mackie 1974 p. 10). This view is connected 
with the notorious problem of induction. However, whether 
the argument that there is no such thing as causal necessity 
is a premise or a corollary of the problem of induction is 
more difficult to determine. 
Before we can justify mapping logico-linguistic conceptual 
models onto real world causal sequences we must establish 
that causal necessity is possible. To be on the safe side 
let us assume that the problem of inductions gives some 
support to the idea that there is no causal necessity. 
Therefore, we must dispose of the problem of induction. 
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The problem of induction was put forward by Hume but it is 
not a simple matter to determine exactly what his argument 
was. Later writers emphasize different parts of what Hume 
had to say. It seems that two main arguments emerge. One is 
that induction is circular. The other is that induction is 
invalid. 
In 1965 D. Stove produced an argument to the effect that not 
only did Hume fail to refute inductive probabilism he did 
not even consider it. Stove's paper is an historical piece 
but unlike most historical philosophical writings, which are 
of limited academic interest within the discipline, this 
paper has significant consequences for science. This is 
because, as Stove points out, later writers on the problem 
of induction refer back to Hume and assume that he had 
proven that there cannot be probable inductive arguments. It 
has been difficult to refute the problem of induction 
because it is difficult to find a coherent formulation of it 
and this is because a coherent formulation does not, and 
never did, exist. 
Stove reconstructs, and expresses in modern terminology, 
Hume's writings on the subject: 
All arguments from experience presuppose that the 
future resembles the past (d). That the future 
resembles the past, however, is a contingent statement 
(e); consequently it is not deducible from any premises 
(all of) which are necessarily true (f), and if there 
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are any arguments for this statement, they are 
arguments from experience (g). But - from (d) and (g) 
- any argument from experience for this statement would 
be circular (h). Hence - from (f) and (h) - no 
predictive inductive inference is one which reason 
engages us to make (i). (Stove, 1965) 
While this might show that a deductive justification of 
inductive inferences is circular, it does not show that a 
probabilist justification of induction is circular. A 
probabilistic argument does not require the first premise 
(d). 
To justify probabilistic inferences we do not need to accept 
that the future always resembles the past. All we need to 
assert in a probabilistic inference is that the future will 
probably resemble the past in some respects. If I say "it is 
probable that the sun will rise tomorrow" then nobody can 
accuse me of making a false statement if the sun does not 
rise tomorrow. The fact that the sun does not rise does not 
. 
entail that it was not probable that it would rise. If I 
were assuming that the future resembles the past then 
would say that the sun will rise tomorrow. 
Mackie expresses essentially the same sentiment: 
Now Hume's premise that "reason" would have to rest on 
the principle of uniformity [the idea that the future 
resembles the past] holds only if it is assumed that 
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reason's performances must all be deductively ýial-d: if 
it were suggested that an observed constant conjunction 
of As with Bs probabilifies that this new A will be 
con3oined with a B, in terms of some logical or 
relational probability as proposed by Keynes and 
Carnap, that is, that some non-deductively-valid 
argument is none the less rational, that its premises 
really support though they do not entail its 
conclusion, then this possibility would not be excluded 
by Hume's argument, because such a probabilistic 
inference would not need to invoke the uniformity 
principle which produces the circularity that Hume has 
exposed. (Mackie, 1974, p. 15) 
Some readers might think that there is a circularity in 
Mackie's argument because when he speaks of logical 
probability he seems to be smuggling in the concept of 
deductive validity by the back door. But this hinges on what 
you take Carnap's to have been doing in his "Logical 
Foundations of Probability" (Carnap, 1962). One might think 
that Carnap was trying to reduce all probabilistic 
statements to statements that can be established by 
deductive logic, just as Russell, in "Principia Mathematica" 
(Russell, 1910) attempted to reduce all arithmetical 
statement to statement that can be established by deductive 
logic. If this were the case then Mackie's argument would be 
circular and would not count against Hume's. 
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However, we need not interpret Carnap's work this way and we 
can be certain that Mackie did not (Mackie's works might not 
be the world best examples of lucid English prose, but he 
was a formidable logician and would not have been guilty of 
a simple circularity such as the one suggested above). We 
could take it that Carnap was trying to express probability 
in terms of standard logical constants and truth bearing 
variables rather than trying to effect a reduction of 
probability to the axioms of deductive logic. That is, the 
axioms of Carnap's system need not be taken as coextensive 
with the axioms of deductive logic. 
This disposes of the circularity argument. The second 
argument is that induction is invalid. If "invalid" is taken 
to mean "not deductively valid" then this is certainly true. 
However, there does not seems to be any problem with 
invalidity in this sense unless it is assumed that the only 
reasonable inferences are valid inferences (deductive 
inferences). There is ample evidence that this is not so. 
Keynes took probability to be a primitive notion. In this 
case a reduction to another form of reasoning, deductive or 
otherwise, is unnecessary. Given this, we can effect a 
. reductio ad absu-rdum against the deductive criticism of 
induction. 
What we need to say is that some basic statement of 
probability theory (from Keynes, Carnap or somebody else) is 
self evident. Against this it can be argued that the claim 
of being self evident is not good enough and that proof is 
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required, and further that the only form of proof available 
is deductive and a deductive proof cannot work without being 
circular. 
Now let us challenge the deductivist by asking what 
3ustifies deduction. The first answer is that deduction is 
based on the law of contradiction, that -(p & -p), which is 
self evident. If we say that we do not agree that this is 
self evident, then the deductivist will claim that it is 
inconceivable that the law of contradiction is wrong. 
Inconceivable can have two meanings. The first is logical, 
in this sense inconceivable means self contradictory. So, if 
the deductivist means inconceivable in this sense then what 
he is saying is that it is self contradictory to deny the 
law of contradiction. This can be expressed as -(-(-(p & 
which reduces to -(p & -p). In other words when you 
say lilt is self contradictory to deny the law of 
contradiction" you are saying no more than what you are 
saying when you assert the law of contradiction. And this is 
not a good enough defense. 
The second meaning of "inconceivable" is psychological. Here 
what we mean is that we cannot, as a matter of fact, imagine 
an example of something that violates the law of 
contradiction. No doubt this is true. Also we can find good 
evidence for the claim that nobody has ever been able to 
imagine something that violates the law of contradiction. 
But what evidence do we have that nobody will ever be able 
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to imagine something that violates the law of contradiction. 
The deductivist cannot appeal to the logical sense of 
inconceivable because that says nothing. The deductivists 
only other option is to appeal to induction. 
This works. As there as never, in the past, been a case 
where a person has been able to imagine something that 
violates the law of contradiction, there is good evidence 
that there will never be such a case. So, induction supports 
the law of contradiction which forms the basis of deduction 
(technically it might be better to say that induction 
supports the real world statement that corresponds to the 
law of contradiction, this is "an object cannot have a 
property and not have the same property simultaneously"). 
However, the deductivist cannot use this inductive argument 
because he claims that induction is unreasonable. The 
deductivist must, therefore, assert deductive methods 
without proof or evidence any yet simultaneously criticize 
induction for its lack of proof or evidence. 
There are only two ways out of this dilemma. One is to 
accept both the law of contradiction and some basic 
statement of probability theory as being self evident. There 
other is to accept as self evident just the basic statement 
of probability; having accepted this the law of 
contradiction, and with the system of deduction, can be 
established inductively. 
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This leads to the odd state of affairs whereby the 
reductionist, who wants to establish his system with the 
minimum number of premises, must base his system on 
induction rather than deduction. Traditionally it has been 
the other way round. A plethora of philosophers from 
Decartes onwards have tried to base there systems purely on 
deduction. The fact that induction supports deduction but 
deduction does not support induction may provide a 
psychological explanation, but not a logical explanation, 
for them thinking that deduction was a stronger foundation. 
The other important consequence is that the absence of a 
problem of induction firmly pulls the rug from under 
Popper's philosophy of science. And this in turn undermines 
the other new wave philosophers of science (such as Lakatos, 
Kuhn and Feyerabend) who were largely concerned with seeking 
a better solution than Popper's. This is not to say that 
everything in the new wave theories is wrong. The 
falsifiability criterion, used by Popper, can be justified 
(indeed it is one of the main principles used in this 
thesis), but it not justified because of a problem with 
induction. 
This ties in with the discussion immediately above. The 
falsifiability criterion is the idea that any scientific 
hypothesis must be capable of being shown to be false. Of 
course, if a scientific hypothesis is correct it cannot be 
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shown to be false. However, even if it is correct it must be 
logically possible (possible without self contradiction) for 
it to be shown to be false. 
For example, if "pigs cannot fly" is a scientific hypothesis 
then there should be no self contradiction in saying "this 
is a pig and it can fly". So, given that there is no self 
contradiction here, it will always be possible (logically) 
to find a flying pig and show that the hypothesis if false. 
However, "pigs cannot fly" would be an analytic statement 
rather than a scientific statement if we included the 
inability to fly as a defining characteristic of pigs. In 
this case the statement "this is a pig and it can fly" would 
be self contradictory. Popper, rightly, claims that such 
things as psychoanalysis are pseudo-sciences because they 
are not scientific in this sense. 
But there is a problem here. As logico-linguistic models are 
analytic, they are not falsifiable. So, how can they play a 
role that is not pseudo-scientific. The answer is that 
logico-linguistic models are analogous to formal system and 
like formal systems are not, in themselves, falsifiable or 
scientific. However, corresponding to them are statements to 
the effect "this formal system or this logico-linguistic 
model maps onto the real world". These statements are 
scientific and are falsifiable. 
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For, example, if there are instantiations for all the 
required elements in the gor tonking example of chapter 5, 
then the model will map onto the world. If we notice that 
the model has been continuously mapping onto the world for 
some time then we would be justified, by inductive 
reasoning, in stating that it will continue to map on 
(within a certain range of possibilities). 
9.1.7 Hume and causal necessity 
We now need to establish that causal necessity is possible. 
Hume was successful in demonstrating that causal connections 
cannot be logically necessary. This is easily demonstrated 
by the fact that even if it is true that A caused B we can 
still assert without contradiction that A did not cause B. 
This is not Hume's only contribution to the theory of 
causation, he also demonstrated that the idea of causal "' 
power is false. In the eighteenth century it was widely 
believed that an efficient cause produced its effect by 
virtue of its power to do so (Taylor, 1963). Thus if one 
could observe this power in an object one would be given a 
warrant to make a priori inferences about what effects that 
object would bring about. The idea of causal power is apt to 
seem as strange to the twentieth century reader as the idea 
of a person's soul being located in his liver; but the 
reason it seems strange is because Hume disposed of the 
notion two hundred years ago. 
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Here, as with the problem of induction, Hume has often been 
credited with more-than his due. Because he showed that 
causal necessity cannot be logical necessity and because 
there cannot be causal necessity arising from power, it is 
assumed that there cannot be any form of causal necessity. 
But as Mackie has pointed out Hume has not shown that there 
cannot be a necessity that distinguishes causal as apposed 
to non-causal sequences (Mackie, p. 12). 
We can postulate a metaphysical necessity. We can say that 
the universe is such that events of type A always bring 
about events of type B and always will bring these about. We 
can say that blue litmus paper being immersed in acid 
necessitates its turning red. We can acquire evidence for 
these types of statement by means of inductive probability. 
The fact that there have been tens of thousands of cases 
where blue litmus paper immersed in acid turned red, and no 
cases where it did not, makes it highly probable that blue 
litmus paper being immersed in acid necessitates its turning 
red. 
It should be noted here that using probability to justify 
causal necessity is quite different from a probabilistic 
theory of causation such as that developed by Suppes (1970). 
This is the idea that causal relations are essentially 
probabilistic. Thus, in saying that A causes B what we 
really mean is that A is very likely to cause B. Mackie 
shows that this idea is the result of a confusion: 
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Saying that A is likely to cause B does not put 
ikelihood into the causing itself: it could mean ... 
that A is likely to necessitate B. (Mackie, 1980, P. 
50) 
Modal logic is quite capable of making the distinctions that 
are required by the findings of this section. We need to 
make a distinction between logically necessary, logically 
contingent, causally necessary and causally contingent. 
Standard modal logics can handle this provided it is 
understood that what is causally necessary can be logically 
contingent. That is it may be causally necessary that the 
sun will rise tomorrow but we can deny that the sun will 
rise tomorrow without self contradiction. 
9.1.8 Causal necessity and indeterminism 
A fourth problem, that Hume was not responsible for, but 
which follows from the arguments immediately above, concerns 
determinism. 
The foregoing has made a case for causal necessity although 
the arguments put forward in previous chapters could 
probably survive without this notion. As the 
anti-reductionist stance of SSM is contrary to determinism 
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it is much less likely they these arguments could sur,,, i,,, e if 
determinism could be shown to be an outcome of their 
premises. 
Therefore, causal necessity and indeterminism need to be 
reconciled. However, the apparent contradiction between 
causal necessity and indeterminism is only superficial. 
Indeterminism is merely the negation of determinism. 
Determinism can be stated as the idea that there are one set 
of necessary and sufficient condition for every event. A 
belief in causal necessity does not require us to believe 
that eve-ry event is paired with a certain individual set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions but only that some 
events are. 
Mackie gives the example of an atom emitting random 
particles - the state of the atom is a necessary but 
insufficient condition of a particular particle being 
emitted at a particular time. Here the state of the atom 
cannot be said to necessitate the emission of the particle 
at a particular time. 
But the existence of this sort of randomness does not entail 
that all events are random and indeterminate. We could take 
it that the randomness coming up from the quantum level 
average: Eý"-out in most cases, therefore, we can have a set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions for most events. And we 
could also say that the randomness does not average out in 
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all cases, an example would be the throw of dice whý---re there 
are no conditions are sufficient to produce a given result 
such as two sixes. 
9.1.9 Note on Quine 
Kant and Kripke were cited above as philosophers who have 
argued that Hume's Fork can be bridged. Quine (1961) seminal 
paper "Two dogmas of empiricism" is more radical and argues 
that the, analytic/synthetic distinction is spurious. 
At the begining of his- essay Quine shows that he understands 
the importance of definitions in the analytic/synthetic 
distinction. However, he recognizes only four types of 
definition. Lexicographical definition in which the 
lexicographer studies existing languages in order to find 
synonyms. Philosophical definition in which a recondite term 
is expressed by paraphrasing it into the terms of a more 
familiar vocabulary. Both of these are dependent upon aý .1 
synonymy that existed prior to the exposition. A third type 
of definition is Carnap's explication. Here the definiens 
supplements the meaning of the definiendum. But Quine 
considers that this rests on other previously existing 
synonyms. The forth type is the introduction of novel 
notation for purposes of sheer abbreviation. 
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It is strange that nowhere in his essay does Quine mention 
stipulative definition. This is the type of definition that 
we have been mostly concerned with above. Stipulative 
definition does not require previously existing synonymy of 
any kind. To determine that premeditated manslaughter is 
murder a legislative body does not need to consult existing 
synonyms. It is hardly likely that Quine thought that a 
stipulative definition is a abbreviation. Consequences 
follow from stipulative definitions that do not follow from, 
say, making up an acronym. It is difficult to think of a 
case where someone was hanged because of an acronym. 
Earlier in the essay Quine pointed out that meaning is not 
to be identified with naming. Is it possible that Quine 
would regard a case of stipulative definition as a case of 
naming? 
Naming is the process of assigning a reference (extension, 
denotation, bedeutung) to a term, or assigning a term to a 
reference. Quine would seem to go along with this (1961, p. 
21). A proper name has reference without having any sense 
(intention, connotation, sinn, and sometimes, confusingly, 
meaning). If we name the family cat "Tiddles" then nothing 
can be inferred from this except things to do with the name 
directly, such as "the family cat is called Tiddles" or "the 
name of the family cat begins with 1"'. 
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We would actually want to say that naming is analytic. But 
in the case of proper names it is uninterestingly so, 
because no knowledge other than the name itself follows from 
naming. The case with general terms is more difficult 
because they tend to have sense and reference. The word 
"cat" has sense: from the fact that Tiddles is a cat certain 
things can be deduced such as the fact that Tiddles is a 
quadruped. This is part of the sense of the word "cat". 
Now suppose I make a stipulative definition: "QChess is a 
game that is played by the same rules as chess except that 
the Queen can only move to a vacant square but can, in any 
move, move to any vacant square on the board". This clearly 
has sense because any chess player can readily begin to 
imagine what a game of QChess would be like. But QChess has 
no reference because a game of QChess has never been played. 
To this it might be objected that QChess refers to a game 
that is in my head. And that what I have done is just to 
give a name to my idea of a funny game of chess. 
There are all sorts of problems with this explanation, but 
let them pass. Whatever goes on when I made up QChess, be it 
a stipulative definition or a name of an idea, inferences 
can be made from it. We can infer, for example, that the 
Queen in a game of QChess can never take a piece. And this 
sort of inference can constitute knowledge. After all, the 
proposition the Queen in a game of QChess can never take a 
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piece is a true, justified, belief. Further, we can say that 
this sort of knowledge is quite different from the type of 
knowledge that does not follow from stipulative definitions 
The finial objection that a disciple of Quine might want to 
make is that the a pri ori /empirical distinction covers the 
distinction that we want to make. But it doesn't because a 
prio. ri knowledge is tied to a particular knowing subject. I 
say valid moves in chess are analytic because they follow 
from stipulative definitions. But I, personally, had to 
learn to make valid moves in chess by experience - by 
reading about chess and watching people play. 
We need to distinguish between things that people make up 
and what follows from them and things that are not made up 
and what follows from them. This is essential to the 
analytic/synthetic distinction. Quine has not shown that it 
is invalid. 
9.1.10 Truth and stipulative definition 
One of the reasons Quine may have ignored stipulative 
definition is because traditionally it has been thought that 
they do not have a truth value. This is the view of CoPi 
(1971) and Robinson (1954). That Copi gives little reason to 
justify this is understandable because he was writing a 
textbook which aimed at covering the whole range of 
traditional logic in a small space. Robinson, however, wrote 
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an entire book on definition but his contention that 
stipulative definitions have no truth value is little more 
than a bland assertion. He states: 
A lexical definition is an assertion that certain 
people use a certain word in a certain way, and is 
therefore either true or false. A stipulative 
definition, however, is not an assertion at all. 
Therefore, since assertions are the only sentences that 
have truth value, it has no truth value. (Robinson, 
1954, pp. 62,63) 
Robinson is not necessarily right here. A stipulative 
definition could be seem as containing an implicit 
assertion. For example, if in a piece of writing I stipulate 
that the word "cat" will refer to an animal with, a tail, 
then I am, implicitly, making an assertion about how the 
word "cat" will be used in that piece of writing. 
Robinson seems to miss the main-problem about giving 
stipulative definitions truth values and that is that 
nothing implies their truth or falsity and nothing could 
count as evidence for their truth or falsity. However, in 
this respect they would not be unique. Self-referential 
statements such as "This sentence is in English" have the 
same status, they are implied by nothing but themselves and 
nothing but themselves counts as evidence for them. 
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Robinson's idea is that a stipulative definition "... is more 
like a request to the reader that he will understand the 
word in a certain way, or a command. .. ". This is not good 
enough because there is never an inconsistency if a request 
is not taken up nor is there ever any inconsistency if a 
command is not obeyed, but there is an inconsistency if a 
stipulative definition is not adhered to. If I have 
stipulated that "cat" refers to an animal with a tail and 
then, in the same piece of writing, go on to say that Manx 
cats are an interesting species, then, clearly, I will have 
been inconsistent. 
Robinson recognizes this and says "That stipulative 
definitions lack truth value does not prevent words 
stipulatively defined from being used to make true or false 
1ý 
statements. If you stipulate that "nacks" is to mean roses 
and "braze" is to mean smell sweet, it is false that nacks 
never braze. " 
What needs to be asked here is how can we possibly say that 
it is false that nacks never braze unless we assign truth to 
the two stipulative definitions. We can work this one out. 
Let F be the predicate "is a rose" 
Let G be the predicate "is a nack" 
Let H be the predicate "it smells sweet" 
Let I be the predicate "it braze" 
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Now to say that it is false that roses never smell sweet is 
to assert: 
-(AX) -(Fx & Hx) 
or the equivalent: 
1 (Ex) Fx & Hx 
Now given: 
2 (Ax) Fx <-> Gx 
(AX) Hx <-> Ix 
we can derive: 
4 (Ex) Gx & Ix 
but we can only do this if we are given 2 and 3. 
To put it in English, the falsity of "nacks never braze" can 
only be derived from the fact that some roses smell sweet if 
the statements "roses are identical with nacks" and "braze 
is identical with a sweet smell" are true. But Robinson has 
said that stipulative definitions have no truth value, 
therefore on his account, these identity statements cannot 
be true. I 
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This brings out the dilemma with stipulative definition. 
While stipulative definitions do not follow from the truth 
or falsity of any other statements, we would like to say 
that the truth and falsity of other statements do follow 
from stipulative definitions. To get a clear grasp of what 
is going on here let us consider a set of stipulative 
definitions. 
0 
THE RULES OF QCHESS 
Rule 1: The Queen in a game of QChess can only move to an 
unoccupied square. 
Rule 2: The Queen can move to any unoccupied square. 
Rule 3: Except for moves made under rules 1 and 2 normal 
chess rules apply 
0 
From the above we can make the following inference: 
Inference 1: The Queen can never take a piece. 
This inference follows from rule 1 and rule 3. However, if 
stipulative definitions are neither true nor false then we 
cannot determine the truth value of Inference 1 on the basis 
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of the rules. We cannot say that Inference 1 is true or 
false. The most we can say that is true would be ''Inference 
1 follows from rules 1 and 3" 
However, suppose we said: 
Inference 1A: The Queen can never take a piece in QChess. 
This is more likely to gain immediate acceptance than 
Inference 1 because there is the worry with Inference 1 that 
it could be taken to refer to normal chess. This brings out 
the point that stipulative definitions are only true in a 
Universe of Discourse. To put it simply Inference 1 is only 
true of QChess. 
Stipulative definitions tend to work badly where the 
Universe of Discourse is not specified or understood. Also 
it is appropriate to note here that in logic the Universe of 
ýýiscourse is identified with the domain of quantification. 
We can see how this ties together with Robinson's 
stipulation that roses are identical with nacks. This is 
true in the Universe of discourse that comprises Robinson's 
book. The formula (Ax) Fx <-> GX could be translated as "for 
every x that is in Robinson's book Fx <-> Gxfl. 
Previous chapters give reason for believing that stipulative 
definitions or the equivalent are a necessary part of any 
information system. From which it would seem to follow that 
every information system has a limited Universe of 
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Discourse. This leads to the bizarre idea that every 
predicative function in an information system is true only 
of objects in that information system. But this is not as 
far removed from reality as it might seem at first sight. 
Bureaucracies have a tendency to define their own entities 
and become largely self verifying. This was well illustrated 
in Franz Kafka's The Castle (1930). This cannot be avoided 
by the simple device of using lexical definitions instead of 
stipulative ones because natural languages themselves are 
based on stipulative definitions or similar ("naming" for 
example). 
But to return to the main point. Although bringing in the 
notion of a Universe of Discourse helps, it does not 
entirely solve the problem of assigning truth values to 
stipulative definitions. All that we have established so far 
is that Inference 1A will b4 true if it is true that "Rule I 
and rule 3 are rules of QChess", however, thi: ý is a 
1. 
statement that can be true or false. What leads us to 
believe that Rule 1 and rule 3 are rules of QChess is the 
fact that they are written down on the bit of paper above. 
What this amounts to is that the promulgation of a 
stipulative definition entails that the definition is true 
in a Universe of discourse. we could, therefore, argue that 
stipulative definitions are not just logically similar to 
self-referential statements, but that they are in fact one 
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species o. f self-referential statement. A more plausible idea 
is that they are Tarski style meta-linguistic statements. 
9.1.11 Note on fuzzy logic 
Returning to the mistake made by Suppes (in section 9.2.5), 
we can note here that the same confusion arises in fuzzy 
logic or fuzzy sets: 
In Boolean algebra, I represents truth and 0 falsity. 
So it is in fuzzy logic; but in addition, all the 
fractions between zero and one are employed to indicate 
partial truth. Thus 
p(tall(X)) = 0.75 
states that the proposition that "X is tall" is in some 
sense three quarters true. It is, by the same token, 
one quarter false. " (Forsyth, 1984) 
Here there is no need whatsoever to deviate from the 
traditional two valued logic and generally accepted English 
usage. There is no need to introduce the counter intuitive 
notion of "three quarters true". We can just as easily say 
that it is three quarters probable that it is true. 
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But not only does fuzzy logic fail to improve on 
existing concepts it is also likely to be dangerous as it 
stands to confuse various types of probability. 
If by "X is tall" we mean that X is taller than other people 
then we can find ourselves in a situation where three 
quarters of the people are shorter than X and one quarter 
of the people are taller than X. Given this, if we take any 
person at random there will be a three quarters chance that 
X will be taller than they are. This is an absolute truth. 
We can know this abso-ute fact by conducting a survey of the 
entire population, but in most cases this will not be 
possible. Therefore, we will have to make a statistical 
sampling of the population, but a statistical sampling does 
not allow us to say anything with certainty. On the basis of 
a 5% sample of the population we might be able to say that 
it is 90% probable that there is a 75% chance of any given 
member of the population being shorter than X. There are two 
different types of probability here and both are likely to 
change independently of each other. Firstly, we might 
conduct another survey of the population which will give us 
more evidence. But secondly, the population might change 
over time, with better nutrition more people would become 
taller than X. 
No doubt fuzzy logicians will find a way of separating these 
two types of probability, but there is no point because 
traditional logic already separates them. Also we are likely 
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to find that in order to make this separation fuzzy log-, clan 
will have to smuggle two valued logic in through the back 
door. 
9.2 Other types of knowledge representation 
9.2.1 A plethora of methods 
A fairly comprehensive account of the various methods of 
knowledge representation can be found in Ringland & Duce 
(1988). This includes accounts of dozens of different 
methods. Almost all of these have some features in common 
with logico-linguistic modelling and logico-linguistic 
modelling has some features which differ from them all. A 
full comparison of all of them in terms of commonality and 
divergence would take up far too much space and would in the 
case of most of the other methods be a tedious and largely 
pointless exercise. 
Instead a brief comparison will be made with Sowa's 
conceptual graphs and with Minsky's frames. Both of these 
are interesting and both have some interesting similarities 
to logico-linguistic models. With both a full exploration of 
the points of divergence would very rapidly take us into 
discussions of philosophical issues that are beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
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9.2.2 Sowa's conceptual graphs 
Sowa's conceptual graphs have a bubble diagram style, are 
concerned with concepts and can be expressed in the 
predicate calculus; they are, therefore, superficially very 
similar to Logico-linguistic models. Like many other 
semantic net style graphs the logical and epistemological 
status of Sowa's graphs is not perfectly clear. He recently 
described them as "a graphic system of logic ... equivalent 
to predicate logic" (Sowa, 1992), yet earlier he described 
them as "a method of representing mental models" (Sowa, p. 
4). 
As a graphic system of logic Sowa's graphs differ from 
logico-linguistic models firstly, in that they do not 
include modality which is one of the principle features of 
logico-linguistic models. The second difference is that 
Sowa's graphs contain the plethora of detail needed to 
capture the vagaries of English syntax. For example, the 
verb "to run" is represented -by ten 
bubbles and ten arrows 
in a conceptual graph (Nogier & Zock, 1992). Such detail is 
not essential for the construction of a knowledge based 
system nor is it practical as a stake-holder driven 
modelling device. 
It is clear that conceptual graphs are a tool for an analyst 
intending to represent discourse in a natural language. 
Logico-linguistic models, by contrast, are not intended to 
represent a natural language but are intended to be an 
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artificial language. Logico-linguistic models are not, 
therefore, dependent on lexicographical science nor are they 
prone to the paradoxes of self reference which are a feature 
of natural languages. It is pertinent to point out here that 
it may, as both Frege and Tarski believed, be impossible to 
formulate a theory of truth for natural languages (Grayling, 
1990, p. 248). 
If Sowa's conceptual graphs are intended to be mental models 
then it seems they are very different from Logico-linguistic 
models. Logico-linguistic models are based on the 
Wittgensteinian theory of language which contends that 
mental models, if they are anything other publicly 
observable neurological states or elements of a public 
language, simply do not exist. Sowa's discussion of 
"percepts" (1984, p. 24) sounds very similar the sense datum 
theories that were discredited by Wittgenstein's private 
language argument. Logico-linguistic models are not intended 
to be representations of mental models nor are they 
representations of anything, they are just records of an 
agreement to uses words in a certain way. 
It seems that the theory of meaning which forms the basis of 
Sowa's graphs is fundamentally different from the one that 
is assumed in here. This could explain the fact that Sowa's 
graphs lack the modal operators that form vital components 
of empirical models described in previous chapters. 
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9.2.3 Frames 
Structured object representation in terms of schemata and 
frames exhibits some similarities to logico-linguistic 
modelling. The "objects" have many similarities to the 
object variables of the predicate calculus. The theory 
behind frames is based on some weighty philosophical 
arguments. Non-monotonic logic is used with frames. 
Frames originate with Minsky's (1975) attempt to represent 
common-sense thought. In this paper he encountered the 
problem of natural kinds. This problem goes, briefly, as 
follows: elephants have four legs, but an elephant can loose 
a leg without ceasing to be an elephant; also it would seem 
that an elephant could loose his other legs and his trunk 
and ears etc. and still be an elephant; so it would seem 
that anything we might use to define or describe an elephant 
might be lost without the animal ceasing to be an elephant; 
so, what is an elephant? Minsky's answer was default 
reasoning which is, briefly, the idea that an elephant has 
four legs, a trunk, ears etc. by default but a particular 
elephant may lack one or more of these attributes. This type 
of default reasoning was later formalized by McDermot & 
Doyle (1980) in a system of non-monotonic logic. 
It could be argued that natural kinds is not a real problem 
and that it is a futile search of an absolute meaning for 
terms such as "elephant". Given Wittgenstein's language game 
theory we might argue that there is no absolute meaning. To 
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follow through this line of thought would be a major 
digression into philosophy. In practice natural kinds does 
not seem to be a problem in SSM conceptual modelling. The 
problems that occur when trying to define lielephant" in an 
absolute sense do not seem to occur when defining "working 
elephant" in the context of a human activity system. 
McDermot's non-monotonic logic is, therefore, designed to 
do a different job from the Popperian falsification for real 
world mapping tas k that is required of the non-monotonic 
logic used in this thesis. 
9.2.4 Modal logic in knowledge elicitation 
Modal logic is a powerful tool that has many uses. It is 
liable to turn up in a wide variety of artificial 
intelligence applications. It could easily be added on to 
one of the many schemes of knowledge representation. 
However, it does not appear to have been used, explicitly, 
in the process of knowledge elicitation. "'The most important 
distinguishing factor of knowledge representation models 
advocated in this thesis is the fact that they are an 





10 CONCLUSIONS AND RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
10.1 Results 
The results of the research that is described in this thesis 
are many and varied. It has shown how SSM models can be 
expressed in formal logic and has provided an explanation of 
the meaning these models in terms of one of the twentieth 
century's most important theories in the philosophy of 
language. This in itself is no mean achievement. 
Philosophical writings on SSM have, with few exceptions, 
been confined to the theory of knowledge and SSM has lacked 
the logic and theory of meaning that is required for a 
comprehensive philosophical foundation. It has also 
introduced a degree of rigor, which has hitherto been rare, 
into the subject of SSM and philosophy. Hopefully it has 
supplied some of the scholarship that Checkland (1992) 
recently called for. 
It has developed these ideas into a method for information 
system design. This method is supported by detailed argument 
that show why each stage in the method is necessary. It is a 
method based on extensive theory and can be contrasted with 
Wilson's method which is based on case examples. This does 
not detract from the value of Wilson's work, indeed, much of 
the work in the thesis was prompted by Wilson's work. The 
point is that the method and reasoning behind the method is 
quite different from Wilson. Both are of value in their own 
way. 
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The theoretical findings have opened up the possibility of a 
range of new application for SSM models. These have been 
detailed in previous chapters and include formulas for 
monitor and control, cause and effect analysis, a logical 
model of efficiency, logical mechanisms for real world 
mapping, knowledge elicitation, knowledge representation, 
knowledge based system design, scientific models, 
information requirements identification and relational 
database design. 
In addition to the findings presented in this thesis, 
logico-linguistic model have prompted work by other authors. 
Merali (1993) has described how, firstly, logically enhanced 
models can be used to enrich the iterative debate and 
secondly, how the consensus that is reached at the end of 
the debate can be expressed in a logical model. 
The finding of the thesis go beyond SSM and can have 
application independently of it. It has been shown that 
modal logic can be used in knowledge elicitation and how the 
results of this can be expressed in a non-monotonic form of 
Prolog. The thesis, therefore, makes a considerable 
contribution to cognitive science and artificial 
intelligence. 
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Finally it can be noted that the thesis gives something of a 
new perspective on the theory of truth, on the principles 
underlying modal logic and upon what would be require to 
formulate an inductive program. This ideas are detailed in 
section 10.3. 
10.2 Action Research 
Much of the writing on the philosophical aspects of SSM for 
information system design is of dubious value for two 
reason. Firstly, it is not grounded in the literature of an 
established discipline and is of questionable internal 
coherence. Secondly, because it is not clear how it could 
make a difference to the structure of an information system, 
it is not clear how it could be established that the use of 
these philosophical ideas has produced a system that is 
different from a system that would have been designed using 
ordinary methods. 
This thesis is not open to these objections because the 
philosophical ideas work their way through to computer code. 
There can be no doubt that if the proposed methods were used 
to design an information system the resulting system would 
be significantly different from one designed by other 
methods. 
312 
The thesis contends that certain processes must be implicit 
in the creation of successful information systems. This 
argument is logical which means that, if the argument has 
been properly formulated, it cannot be denied without self 
contradiction. The thesis recommends that these implicit 
processes be made explicit in a certain sort of way and that 
contends that if this is done better sorts of information 
system can be created. This argument needs to be established 
empirically. 
Empirical research will need to establish: a) that the 
method is in anyway practical, that is, that it can ever be 
used in practice; b) in which circumstances the method can 
be used; c) the most"practical way of presenting the method. 
With regard to c) the public relations project raised a 
number of issues. The logico-linguistic models and the 
empirical models are discrete logical events and constitute 
different stages in chapter 6. In practice it was not clear 
whether it was best to make these separate chronological 
stages in a real world project. This matter will be best 
resolved by conducting more real world project. A second 
issue raised by the project was the amount of model building 
input required from stake-holders and analysts. Clearly the 
early models should be stake-holder driven and the later 
conversion into Prolog analyst driven, but the intermediary 
stages are a gray area that needs to be resolved in 
practical projects. 
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The work can be seen in terms of the R&D model of 
industrial innovation. The main body of the thesis has 
provided the research. Development is a separate stage which 
began with the public relations project. It can be expected 
that many more projects will be needed before the method 
becomes a fully developed product. The classic SSM action 
research model, in which theory guides practice which in 
turn contributes to theory, is ideal for this type of 
work. 
10.3 New directions for theory 
10.3.1 Truth and programming 
Philosophical logic has had two main concerns. On is to give 
a coherent explanation of how the concept of truth is used 
in natural languages. The other is to give a coherent theory 
of truth for artificial languages. The artificial language 
with which they have been almost exclusively concerned have 
been mathematics and logic. Formal systems of mathematics 
and logic are special cases in that they comprise very few 
rules from which an enormous number of theorems can be 
generated. A standard business computer system by contrast 
comprises enormous numbers of rules which can generate very 
few theorems. 
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Standard business computer systems often fall and the 
failure rate is of growing concern. When viewed from the 
perspective of philosophical logic it is surprising that 
they ever succeed. But the fact is that in most cases-they 
do succeed; and this make the theory of truth that must be 
implicit in information system design interesting. 
One of the most striking differences between information 
system designers and philosophers is the attitude towards 
stipulation. In the formulation of a formal logical or 
mathematical systems stipulation which is in terms of 
axioms, definitions and rules of production is kept to a 
minimum of self evident propositions. In the analysis of 
natural languages most philosophers of logic would recognize 
stipulation as in the case of naming. However, their 
attention is drawn not to what makes it true that an act of 
naming takes place, as when Adrian says I shall call this 
dog "Rover", but to how it is true that an act of naming has 
taken place, as when Betty says Adrian calls his dog 
"Rover" 
Systems analysts, database designers and programmers make 
stipulations all the time. They stipulate, with hardly a 
thought, that every valid order has an order number and an 
order date. Admittedly if they are using SSADM these will 
not always be stipulations but representations of the 
existing bureaucracy. But this just pushes the problem one 
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stage back - the bureaucrats made the stipulations. Also in 
green field information system design the computer people 
are forced to make the stipulations themselves. 
The thesis has attempted to identify the logical mechanisms 
that can enable such a large amount of stipulation to work 
effectively in a real world situation. In order to do this 
the thesis has drawn heavily on theories of truth and 
meaning from philosophical logic. However, as the task has 
been quite different from that normally faced by a 
philosopher of logic an unusual account of truth has begun 
to emerge. 
In brief, the implicit theory of truth in information system 
design and in programming is not coextensive with the theory 
of truth developed by philosopher to explain natural 
language or mathematics. A promising area for future 
research would, therefore, be to see if the ideas about 
truth and modality that have been used in this thesis can be 
developed into a theory of truth and modality that could 
cope equally well with the philosophers' concern about 
natural language and mathematical systems and with the 
implicit notions of truth contained in information system 
design and programming. 
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10.3.2 Theories of truth 
Most theories concerning truth and meaning try to explain 
meaning in terms of truth. As was indicated in chapter 3 
Wittgenstein held that "truth" was just another term in a 
language game. In other words he explained truth in terms of 
meaning. This idea has not been worked out in any great 
detail in philosophical logic. 
This thesis has taken the language game theory as 
fundamental and has attempted to base a method of 
information system design upon it. Repeatedly the thesis has 
been drawn into arguments about the nature of truth. 
Although each of these arguments are not particularly 
unusual when they are drawn together and the rather 
surprising result is that a new theory of truth begins to 
emerge. 
The fact that SSM models have such an unusual logical status 
plus the fact that we have been able to use rigorous 
arguments to develop a computerized system that can learn 
indicates that some light might have been thrown on the 
theory of truth. The formulation of a new theory of truth is 
not an undertaking that should be undertaken lightly but it 
does present an exciting idea for further research. The 
remainder of the this section will bring together arguments 
that have been touched upon in earlier chapters and draw up 
a tentative outline of what could be a new theory of truth. 
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Modal logic gives us two types of truth: factual truth and 
logical truth. One can be expressed in terms of the other: 
M p -L 
L 
From this it might seem that if we can establish a truth 
theory for one type of modal statement that we will have 
established a truth theory for the other. 
The correspondence theory (which was discussed in chapter 3) 
works well for "M' statements so it might seem that the 
whole of modal logic can be explained in terms of the 
correspondence theory. However, there is a problem here. 
Although negative "L" statements can be derived from 
positive "M' statements (e. g. Mp -> -L -p) , positive "L" 
statements cannot be derived from a positive "M' statement 
or any set of positive "M' statements. This means that no 
matter how many positive facts we are able to establish on 
the basis of observations of the real world we will never be 
able to derive a positive "L" statement from them. 
Nor can we derive a positive "L" statement from any set of 
negative statements about the real world. Suppose that "p" 
stands for "pigs can fly" the real world observation might 
lead us to assert "M -p" or possibly "-M p". But we require 
"-M -P" in order to derive "L", and it does not seem 
possible to support "-M -p" solely on the basis of 
observation. We cannot take "-M -p" to be a purely empirical 
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statement, instead "M -P" must be derived from "L". Thus we 
cannot, at least straight-forwardly, explain "L" statements 
in terms of the correspondence theory of truth. 
A solution can be worked out as follows. We can accept the 
correspondence theory as a theory of reference. To say of an 
I'M' statement that it is true is to say that it corresponds 
to a fact. We can now add an element from Tarski's semantic 
theory of truth and make the divide between object language 
and meta-language. An object language "R" will consist 
entirely of I'M' statements. Saying that an I'M' is true will 
be a statement in a meta-language 'IS". All "L" statements 
will also be part of the meta-language 'IS". "L" statements 
will be statements of the rules of "R". To say that an "L" 
statement is true will be to make a meta-meta-linguistic 
statement to the effect that "L" is a rule of "R". An "L" 
statement can only be true of "R" if it is not a 
contradictory of any other "L" statement, thus something of 
a coherence theory of truth can be used for "L" statements. 
"L" statements will describe the sense of the terms used in 
"R". 
This combines elements of the correspondence, semantic and 
coherence theories of truth along with an explanation of the 
meaning of modal operators. It does not require Kripke's 
possible world semantics to explain modality but possible 
world semantics might follow from it. We now need to explain 
how "L" statements are established. This can be done using 
Wittgenstein's language game theory. 
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"L" statements are established by stipulation or agreement 
as in the case of SSM. They are something like edicts - 
statements of the law rather than statements about the law. 
A new "L" statement changes the language game, in fact it 
creates a new language and is, therefore, automatically true 
of that language. 
If there is an existing language, say "RT", then we might 
wish to discover its rules and make statements about them. 
But all statements about "RT" will be contingent and will 
need to be discovered empirically. Suppose we think that "a 
-> Y is a rule of RT then we might express this as 
"M La 
-> bil. This means that we are making an inductive hypothesis 
to the effect that "a -> Y is logically true in RT. This in 
turn means that the people who speak RT have agreed to this 
rule. We can find out that "a -> Y is a rule of RT by 
observing the linguistic behavior of RT speakers. 
10.3.3 Foundations for modal logic 
The theory of truth given in the proceeding section suggests 
a system of modal logic which is somewhat different 
from 
existing systems. As was explained in section 8.1, 
in S5 the 
following is a theorem: 
L (A) ->M (A) 
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If we read "L" as "by definition" and "Y' -as "contingently" 
then we have: 
If is true by definition that all panthers are black 
then it is contingently true that all panthers are black. 
This is obviously false. In fact the opposite is true as was 
demonstrated in 4.5.1. Given the theory of truth advocated 
here it would seem that "L (A) -> -M (A)" should be an axiom 
or theorem of the modal system. Further research is needed 
to determine if a modal system can be formulated that 
employs this as an axiom. 
10.3.4 Limitations of Prolog 
10.3.4.1 Theoretical limitations 
One of the aims 
logico-linguist 
behind them can 
program. Prolog 
someone without 
format makes it 
of the thesis has been to show how 
ic modelling and the theoretical arguments 
work their way through into a computer 
was chosen mainly because it is easy for 
a background in computing. The near English 
easy to see how statements and predicate 
logic can be expressed in a program. 
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However, previous chapters have shown that Prolog is limited 
in its ability to express formulas of the predicate 
calculus. There does not seem to be a way of making a Prolog 
program as powerful as a model in predicate logic. 
The main limitation on Prolog is that although it is said to 
be a theorem prover (Forsyth, 1984, p. 13) it is not a 
theorem generator. It works on the chaining principle and 
this has more in common with a database and query language 
than with the predicate calculus. Essentially Prolog, like a 
database query language, works on the principle of search, 
find and list. The predicate calculus is quite different. 
A system in the predicate calculus is made up of axioms and 
rules of production. One of the most simple rules of 
production is a rule of substitution concerning negation. 
This is that -(-p) can be substituted for p. So, given the 
axiom p we can apply this rule and derive the theorem -(-p) 
and this is written down as part of the system. Now we carr- 
apply the rule to -(-p) and derive the theorem -(-(-(-(P). 
This exercise in futility can repeated indefinitely and 
shows that this simple rule of production can generate an 
infinite number of theorems. 
Given the axioms: 
All Athenians are Greeks 
All Greeks are mortal 
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the rule of production known as "Hypothetical Syilogism" 
will produce: 
All Athenians are mortal 
In the notation of the predicate calculus: 
Fx: x is Athenian 
Gx: x is Greek 
Hx: x is a mortal 
(Ax) Fx -> Gx 
(AX) Gx -> Hx 
therefore, 
(AX) Fx -> Hx 
We can proceed in this manner, generating as many theorems 
as we like, without worrying about whether there is an x or 
not. However, should we decide that there is an x, say 
socrates, then, by the production rule of Universal 
Introduction, we can substitute "socrates" throughout the 
system: 
F(socrates) -> G(socrates) 
G(socrates) -> H(socrates) 
F(socrates) -> H(socrates) 
In order to carry out this substitution you do not need to 
think about the nature of the logical connectives. Provided 
the axioms are not self contradictory any substitution will 
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always produce a consistent system; this is because everv 
formula in the system is either an axiom or a theorem of the 
system. 
Prolog does not proceed in this way. Instead Prolog makes 
one substitution, say F(socrates), and then looks for 
others. It sees the rule F(socrates) -> Gx, and then makes 
another substitution i. e. G(socrates). In other words Prolog 
takes the implication sign in universal statements (those 
beginning with (Ax)) as being rules of production. Prolog is 
forced to behave this way because it allows contradictory 
statements to be written in the same program. That is there 
is no mechanism to prevent contradictory statements being 
entered into the system. These will compile and it is only 
when the program is run that the inconsistency may be 
detected. 
Further research is needed to determine whether the type of 
Prolog program given at 6.3.5.2 or a similar Prolog program 
with the automatic deletion. can have practical applications. 
Given that Prolog is one of the major artificial 
intelligence languages it is quite possible that it does. 
Further research is also needed to determine whether a more 
suitable program can be found to represent the modal logic 
in stage five of the six stage method. Lisp is a likely 
possibility. 
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10.3.4.2 Towards a true logic program 
Prolog stands for "programming in logic" and it is now clear 
that this is something of a misnomer. It can be confusing 
because Prolog looks like logic and it can perform some of 
the functions of logic even though it does not function like 
logic. The shortcomings of Prolog for the expression of 
predicate logic gives us a good idea of how a proper logic 
program should perform. 
Firstly, the program should perform in accordance with the 
rules of production for predicate logic, these would be 
built into the program. A particular program would start 
with a set of consistent universal statements which we can 
call "axioms". The rules of production would be allowed to 
operate on the axioms to produce theorems, these would all 
be universals. The variables could then be instantiated by 
rules of introduction. The resulting theorems would be 
particular statements. To find out if a particular statement 
is true the program would simply look it up. In this system 
chaining would be unnecessary. 
New universals could be introduced provided they were 
consistent with the axioms. The new universals could be 
combined with the axioms and existing theorems to produced 
new theorems using the rules of production. A consistency 
checker should be easy to formulate as any statement that is 
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not the negation of an axiom or a theorem will be 
consistent. This would be a proof theoretic system as 
apposed to a model theoretic system such as Prolog. 
Another shortcoming of the Prolog programs that have been 
given in previous chapter is that although they can show 
that inductive hypotheses are false they cannot generate 
them. It seems that an algorithm capable of generating 
inductive hypotheses could be formulated in second order 
predicate logic. For example: 
(EX) (EY) (AZ) (AX) (AY) Xx & Yx & Xy & Xy & -(x = y) & -(XZ 
& -Yz)) -> (Yz ->Xz) 
This means that if there are two objects x and y and the 
predicates X and Y apply to both objects, and there is no 
third object to which the predicate X applies but Y does 
not, then any object to which Y applies will be an object to 
which X applies. 
Suppose that X is the property of being white and Y is the 
property of being a swan. in this case the formula means: if 
there are two swans that are both white and there is no swan 
that is not white then all swan are white. 
A system incorporating this principle would employ classic 
induction. Unlike decision tree induction there would be no 
need to select and set the program up with a data set. 
Unlike neural networks it would not be confined to 
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probabilities about a particular thing. It cou-,, -d 
funcl, -ion as 
a day to day expert system or even an order processing 
system and at the same time its knowledge would grow as more 
facts were fed into the system. Whether it is practical is -a 
different matter as proof theoretic systems have tended to 
fall victim to the combinatorial explosion. 
Such avenues of research are in any case closed to Prolog as 
it is confined to the first order predicate calculus (object 
variables only). It, cannot handle the predicate variables 
that constitute the second order predicate calculus. 
There is obviously a need for further research in this area. 
It needs to be determined whether Prolog is the best 
platform for the expression of logico-linguistic and 
empirical models. It is possible that another artificial 
intelligence language, such as LISP, might be better. 
Alternatively the development of a new platform written in a 
lower level language might be the best solution. 
10.3.4.3 Carnap for structuring Prolog 
An alternative platform is one solution to the limitations 
of Prolog but it might be found that other platform have 
similar if not worse limitations. Chapters 6 and 7 have 
shown that a workable Prolog program can be produced. 
Another direction for future research would be the further 
enhancement of the models prior to writing the Prolog. 
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Section 7.6.1 indicated that if it can be determined what 
information in terms of particular facts is likely to be 
available and which conclusions need to be reached, then 
this could provide guidelines for the choosing between the 
various ways in which the model can be expressed in Prolog. 
Carnap and Bar-Hillel's theory of information might provide 
some theoretical foundation for this. A Prolog rule in which 
the antecedent is the consequent of few other Prolog rules 
and in which the consequent is the antecedent of many other 
Prolog rules will have a greater information content than a 
Prolog rule where the antecedent is the consequent of many 
other Prolog rules and in which the consequent is the 
antecedent of few other Prolog rules. For example: 
Program A 
dog (X) if canine (X). 
clever (X) if dog (X). 
can_be_trained (X) if clever (X). 
make_good_guard (X) if clever (X). 
Program B 
dog (X) if likes-bones (X). 
dog (x) if barks (X). 
clever (X) lf dog 
can_be_trained (X) if clever (X). 
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On something close to (but not precisely the same as) 
Carnap's theory we could say that the statement that dogs 
are clever has a greater information content in Program A 
than it does in Program B. Suppose we have one 
instantiation, say "Rover" . In Program A it is only the fact 
that Rover is canine that would allow us to deduce that 
Rover is clever, while in Program B this can be deduced from 
the fact that Rover likes bones or from the fact that Rover 
barks. Given that Rover is clever Program A can deduce that 
Rover can be trained and that Rover will make a good guard 
but Program B will deduce only that Rover can be trained. 
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li APPENDIXES 
11.1 APPENDIX I- Logical notion 
-P means not p (negation). It is true when p is false. 
p&q means p and q (conjunction). p&q is true only if 
p and q are true. 
pvq means p or q or both (alternation). pvq is true if 
p is true or if q is true or if p and q are true. 
pq means if p then q (the conditional). p -> q is only 
false when p is true and q is false, otherwise it is true. 
Sometimes known as implication. 
p <-> q means p if and only if q (the biconditional, 
sometimes known as logical equivalence or identity). p <-> q 
is true if p and q are both true or if p and q are both 
false, otherwise it is false. 
(Ax) Fx "A" is used as the universal quantifier in the 
thesis. Where typesetting allows it is usually printed as an 
"A" upside down. It means "for all x". The formula here 
means that "F" is true of every x. 
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(Ex) Fx "E" is used as the universal quantifier in the 
thesis. Where typesetting allows it is usually printed as an 
"E" backwards. It means "there exist an x". The formula here 
means that "F" is true of at least one x. 
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11.2 APPENDIX 2- Formal modal meta-rules 
Section 6.3.4 contained the following modal meta-rules: 
Meta-rule one: if A :-B then L(A) ;- L(B) 
Meta-rule two: if A ý- B then M(A) ý- M(B) 
Meta-rule three: if A, B :-C then L(A), L(B) :- L(C) 
Meta-rule four: if A, B :-C then M(A), L(B) ý- M(C) 
The first three meta-rules are intuitively obvious and will 
follow from the axiomatization of any system of modal logic. 
Meta-rule four seems to be obvious but its proof turns out 
to be quite complicated. The author had difficulty proving 
formula (15) in section 6.3.4. Following a discussion with 
the author, David Miller of the Philosophy Department, 
University of Warwick, came up with the idea of using 
meta-rules furnished the following proof of the following 
meta-rule: 
if A, B :-C then L(A), M(B) ý- M(C) 
which is equivalent to Meta-rule four. Here is Miller's 
proof : 
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Although I need nothing like its strength, I'll use ti-, e 
axiomatization of S5 given in Chellas (1980, p. 14). In 
Chellas the box is used instead of "L" as the operator 
indicating necessity and the lozenge is used instead of ''M' 
as the operator indicating contingency. The symbols "L" and 
I'M' will continue to be used here. "ý-" is used for 
deducibility. (for deducibility in modal logic see Chellas, 
p. 47 ) 
What I want to show is the validity of the meta-rule 
if A, B :-C then L(A), M(B) ý- M(C) 
Since A, B :-C, we have by classical sentential 
[propositional] calculus that A (-C -> -B) is a 
tautology. Hence it is a theorem of almost any modal system. 
By the rule RN of necessitation, then, 
L(A -> (-C -> -B)) 
is a theorem. So by the rule K, 
L(A -> (-C -> -B)) -> L(A) -> L(-C -> -B)) 
is a theorem. By MP (modus ponens), 
L(A) -> L(-C -> -B) 
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is a theorem. By K again 
L(-C -> -B) -> (L(-C) -> L(-B)) 
is a theorem, and by some routine (but boring) applications 
of PL and MP we may conclude that 
L(A) -> (L(-C) -> L(-B)) 
is a theorem. But by definition M and some more sentential 
logic we see that L(-C) is equivalent to -M(C), and L(-B) to 
-M(B)> Because logical equivalents are inter-substitutable, 
we conclude that 
L(A) -> (-M(C) -> -M(B) ) 
is a theorem, and so, at last, 
L(A) -> (M(B) -> M(C)) 
is a theorem. By the definition of deducibilitY, 
L(A), M(B) ý- M(C) 
Of course, quite a few steps have been left out here. As we 
know, axiomatic systems of modal logic are unwieldy to 
operate. 
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11.3 APPENDIX 3- Diagrammatic Techniques 
11.3.1 Compiling the dictionary 
11.3.1.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this dictionary is to lay out the 
logico-linguistic modelling diagramming techniques along 
with the equivalent statements in propositional logic, 
predicate logic and Prolog. 
The logico-linguistic diagraming convention here differs 
from those used in some previously published papers (see 
Declaration for list of papers). The diagramming technique 
evolved slowly and progressed as research indicated the need 
to include more and more logical relations. In the first 
paper, "Causation & Soft Systems Models". a broken arrow had 
been added to the traditional SSM diagramming vocabulary. By 
the time "Mapping Conceptual Models on to the Real World" 
was written the models included broken arrows, double headed 
arrows, containing bubbles and model flags. All, of these had 
been added on an ad hoc basis. 
The general flow of the arrows used in the Checkland models 
has been preserved because this matched Prolog fairly well. 
For example the Checkland statement "Obtain raw material" 
with an arrow to "Make product" would correspond to the 
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Prolog statement "rawmaterialobtained (X) :- product made 
(X). " Both statements are saying that if the product lias 
been made then the raw materials must have been obtained. 
It is most confusing that the direction of the arrow of 
implication is the opposite way round in both propositional 
and predicate logic. In logic the statement would be 
"product made -> raw material obtained". For many readers it 
will be easier to go from the bubble diagrams directly to 
Prolog and the diagramming technique has been constructed 
accordingly. The logic is still important because it 
provides the justification for the translations. In natural 
English the arrow of implication can go both ways: "Raw 
materials will have been obtained if the product has been 
made"; "If the product has been made then raw materials will 
have been obtained"; "The product can be made only if the 
raw materials are obtained". 
The compilation of the dictionary was not in itself intended 
to be a work of any academic importance. However-, there were 
some findings that may be of some interest. 
11.3.1.2 The superfluous broken line 
If we equate q being a necessary condition of p with -(P & 
- 
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or p -> q; and if we equate r as a sufficient condition of s 
then r -> s and so we can say that if q is necessary for p 
then p is sufficient for q. This holds in all cases even 
where the necessary or sufficient conditions are compounds 
of & or v. Thus the broken arrow is not logically required - 
the same statement can be made by reversing the arrows. 
However, there are reason for including the broken arrow. 
Psychologically if we are looking for the cause of p it 
seems strange to require that it be pointed out that p is a 
necessary condition of r. However, if p is a necessary 
condition of r then r is a sufficient condition of p and 
therefore relevant to a causal account of p. Psychologically 
it is much better to describe r as a sufficient condition. 
Sufficiency and necessity are not exactly the same as 
implication. To say that q is part of the cause of p is to 
say that q did not happen later than p. There is an implicit 
temporal reference in the relations of necessity and 
sufficiency. This can only be eliminated if temporal 
references are brought out. Thus p is necessary for q should 
be rendered as: 
q -> p and q is an event not later than 
The arrows will only function as pure logical connectives if 
the temporal references are included in the bubbles. This 
has been done in the figure 7. Here every case of a broken 
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arrow can be replaced by a solid arrow in the opposire 
direction and by the same token every solid arrow can be 
replaced by a broken arrow in the opposite direction. 
Time references in English make it very difficult to think 
without the dotted arrow, as the author found when he tried 
to build models that left it out. Losing the dotted arrow 
does not make model construction easier. The same is true in 
logical notation of the four logical connectives "&", livil, 
"->", "<->" two are superfluous and can be expressed in 
terms of'the other two. They are retained only because 
psychologically they make it easier to render English into 
logic. 
However, if might be found easier to express the models in 
Prolog if the broken arrows are replaced with solid arrows 
prior to writing the programs. 
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11-3.2 Dictionary - diagrams, logic & Prolog 
Single solid arrow 
Logic-linguistic diagram, type 1 
Examples: 
Ruddles is sold if people are happy. 
If people are happy then Ruddles is sold. 




Px: x is a situation in which people are happy 
Rx: x is a situation in which Ruddles is sold 
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(AX) Px -> RX 
Prolog: 
ruddles-sold (X) :- 
people_happy (X). 
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11.3.2.2 Single broken arrow 
Logic-linguistic diagram, type 2 
c3 
Examples: 
People are happy if Ruddles is sold. 
If Ruddles is sold then people are happy. 




Px: x is a situation in which people are happy 
Rx: x is a situation in which Ruddles is sold 
(Ax) Rx -> Px 
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Comment: The broken arrow is a useful device in knowledge 
elicitation but it is logically redundant, it is the logical 
equivalent of a solid arrow pointing in the opposite 
direction. Prior to converting the model into Prolog it is a 
good idea to replace all broken arrows with solid arrows. 
When this is done we see that the solid arrow goes the 
opposite way to that in the previous example. The 
combination of the two examples results in a double headed 
arrow and is the same thing as the next example. 
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11.3.2.3 Double headed arrow 
Logic-linguistic diagram, type 3 
Example: Ruddles is sold if people are happy and people are 




(Ax) Rx <-> Px 
This the same as the conjunction of: 
(Ax) Rx -> Px 
and 
(Ax) Px -> Rx 
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Prolog: 




Explanation: We cannot express this as "ruddles-sold (X) : - 
peoplehappy (X). peoplehappy (X) :- ruddles-sold (X). 11 
because this would introduce the loop. So we express one 
half of the biconditional using the "not" predicates. In 
causal terms type I arrows show r as a necessary condition 
of p, type 2 arrows show r as a sufficient condition of p, 
and type three arrows are a conjunction of the two i. e. a 
necessary and sufficient condition. 
This will enable us to make all the deductions that follow 
from the double headed arrow. If we know whether people are 
happy or not we will be able to work out if ruddles is sold 
and if we know whether people are happy or not. Suppose we 
know that people are happy at the Bull, that Ruddles is sold 
at the Bear, people are not happy at the Stag and Ruddles is 








not_people__happy (not thebull). 
peoplehappy (notthestag). 
notpeoplehappy (thestag). 
Given this Prolog returns the following: 










In other words people are happy at the Bear and at the Bull. 
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11.3.2.4 AND, solid arrow leading in 





)(: )( D 
A/ 
The solid arrow on the right-hand diagram can replace the 
redundant broken arrow in the left-hand diagram. 
Example: People are happy if Ruddles, Theakstons and 
Boddingtons are sold. 
If Ruddles, Theakstons and Boddingtons are sold then people 
are happy. 
Propositional Calculus: 
(. r t& b) -> 
Predicate Calculus: 
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(AX) ((Rx & Tx & Bx ) -> Px) 
This is a horn clause. 
Prolog: 
Alternative A 









not_theakstons-sold (X) :- 
not_people_happy (X), 
boddingtons-sold (X), 
ruddles-sold (X). t, e ,. 





Explanation: These two alternatives cannot both be part of a 
program without circularity. 
Alternative A maximizes the power of inferences in the 
direction of "p". Information about beer sales will allow 
inferences about people being happy. This program will infer 
that people are happy in those cases where all three beers 
are sold. It cannot make any inferences about which beers 
are sold. 
Alternative B maximizes the power of inferences in the 
direction of "r, t, b". Instances where all three beers are 
sold must be instances where people are happy. Therefore, if 
there is a case where people are not happy and the two types 
of beer are sold then it is not possible for the other type 
of beer to be sold. This, however, will be able to make any 
inference about people being happy. 
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11.3.2.5 AND, solid arrow leading out 
I 
Logic-linguistic diagram, type 5 
(D (i) (: ýD 
AND 
/D 
Again the broken line is redundant and can be replaced with 
the solid line going in the opposite direction. 
Examples: Ruddles, Theakstons and Boddingtons are sold if 
people are happy. 
If people are happy then Ruddles, Theakstons and Boddingtons 
are sold. 
It will not be true that people are happy unless it is true 
that Ruddles, Theakstons and Boddingtons are sold. 
CD (i) (D 





Tx: x is a situation in which Theakstons is sold 
Bx: x is a situation in which Boddingtons is sold 
(AX) Px -> (Rx & Tx & Bx) 
Prolog: 
Alternative A 





ruddles-sold (X) :- 
people_happy (X). 
theakstons-sold (X) :- 
people_happy 
boddingtons_sold (X) :- 
people_happy (X). 
Explanation: These two alternatives cannot both be part of a 
program without circularity. 
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Alternative A maximizes inferences about whether pe-cple are 
unhappy. The sales of all three types of beer are a 
necessary condition of people being happy, therefore, any 
instance of one of the beers not being sold will be an 
instance of people being unhappy. 
Alternative A maximizes inferences about which beers are 
sold. Being happy is a sufficient condition of all three 
beers being sold, therefore, if people are happy each of the 
beers must be sold. 
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11.3.2.6 AND, double headed arrow 
Logic-linguistic diagram, type 6 
Examples: Ruddles, Theakstons and Boddingtons are sold if 
people are happy and people are happy if Ruddles, Theakstons 
and Boddingtons are sold. 
Propositional Calculus: 
p <-> (r &t& b) 
Predicate Calculus: 
Tx: x is a situation in which Theakstons is sold 
Bx: x is a situation in which Boddingtons is sold 

























ruddles-sold (X) :- 
people_happy (X). 
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theakstons--sold (X) :- 
people_happy (X). 
boddingtons__sold (X) :- 
people_happy (X). 
Explanation: The double headed arrow is the biconditional 
and is the combination of types 4 and 5. It can be 
constructed by combining the alternative A from 4 and 5 or 
by combining the alternatives B from 4 and five. The former 
maximizes inferences in the direction of people being happy 
or not, the latter inferences in the direction of what beers 
are sold. 
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11.3.2.7 ANDOR, arrow leading in 
Logic-linguistic diagýýam, type 7 
CD CD (D 
A 
Example: People are happy if one or more of Ruddles, 
Theakstons or Boddingtons is sold. 
If any of Ruddles, Theakstons or Boddingtons is sold then 















not ruddlessold (X) :- 
not-people_happy (X). 
nottheakstonssold (X) :- 
not__people_happy (X). 
not-boddingtons_sold (X) :- 
not_people_happy (X). 
Explanation: Alternative a. follows from the fact that 
either one of the beers being sold is sufficient for people 
to be happy. Alternative b. from the fact that at least one 
of the beers being sold is dependent upon people being happy 
therefore if people are not happy then none of the beers can 
have been sold. 
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11.3.2.8 ANDOR, arrow leading out 
Logic-linguistic diagram, type 8 
(D (i) (D 
A N'D 0 rý 
CD CD (D 
A tv 0 ark 
p 
Examples: One or more of Ruddles, Theakstons or Boddingtons 
is sold if people are happy. 
If people are happy then one or more of Ruddles, Theakstons 























boddingtons-sold (X) :- 
people-happy (X), 
not_theakstons-, sold (X), 
not-ruddles-sold (X). 
Explanation: Alternative A, people being happy is sufficient 
for at least one of the beers to be sold. Therefore, if none 
of the beers are sold them people cannot be happy. 
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Alternative B, at least one of the beers must be sold if 
people are happy. So, given that people are happy and two 
of the beers are not sold the other beer must be sold. 
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11.3.2.9 ANDOR, double headed arrow 
Logic-linguistic diagram, type 9 
CD (: D 
(v L) 0 rý 
12 
Example: One or more of Ruddles, Theakstons or Boddingtons 
is sold if people are happy and people are happy if one or 
more of Ruddles, Theakstons or Boddingtons is sold. 
Propositional Calculus: 
(r vtv b) 
Predicate Calculus: 













not-ruddles-sold (X) :- 
not-people_happy (X). 
not-theakstons-sold (X) : - 
not-people_happy (X). 
not-boddingtons_sold (X) :- 
not iDeople-happy (X). 








boddingtons-sold (X) :- 
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people-happy (X), 
not. theakstons sold (X), 
not ruddles--sold 
Explanation: Alternative A is the conjunction of the type 
the type 7 and type 8 alternative A. Alternative B is the 
conjunction of the type the type 7 and type 8 alternative 
B. 
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11.3.2.10 OR, arrow leading in 
Logic-linguistic diagram, type 10 





Example: People are happy if only one of Ruddles, Theakstons 
or Boddingtons is sold. 
Propositional Calculus: 
( (r & -( tv b) )v(t& -(r v b) )v (b & -(. r v 
Predicate Calculus: 
(AX) ((Rx & -Tx & -Bx) v (Tx & -Rx & -Ex) v (Bx & -Rx 
-Tx) ) -> Px 















not-ruddles-sold (X) :- 
not_people_happy 
not_theakstons_sold (X) :- 
not_people_happy (X). 
not--boddingtons_sold (X) :- 
not_people-happy (x). 
Explanation: OR represents exclusive alternation which means 
that one of the beers being sold but not more than one of 
the beers being sold is a sufficient condition of people 
being happy. Alternative A follows from the fact that if any 
one beer is sold and the other two are not then people will 
be happy. Alternative B follows from the fact that people 
are happy is a necessary condition of any beer being sold, 
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therefore, if people are not happy none of the beers are 
sold. 
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11.3-2.11 OR, arrow leading out 




Example: One and only one of Ruddles, Theakstons or 
Boddingtons is sold if people are happy. 
If people are happy then one and only one of Ruddles, 
Theakstons. or Boddingtons is sold. 
Propositional Calculus: 
p (r &tv b) )v(t& -(r v b) )v (b & -(r v t) 
Predicate Calculus: 
(Ax) Px -> ((Rx & -(Tx v Bx)) v 
(Tx & -(Rx v Bx)) v (Bx & 




not__people__happy (X) :- 












not-boddingtons-sold (X) :- 
people_happy (X), 
theakstons-sold (X); 
ruddles-so, 1, d (X). 
Explanation: Alternative A follows from the fact that at 
least one of the beers being sold is a necessary condition 
of people being happy. Therefore, if none of the beers are 
sold people cannot be happy. Alternative B is more complex. 
The Prolog program give above as type 8 Alternative B (the 
one that begins "ruddles-sold (X) :- people_happy (X), 
not__theakstons_sold (X), not_boddingtons_sold (X). ") also 
follows from the propositional and predicate formulas given 
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here. The formula given here, however, is more powerful 
because less information is required to make a deduction. In 
order to deduce that Ruddles is sold we need to know that 
Theakstons is not sold and that Boddingtons is not sold. The 
program given here allows the deduction that Ruddles is not 
sold from the fact that Theakstons is not sold or from the 
fact that Boddingtons is not sold, therefore we do not need 
to know as much. 
There are, therefore, at least three ways this can be 
expressed in Prolog. 
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11.3.2-12 OR, double headed arrow 
Logic-linguistic diagram, type 12 
Example: Only one of ruddles, theakstons or boddingtons is 
sold if people are happy and people are happy if only one of 
Ruddles, Theakstons or Boddingtons is sold. 
Propositional Calculus: 
p <-> ((r & -(t v b)) v (t & -(r v b)) v 
(b & -(r v t))) 
Predicate Calculus: 
(AX) Px <-> ((Rx & -(Tx v Bx)) v (Tx & -(Rx v Bx)) v (Bx 



















not-ruddles-sold (X) :- 
not_people_happy (X). 
not_theakstons_sold (X) :- 
not_people_happy (X). 
not-boddingtons-sold (X) : - 
not_people_happy (X). 
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F-, gure 7 
a 
A drill is 
available 
at T-2 
v An agent is 
employed who will 
make lengths with 
holes if square 
lengths are obtained 




with holes are 
made at T1 
An agent is 
employed who will 
make round lengths 




are obtained at 
T- 2 
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0ý p --% 
Round lengths 
with holes 
are made at 
T-0 - 
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u An agent is 
employed who will 
make round lengths 
if square lengths 
are obtained and 
a lathe is 
available 
q 
At T-1 a drill 
is available if 
s is true or 
a lathe is 
available if w 
is true 
ý, -, gure ý-' 
I Appreciate colour Whenle 
of the property 
3 Decide colour to paint the 
fence 
2 Decide the scope of 
fence-painting task to be 
& undertaken - 
4 Obtain inaterials: 
- paint, bmshes etc. 
5 Paint the fence 
7 Mortitor I-5 
8 take control action 




4 Obtain materials - 
paint, brinhes etc. 
5 Paint the fence 
-5b Know that an agent 
can nuke 5 happen if 4 
--ý happens 
5a Employ an agent who will 
nuke 5 happen if 4 happens 
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Prem. 4. (Ax) (Sx -> Rx) 
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qq Obtain 











Conceptual Model - Level Two, "Undertake Project'' 
Monitor Take 







A system to improve or maintain the legal environment for 
product sales in the country. 




of the legal 
environment 
2 Understand 
causes of Change 
in the legal 
environment 
4 Cause -*NN 
benef icial 
changes & prevent 
detrimental 
changes 
OF 5 Maintain 'N 
or improve legal 
,, environment ) 
6 Monitor 7 Take 
1 through 5) control 
action 




El, E2, E: ý 
El: Legal environment improved or maintained 
E2: Beneficial changes minus detrimental changes, divided by 
resources used. 
E3: Increased product sales in the country 
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r L,: l U. L t: ý ". / 
A system to build a model of the legal environment in 
country. (Expansion of element 1, figure 26) 
I Build 
definitional 
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8 No 'ýýN 
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Figure 29 
A system to have a proposal for the repeal of detrimený: al legislation made and passed at Ministerial level. 
16 Official ' 
thinks proposal 
is ethical , 
17 Official 
thinks proposal 





is willing to 
make proposal 
15 Official 'N 
is in a position 
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AND 13 Proposal 
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ap approved by 
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cabinet 
7 Proposal -", 
for repeal made 




r. Lgure JU 
A system in which an official makes a proposal for personal, 
reasons. 
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ff icial p 01 
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h lp cr 
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21 Proposal 22 Official 






17 Official 'N 






A system in which an official believes that prcpcslng the 
repeal of regulations detrimental to product sales w1l'L te 
career help. 
e-' 32 Evidence 
that a powerful 
group is in favour 
\, can be found J 
1 31 There 
is a powerful 
group in favour 
of the proposal 
. -11 30 It can -', s 
be demonstrated 
that there is a 
powerful group in 
favour of the 
proposal 
01 29 Official 'N 
believes there is 
a powerful group in 
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believes that any"*ý 
group opposed to the 




A system in which an official believes that pr--, pc)sin. g t-e 
repeal of regulations detrimental to sales will gain 
acclaim. 
36 Majority 




are in favour 
of the proposal 
35 Evidence ",, N 
can be found that 
the majority are in 
favour of the 
N. proposal 
38 Majority 






/00' 33 It can -"*, N 
be demonstrated 
that the proposal 
will gain public 
%-, acclaim 
ooll 28 Official 
believes that the 
proposal will gain 
public acclaim , 
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Fig ure 33 
A system in which the majority of the pubilc is in 4 73-, - o,, ý r a proposal to repeal regulations detrimen!: a-' to prod, -: c-- sales on ethical grounds. 
, 
140 The majority 
believe that the 
proposal is justifie 
on utilitarian 
grounds 
, '- 41 The majority -'*, - 
believe that rules 
and regulations 
governing public 
behaviour should be 
s,, ýept to a 
minimum 





can be show 













A system in which the majority of the public ,s i-n favcur 
a proposal to repeal regulations detrimental to product 
sales on utilitarian grounds. 








46 The majority'ý-, 
believe that the 
product has advantages 
-for some people and little disadvantage 
for others 
42 The majority 
believe that the 
benefit to workers 
in the trade 
outweighs any harm 
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from sponsorship 
43 The majority 
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more harm than 
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Information as Logical Information as Phys: cai (Carnap) (Shannon) 
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Input of records 
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, ab le 
n 
Pat: ent A '. p "ni a Ant: tcdy Nose ""'emp s 
: 'ý7]jffu ]ATA 
Adam yes n0 NA IA .1A Betty yes NA NA iA NA . 1ý 
0 in no I, A runny '. I aled It fý 
D., anna IN A iA runny high in Isn yes Edward no NA dry t gh I -amed Irlorma. 
,; ertrude yes no runny h: gh inflama ýd rash yes Harry .1A NA r,., nny Iqh flame n. ý ýd NA IA 
FIRST NEW 
Isabel no NA runny high 
SECOND NEW 
Johnny yes no dry hlqh 
THIRD NEW 
Karen yes 110 
dry loll, 
inflamed rash 
inflamed rash 7es 
normial iorsai yes 
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